著者

米倉 悠平

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, pp.249-262, 2022 (Released:2022-07-11)

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Morality sometimes makes severe demands on us. On the one hand, we may be moved by these demands, but on the other hand, we may find that fulfilling them involves a great deal of self-sacrifice. In such scenarios, one wonders: “Should I really fulfill the demands of morality? Why should I fulfill the demands of morality?” This paper examines an argumentative strategy that attempts to respond to these questions in the form of a “transcendental argument.” This argument is standardly used as a response to some form of skepticism and is understood to have the following features: It has a premise which states some fact that is difficult even for the skeptic to deny, it has another premise which states that one of the conditions that must be met for this fact to be possible is the very thing that is the target of the skeptic’s doubt, and it has a conclusion that states the subject of the doubt. In recent years, it has been noticed that this argument can be uniquely persuasive when used in ethics, that is, in the realm of evaluative matters. What makes it persuasive is the prospect of the gap between what we value and what really is valuable not becoming a stumbling block to a transcendental argument, insofar as there are prospects for some anti-realist views in metaethics, including moral constructivism. However, even with this prospect, the argumentative strategy to respond to moral skepticism with a transcendental argument seems to face difficulty. Accepting such an anti-realist view seems to make it unintelligible to have these questions. The purpose of this paper is to explore ways to deal with this difficulty. I shall argue that a kind of contractualist conception of morality can play a role in addressing this difficulty.

著者

酒井 健太朗

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.97-111, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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The notion of practical syllogism occupies a crucial place in contemporary debates on human action. The practical syllogism is a form of practical reasoning expressed in syllogistic form, in which a human action is defined as a conclusion drawn from major and minor premises. This notion was not invented by modern or contemporary philosophers; it was Aristotle who first applied the concept of practical syllogism to account for the nature of our actions. What Aristotle meant by this notion, however, is unclear. The present article aims to clarify the meaning of the notion of practical syllogism in Aristotle’s works, such as De Anima, De Motu Animalium, and Nicomachean Ethics. In these works, he divided syllogism into two patterns: the means-end pattern and the rule-instance pattern. Most previous studies focused on the former pattern and did not address the significance of the latter. In this article, I first explain Aristotle’s idea of practical syllogism in general. Then, focusing on the rule-instance pattern, I will show that this pattern of practical syllogism plays an important role in Aristotle’s theory of human action, particularly in his Nicomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, children and young people can become good persons only after they undergo moral development by respecting the rule-instance pattern practical syllogism. In setting forth my argument, I also address the divergence between Aristotle’s notion of rule and the Kantian idea of duty as, in his development of this notion, Aristotle did not consider the Kantian idea of duty that is independent of particular actions. For him, the rule must be inseparable from particular human actions, amounting to that which people, who want to become good persons, should learn and establish to carry out their own actions.

著者

冨岡 薫

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.71, pp.219-232, 2022 (Released:2022-07-11)

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“Autonomy,” which is a key concept for diagnosing the ethical legitimacy of one’s actions, has been argued in various ways in philosophy and ethics. In one way, the concept of autonomy is perceived as individualistic in the sense it authorizes excluding interventions by other people. In another way, it is employed by feminists to protect women’s rights. Then, along with these two ways of understanding autonomy, care ethics, which began with In a Different Voice by Carol Gilligan in 1982, was forced to deal with the predicament whether it should criticize the concept of autonomy as relational ethics against individualism or accept it as feminist ethics. The aim of this thesis is to raise a question about the current form of care ethics which uses the concept of autonomy as a criterion for good care to address the issue of oppression suffered by caretakers. To guide the conclusion, in the first section, I confirm that at the beginning care ethics criticized the concept of autonomy as being individualistic. Feminists criticized that by excluding the concept of autonomy, care ethics could not protect caretakers’ autonomy in oppressive situations. In the second section, I suggest that together with developing the theory of relational autonomy, care ethics incorporated the concept of autonomy as a criterion for good care in response to the feminists. In the last section, though, I criticize that incorporating the concept of autonomy into care ethics continues the ideology of autonomy and then makes a certain care relation invisible. So, I propose that care ethicists must distinguish the issue of oppression from the issue of autonomy, and that they can address the issue of oppression more adequately without using the concept of autonomy.

著者

佐藤 邦政

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.247-261, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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In her pioneering work Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker elucidates how people are wronged as the knowers in various social epistemic practices of knowledge production, acquisition, transmission, and dissemination. In her account, “hermeneutical injustice” in essence refers to injustice caused by prejudice that is structurally internalized in the collective hermeneutical resource, such as conceptual tools and expressive styles, in a particular society at a particular time. Due to this structural prejudice, people of minority and socially powerless people can wrongfully be treated as knowers, so that their distinct voices and experiences remain unintelligible. This paper explores the essential constituents of the vicious agency of perpetrators involved in hermeneutical injustice. In Fricker’s view, structural prejudice in the collective resource is bad not only epistemically but also morally because it causes people of minority and socially powerless people to be hermeneutically marginalized. However, Fricker argues that there is no perpetrator in hermeneutical injustice as prejudice is incorporated implicitly in the collective hermeneutical resource. On the contrary, Medina contends that vicious agency makes sense in terms of responsibility for noticing others’ non-standard voices and distinct experiences. Whereas Medina’s argument illuminates the possibility that people perpetrate hermeneutical injustice, there are other essential constituents of the vicious agency alongside agent’s responsibility. On the basis of virtue theory, I will demonstrate that the vicious agency of agents who commit hermeneutical injustice is assessed not only by their vicious motivations but also by bad results produced by their action. First, if agents have motivations to intentionally disregard others’ sincere voices and experiences, and maintain the structural prejudice in the collective resource, they perpetrate hermeneutical injustice. Second, if agents do not neutralize the prejudice in their own hermeneutical resource, even by a direct interaction with others who appeal their voices and experiences, they are culpable of committing hermeneutical injustice.“ Neutralizing prejudice” here refers to agents’ becoming aware of a lacuna in the present hermeneutical resource as well as recognizing structural prejudices. Conversely, even if agents are unsuccessful in making others’ voices and experiences socially intelligible, they are not deemed as perpetrators if they produce the effect of neutralizing prejudice.

著者

中橋 誠

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.163-174, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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Heidegger’s term Eigentlichkeit is generally translated into authenticity. This translation often leads us to the assumption that there is something authentic. But Heidegger uses this term to express human Dasein’s modus. He says Dasein is to be grasped through how Dasein is, contrasted with other entities which are grasped through what they are. This means that Dasein is always variable and has no regular modus, including an authentic one. This being taken into consideration, the conclusion is drawn that authenticity is inappropriate to express Eigentlichkeit. The term Eigentlichkeit in the thought of Heidegger is chosen “in a strict sense”. The sense of this term lies in eigen, which is own in the primary meaning. Following this, we should translate Eigentlichkeit into own-ness or ownedness(eigen, i. e. own is the past participle in its origin). This translation matches with the way Dasein exists; Dasein exists in a modus in each case, which means that Dasein owns his or her temporary modus in each case. Eigentlichkeit is owned by Dasein in each case. Therefore, Dasein can lose Eigentlichkeit in each case, Dasein can be in its negation(Uneigentlichkeit) in each case. The above matches also with the definition of Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentlichkeit. They are both based on the fact that Dasein is in general determined by mineness-in-each-case(Jemeinigkeit). Dasein is always concerned about whether Eigentlichkeit is owned or not. Heidegger regards the business of philosophy as the preservation of the power of the most elemental words. Otherwise, the words would be flattened by the common understanding and levelled off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of illusory problems. This is true specifically of the term Eigentlichkeit.

著者

河合 一樹

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.277-291, 2018

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"Imina," the custom that prohibited people from addressing each other by their personal names, was prevalent in pre-modern East Asia, including Japan. Today, most researchers accept this opinion, which was given in a famous study by Hozumi Nobushige. However, Motoori Norinaga, one of the most prestigious scholars in Kokugaku, had a different idea. He argued that "Imina" was only a Chinese custom, and that it did not exist in ancient Japan. Previous research contradicted him, but did not discuss the reason for his insistence. Thus, there is a problem with regard to understanding the meaning of "Imina" in his thought.<br> From this point of view, this study firstly focuses on how he described "Imina" in accordance with "Kojikiden" and "Tamakatsuma." In these texts, he animadverted on it strongly as "Karagokoro", the word that he usually use for attacking Confucians. Therefore, "Imina" has a particular meaning in his thought. Second, we examine the history of the idea of "Imina" in the Edo period. We refer to several scholars, including Suzuki Teisai, Dazai Shundai, Arai Hakuseki, Murata Harumi, and Mencius, and disclose that the belief at that time was that "Imina" was based on the emotion of sorrow for the dead. In other words, sorrow for the dead prohibits the use of a person's name. Finally, we consider why Norinaga attacked "Imina." In an annotation in "Kojikiden," he stated that sorrow for the dead should give rise to the impulse to call a person by name, according to a Japanese poem by Kakinomoto Hitomaro. Moreover, he explained that we should express our feelings without protesting with one of his the most important ideas, "Magokoro." Based on these thoughts, "Imina" was a bad custom that covered "Magokoro" and had to be criticized as "Karagokoro" by him.

著者

服部 圭裕

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, pp.159-173, 2023 (Released:2023-07-24)

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This study analyzes the usages of the word “life”(生命seimei)in modern Japanese philosophical studies and elucidates the influence of these discussions on “life” in current “bioethics”(生命倫理seimei-rinri). Although Japanese “bioethics” is regarded as a framework corresponding to American “bioethics,” it is widely argued that there are considerable differences in its actual content due to the ideological and historical dissimilarity between Japanese and Western societies. The cultural-historical background of Japanese society, which forms the basis of the uniqueness of Japanese “bioethics,” has not been explored explicitly. In the early Meiji Era, when philosophical research began in Japan, the term “life” was defined as a physical or biological phenomenon from the perspective of the theory of evolution. However, in the later Meiji Era, influenced by German philosophy, the term “life” began to refer to the fundamental “reality” that enables all phenomena to arise. From this viewpoint, the function of each individual’s “subjectivity”(personality)was also considered to be founded on this “life.” The dual use of the word “life,” in the physical and philosophical sense, became common in Japanese society since then. For example, we can find this multilayered terminology in the arguments made in Omodaka Hisayuki’s magnum opus, Essence of Medicine(1945─1959). Today, he is regarded as one of the pioneers of “bioethics” because he presented “life” in terms of the “dualistic oneness” of “Activity” and “Body.” In his view, human “personality” and “body” are understood as expressions of two aspects of “life.” This idea seems to be one of the bases for the criticism against the “person theory”─which denies the rights of human beings who have lost their “personality”─that has been proposed in Japanese “bioethics” so far.

著者

五味 竜彦

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.161-175, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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The theory of life form, which is mainly proposed by Phillipa Foot and Michael Thompson, claims that each individual human being is evaluated according to natural historical knowledge of human life form. If the claim is true, we can make a moral judgment objectively, but there is a big problem about its normativity: because of the gap between human goods and rationality in general and those of individual persons, theory of life form has to explain that there are necessary reasons for everyone to obey or act in concordance with human life form. In order to tackle the problem, this paper proposes three suggestions. First, if we think of the theory of human life form sincerely, we should regard moral judgments or moral evaluation as a part of a proceeding moral activity; a pure moral judgment completely independent of other activities cannot be meaningful in human life. Second, moral judgment is made by a historical person, which is not a merely abstract concept of an agent but was born in a preceding social normative system. Third, when a historical person makes a set of moral activity, she does it in accordance with natural historical knowledge on the personal level of human life form, that means, a life form fully understands and acted on by oneself. On this level of life form, every person seems to obtain a reason for action for oneself in each situation, not just understanding it. Here, we can see a solution about the problem of normativity in the theory of life form, and the theory can get more compelling.

著者

秋葉 剛史

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.261-275, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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The early non-cognitivists in metaethics used to claim that moral sentences such as “torture is wrong” are neither true nor false, because they are merely expressions of our attitudes or emotions. By contrast, more recent non-cognitivists have come to acknowledge that there are in fact moral truths, i.e., moral sentences that are true. This change of view is often defended by appealing to the so-called minimalist or deflationary theory of truth, according to which “true” is simply an expressive device for agreement or endorsement, so that there is nothing more in saying “S is true” than in saying S itself. With this theory on truth in hand, it becomes surely possible for non-cognitivists to recognize the existence of moral truths, since they can sincerely accept some moral sentences. However, in my view this is not an appropriate way for non-cognitivists to accommodate the moral truth. A first difficulty is the problem of “creeping minimalism”, which is to the effect that once non-cognitivists invoke the minimalism about truth, they cannot stop invoking minimalism about other notions (such as belief and fact), so that they end up collapsing into realism. A second difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes it difficult for noncognitivists to admit the legitimacy of constitutive explanations about truth in other domains than ethics. A third difficulty is that the appeal to the truth minimalism makes the significance of explanatory project by quasi-realists hardly intelligible. After considering these difficulties, in the final part of the paper I propose an alternative strategy for non-cognitivists. It consists in holding the “functionalism about truth”, according to which truth is a functionally defined and multiply realizable property. By endorsing this view, I argue, non-cognitivists can successfully meet the three difficulties mentioned above, so it is recommended for them to accept it.

著者

槇野 沙央理

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, 2017

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Wittgenstein's <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>(hereafter PI)is known forits dialectic style. Wittgenstein, as a therapist, makes his interlocutor reflect onhis own wording. Several studies have been conducted regarding Wittgenstein'sinteractive style. However, little attention has been given to a conflict betweenWittgenstein and his interlocutor. They often talk past each other. Wittgensteingets irritated at his interlocutor's reaction. The interlocutor complains thatWittgenstein's advice is irrelevant. The question why Wittgenstein describes theconflict in a positive way remains unanswered.<br> The key to solving the problem is to consider the interlocutor's perspective. I will answer the question through an examination of the interlocutor's reactiontowards Wittgenstein's advice. First, I will examine in detail the therapyof PI §§191─195. In these sections, Wittgenstein not only points out that the interlocutor'sexpressions lack a concrete example and context in which we coulduse them, but also offers objects of comparison in which Wittgenstein makes hisinterlocutor reflect on his own wording. However, the interlocutor does not receiveWittgenstein's offering in a straightforward manner. Second, I will investigatethe interlocutor's reaction in PI §195. I suggest that the interlocutor seemsto realize the analogies between objects of comparison and his own expressionsbut refuses to admit such analogies are tenable. If my explanation is true, thequestion why Wittgenstein describes the conflict in a positive way can be answered.<br> Finally, I will reconsider the reason why Wittgenstein positively describesthe conflict by focusing on the readers' point of view. I assert that Wittgensteinencourages us to scrutinize our foundations of thought.

著者

三重野 清顕

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:04830830)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.59, pp.159-172, 2010

著者

大久保 歩

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.133-146, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz soll erörtert werden, wie sich Nietzsche mit der Frage der Autonomie auseinandersetzt. Nietzsche geht es stets darum, wie man der bisherigen Moral und den öffentlichen Meinungen kritisch gegenüberstehen kann, um sich selbst Gesetze zu geben und ein neues Wertemaß zu setzen. In der bisher veröffentlichten Literatur gibt es zwei umstrittene Punkte bezüglich Nietzsches Autonomie: 1. Wie soll man den Widerspruch zwischen Nietzsches Verneinung der Freiheit des Willens und sein Verlangen nach Autonomie behandeln? 2. Was ist die eigentliche Beschaffenheit seiner Autonomie? Während Nietzsche in seiner mittleren Periode die Freiheit des Willens aufgrund des Determinismus verneint, hält der späte Nietzsche es für eine wichtige Aufgabe, neue Werte zu setzen. Obwohl manche Forscher die zwei widersprüchlichen Behauptungen als Nietzsches naturalistischen Kompatibilismus auszulegen versuchen, handelt es sich meiner Meinung nach um den Unterschied zweier Verantwortlichkeiten: Bei der Kritik über die Freiheit des Willens greift Nietzsche die moralische Verantwortlichkeit an, die die Leute mit dem Gefühl der ungeheuren Schuld beladet und sie dadurch immer weiter leiden lässt. Wenn dagegen Nietzsche das Ideal der Autonomie darstellt, setzt er eine andere Verantwortlichkeit voraus, bei der man mit andern eine Versprechung macht und die Folgen verantwortet. Bei der Erörterung von der Beschaffenheit Nietzsches Autonomie ist es hilfreich, sich auf die der Autonomie selbst inhärenten Aporie zu beziehen: Wenn man sich gesetzlos, d.h. ohne Grund, ein Gesetz gibt, gerät man nur in Willkür; wenn man sich jedoch aufgrund eines Grundes ein Gesetz gibt, ist die eigene Gesetzgebung von außen schon bestimmt und darum heteronom. Bei bisherigen Auslegungen wird Nietzsches Autonomie entweder oft als eine willkürliche und individuelle Ethik oder als eine vom Willen zur Macht beherrschte Heteronomie vorgestellt. Meiner Auffassung nach versucht Nietzsche seine Autonomie gegen die Willkür der Annahme, dass sich die Menschen durch Züchtung in der Geschichte gesellschaftliche Normen verinnerlicht haben, zu verteidigen. Um Heteronomie vom Willen zur Macht zu vermeiden, spielt der „Freigeist“, der unbedingte Begründung ablehnt und nur kontingente Gründe annimmt, eine große Rolle.

著者

和泉 悠

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.72, pp.129-142, 2023 (Released:2023-07-24)

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Pejorative language, such as slurs and name-calling, has varying social implications depending on the context of use. One and the same expression can seriously denigrate an individual in one context, while signaling a sense of camaraderie in another. This article offers an account of the duality of pejorative language, according to which pejorative language use virtually “downgrades” or “ranks low” individuals who are supposed to have equal social standing. Section 2 introduces a standard analysis of gradable adjectives, which are often used in name-calling. The standard analysis allows comparisons among individuals by assigning values to them. Since people are hierarchically ordered via linguistic value assignments, resulting orders or rankings can be considered virtual products. Section 3 introduces the concept of ranks as proposed by Jeremey Waldron(2012). According to Waldron, every individual has equal social standing and is not inherently superior or inferior to others. Everyone is on the highest rank, which guarantees protection from abuse. Sometimes, however, people disregard the equal standing of others, and by blatantly abusing them, they indicate that some people are not worthy of equal respect, i.e., they are “downgraded” or “ranked low.” Section 4 explains how a use of a pejorative expression sometimes but not always downgrades individuals. In some contexts, people verbally abuse others by using pejorative expressions including gradable adjectives. A use of a pejorative expression, if nothing intervenes, updates the common ground of a conversation in such a way that the targeted individual is unworthy of equal respect. As long as this piece of information is retained in the common ground, the use effectively manages to “downgrade” or “rank low” the targeted individual. In other contexts, a use of a pejorative expression fails to “downgrade” an individual because there is a gap between merely updating a common ground and really treating others as lower-ranked individuals.

著者

中村 信隆

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.173, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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The purpose of this paper is to consider the moral responsibility for actions from ignorance. For example, a man may behave violently toward women because he mistakenly believes that men are morally superior to women and are, therefore, permitted to treat women as instruments of man’s will. If we assume that such a man acts from a kind of ignorance, how can we hold him responsible for his action? To consider this problem, I look at the Strawsonian theory of moral responsibility and the concept of insult as an object of resentment. According to Peter Frederick Strawson’s famous lecture “Freedom and Resentment,” responsibility can be understood in the context of “reactive attitudes,” such as resentment. Focusing on insult as an object of resentment, Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton argue that we resent injuries done to us because such injuries involve insulting messages about our dignity or moral status. The wrongdoer is saying, “I can use you for my purposes and you are not worth better treatment”; in these circumstances, resentment is the defensive reactive emotion against an action involving such an insult. Based on these ideas, we propose the following hypothesis: a person, who injures someone but mistakenly believes that his action is permitted and acts from ignorance, can be held responsible for his action if the victim appropriately feels resentment toward his action, as it involved an insulting message about the victim’s moral status. To validate this hypothesis, I will begin by critically reviewing previous studies on the moral responsibility for actions from ignorance. Following this discussion, I will explain the distinctive character of the insulting action from ignorance about someone’s moral status. Finally, I will demonstrate that an insulting action from ignorance about the victim’s moral status inevitably causes resentment by attacking the victim’s self-respect, and that ignorance never excuses the wrongdoer from their responsibility.

著者

佐々木 雄大

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.203-217, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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Généralement, on pense que le sacré est un concept pour définir l’essence de la religion. La religion est basée sur la distinction entre le sacré et le profane, et le sacré, qui est isolé de la région profane, a l’ambiguïté du pur et de l’impur, et du faste et du néfaste. Contrairement à cela, ces dernières années, de nombreux doutes sur le concept du sacré et le dualisme du sacré et du profane ont été soumis. Une telle critique pourrait également être dirigée vers Georges Bataille, qui employait le sacré comme un concept important de sa pensée. D’une part, il acceptait le dualisme de Durkheim dans « hétérologie », mais d’autre part, dans le compte rendu sur L’homme et le sacré de Caillois, il dirait que la différence entre le sacré et le profane n’était que celle de « l’angle de vue ». Cet article vise à défendre la théorie du sacré chez Bataille contre les critiques du concept du sacré, et à montrer sa possibilité de surmonter la distinction entre le sacré et le profane. D’abord, après avoir confirmé la position du sacré dans la sociologie religieuse de Durkheim, nous montrons que, dans La structure psychologique du fascisme (1933), Bataille a remplacé le sacré et le profane par l’hétérogénéité et l’homogénéité et a analysé la structure sociale avec ces concepts. Ensuite, nous prouvons que, dans La théorie de la religion(1947), il a repris le sacré comme le problème d’une conscience de soi, et le monde sacré et le monde profane coïncident dans « la nuit du non-savoir ». Et enfin, il devient clair que, dans La guerre et la philosophie du sacré (1951), Bataille a atteint à l’ambiguïté entre le sacré et le profane en saisissant la relation entre les deux comme celle entre la totalité du monde et les objets isolés. De cette façon, on conclut que Bataille peut surmonter le dualisme et considérer le sacré comme un problème général de la vie humaine qui ne se limite pas à la religion.

著者

安倍 里美

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.68, pp.215-229, 2019 (Released:2021-05-17)

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According to T.M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value(BPA), goodness is not a property that can provide a reason in itself, but is the purely formal, higher-order property of having some lower-order property that provides a reason. If this is correct, whenever we have reason to have a certain attitude toward something or to behave in a certain way, the object is valuable in some sense: that is, the relationship between reasons and values is biconditional. In addition, it implies the eliminativism of value, in the sense that it reduces the fact that something has value into a mere relationship between a reason-giving property and reasons, and it deprives value of its normative power to give reason. The present study attempts to defend the implications of the biconditonality of reasons and values. To undermine this, objectors need only establish one case where a reason does not bear on evaluations. We may have reason to respond to objects in favourable ways ─ for example, we might desire, respect, or recommend them ─ even though the objects are not at all valuable in themselves, or because we have reasons that have nothing to do with the objects’ value. Or, one may have a strong intuition that purely deontological reasons are completely separated from values. On the contrary, this study posits that we can affirm the consistency of BPA by introducing a distinction between derivative reasons and non-derivative reasons(what one might call “ultimate reasons”), or by clarifying the difference between the normativity of reasons and the normativity of deontology. In comparing the normative character of reasons and the deontic, I will also demonstrate the similarity between the normative feature of reasons and the evaluative function. In so doing, BPA becomes more plausible.

著者

花形 恵梨子

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.70, pp.177-190, 2021 (Released:2021-06-14)

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Although Rawls never addressed the issue of affirmative action in his writings, remedying the discrimination-related disadvantages that influence people’s life chances will also likely fall within the purview of justice. This paper discusses the implications of his theory for affirmative action, its justification, and the extent to which it is justified in the framework of justice as fairness. Rawls mainly focuses on ideal theory. He works out the principles of justice under the assumption that people comply with the demands of justice and that favorable circumstances hold, while affirmative action is a problem for a nonideal society. In the framework of justice as fairness, affirmative action is addressed under the principle of equality of opportunity(EO). Formal EO and fair EO together require that people develop their talents regardless of the social circumstances to which they are born. They compete for offices and positions under fair conditions, and motivated, qualified individuals acquire the positions. However, under nonideal circumstances, there are entrenched injustices that hinder the realization of such an ideal. Under nonideal circumstances, principles of ideal theory serve as a guide to a fully just society. It is often claimed that affirmative action is incompatible with fair EO, as it requires differential treatment based on group membership, while fair EO focuses on the qualifications of individuals. By discussing criticisms of affirmative action, I will argue that affirmative action in the form of preferential treatment is justified as a transitional measure to remedy systematic group disadvantages and realize the fair EO ideal. As Rawls’s democratic equality aims not for a meritocratic society but for one in which people can relate as equals, the criticism that affirmative action policies stigmatize the targets of affirmative action can also be answered.

著者

東谷 優希

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.69, pp.129-143, 2020 (Released:2021-05-24)

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About 60 years ago, in his essay “Socrates, Callicles, and Nietzsche,” E. R. Dodds argued that Nietzsche’s thought had been inspired by that of Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, i. e. Nietzsche was the heir to Callicles. Although this claim has had a strong influence up to the present, it seems to remain controversial. This article aims to refute Dodds’ view by examining his arguments and to demonstrate that Nietzsche was by no means the ‘Calliclean.’ In presenting his claim, Dodds made four arguments:(a)Nietzsche’s “blonde beast” is equal to Callicles’ “lion.”(b)Both uphold “φύσις[physis]against νόμος [nomos].”(c)Nietzsche says, like Callicles, what nomos prescribes is a morality of slaves. Nietzsche’s men of resentment “are precisely” Callicles’ “many,” or the weak who preach equality.(d)As Callicles has his own conception of the morality which suits the master class, so Nietzsche claims the necessity of a morality of masters “beyond good and evil,” or within good and bad: Nietzsche defines his “will to power” as “Haben- und Mehrhabenwollen[will to have and have more],” which is inspired by Calliclean term “πλεονεξία[desire to have more].” For Callicles, “τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ κολάζειν[not to suppress desires]” is normative, so is to live in accordance with the “will to power” for Nietzsche. Each of these, however, is based merely on word similarities. Systematical examination of the contexts in which Nietzsche used Calliclean terms will lead to the completely opposite conclusions: The “blonde beast” differs from Callicles’ “lion,” and Nietzsche does not uphold physis. According to Nietzsche, what nomos prescribes is a morality of masters. Callicles’ “many” are not men of resentment in Nietzsche’s terminology because the latter who preach slave morality are also in master morality. Nietzsche’s master and slave morality are thus not contradictory concepts; both are to be criticized for him. Further, Nietzsche raised “will to power” not as the norm but as the “primordial fact of all history,” the object of accusation. In conclusion, Nietzsche’s thought is not compatible with that of Callicles: Nietzsche was by no means the ‘Calliclean.’

著者

木村 史人

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, pp.175-188, 2018 (Released:2019-04-01)

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In Being and Time(Sein und Zeit), Martin Heidegger points out that the personality of a person who is aware of their mortality is individualistic, and they seem not to have relationships with others. By contrast, in The Human Condition(Vita activa oder Vom tätigen Leben), Hanna Arendt emphasizes the relations between others as “action”(Handeln). In this article, I first of all endeavor to compare the “being-with”(Mitsein)in Being and Time with the “action” in The Human Condition, and from there attempt to reinterpret the Dasein as a performer of the action. This argument indicates that we are “with” others precisely in actions involved in unpredictable possibilities. Secondly, I focus on authenticity, which is disclosed when the Dasein is anticipating death and the existential structure of our “who” is revealed. It would appear that “individualization” and “no relation” negate being with others in the world, but this existential metamorphosis into authenticity is our transformation into Dasein as a performer of action in the world with others through our becoming aware that we are each a unique “who” who cannot be defined in the world. Death as the most extreme possibility is neither a predictable possibility nor an unpredictable possibility on the line that extends from the present into the future, but it shows that we ourselves are beings with potential in the sense of making these possibilities. By clearly showing the relationship between authenticity and the performer of the “action”, I endeavor to point out that the thoughts of Heidegger and Arendt are not opposing, but rather complement each other. Finally, this article shows that it is precisely because plural “whos” who are the most unique “beings with potential” when anticipating death face each other that actions have the characteristics of newness and initiative as if they were a “second birth.”

著者

橋爪 大輝

出版者

日本倫理学会

雑誌

倫理学年報 (ISSN:24344699)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, pp.159, 2017 (Released:2019-04-16)

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Hannah Arendts letztes Buch, »Vom Leben des Geistes«, behandelt das Problem der »reinsten Tätigkeit, die dem Menschen fähig ist«: die Fähigkeit des Denkens. »Was tun wir, wenn wir nichts anderes tun als denken?«, fragte Arendt dort. Unser Aufsatz versucht, diese Frage zu beantworten. Zuerst trennen wir die drei Momenten des Denkens voneinander:(1)dessen Tätigkeit an sich, (2)dessen Gegenstand(den Sinn), und(3)dessen nachfolgenden Effekt(Hindernis des Bösen). Unter den drei Momenten beachtet man vor allem den zweiten und den dritten(z.B. bei Richard Bernstein), der erste Moment aber ist bis heute außer Acht geblieben. Um jedoch den Gegenstand und den Effekt des Denkens zu verstehen, ist es nötig, den Mechanismus der Tätigkeit des Denkens im Detail zu verstehen. Dieser Aufsatz handelt im ersten Abschnitt vom »Rückzug« des denkenden Ichs aus der Erscheinungswelt. Dieser Rückzug aus der Welt ist nicht der in so etwas wie eine »geistige Welt«, sondern der Vorbehalt von Beziehungen mit weltlichen Dingen oder anderen Menschen. Dies ist aber eine negative Seite des Denkens und es ist uns wichtig, dessen positiven Gehalt zu zeigen. Wie der zweite Abschnitt zeigt, charakterisiert Arendt das Denken nicht abstrakt, sondern konkret als »Dialog mit sich selbst« von »Zwei-in-einem«. Das denkende Ich wird kraft dieses Dialogs »einsam«, enthoben aus der Welt. Es ist dann un sere letzte Aufgabe im dritten Abschnitt zu verdeutlichen, was diesen Dialog ermöglicht. Arendts Antwort lautet: Zeit. Das Menschsein kann sich, ohne räumlich zu handeln, rein in der Zeit bewegen: das heißt, sich in der Zeit spalten in »Fragenden und Antwortenden«, aber die Einheit des Ichs erhalten kraft der Sprache. Durch diese drei Paragraphen legen wir Struktur und Entstehungsmechanismus des Denkens dar.