著者

マルクス・ガブリエル スラヴォイ・ジジェク著 飯泉佑介 [ほか] 訳

出版者

堀之内出版

巻号頁・発行日

2015

著者

飯泉 佑介

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.135-147, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the referent of the “we” that appears in G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit(1807)and its intended significance for “we”. This attempt is accomplished by the immanent analysis of the relationship between “we” and the consciousness, whose path to “absolute knowing” is the focus of Phenomenology. Consequently, it is revealed that “we” refers to the public who are contemporary with Hegel, and Phenomenology must be planned as an educational project(das Bildung)for the public or a kind of public selfenlightenment. In contrast to Hegel’s later work, Science of Logic(1812─13/16/32), whose subject is the “speculative thinking” abstracted from the empirical world, the subject of Phenomenology seems to be obscure. Phenomenology describes the developmental path of consciousness headed for “absolute knowing,” but according to Hegel, “we” contemplates(zusehen)its path without any interruption. Since Hegel’s explanation for the methodological role of “we” is not sufficient and he lacks an account of its referent, there has been controversy on this subject. Some interpret the “we” as a philosopher or Hegel himself who has already attained “absolute knowing.” Others interpret the “we” as the reader of Phenomenology, who only reflects upon consciousness in each stage of its development. Then, first, this paper shows that both interpretations do not correspond to Hegel’s description of “we.” Second, it presents the real figure of “we” based on the analysis of the first shape of consciousness, “sense-certainty.” Besides, by comparison with the “we” in J. G. Fichte’s early philosophy(the Science of Knowledge), the distinctive feature of the phenomenological “we” becomes clear: the referent of “we” is indefinite and open. Therefore, “we” should be considered as the public, including the scholars and citizens of various philosophical or even non-philosophical positions. From this perspective, accordingly, the significance of Hegelian philosophy is interpreted as a radical self-examination of the public and the self-transformation of its knowledge.