著者
齋藤 隆子
出版者
The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史学会年報 (ISSN:04534786)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.39, no.39, pp.128-145, 2001 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
27

This paper studies Roy Harrod's philosophical work, Foundations of Inductive Logic (1956). As compared to his economic theory, his philosophical work (and its relation to his economic theory) has not drawn much attention so far. This paper attempts to fill this gap, and demonstrates the significance of the fact that Harrod was a philosopher as well as an economist. In particular, this paper reviews Harrod's argument by illustrating the main differences in Harrod's empiricist notions of probability and induction, and Keynes' rationalist notion of them (A Treatise on Probability, 1921). Then it demonstrates how these differences in their understanding of probability and induction are reflected in their different approaches to economics.