著者
伊藤 秀史
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.52-62, 2007-12-25
被引用文献数
2

The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics. According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally referred to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts. Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, "economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions." (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.
著者
西條 辰義
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.51-66, 2006-12-20

Over the past decade, a number of economists at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, including myself, have been conducting experiments to test theories regarding the provision of public goods. One of our more interesting findings to date is evidence among Japanese of a trait that can be described as "spite" in the way it impacts the provision of public goods. This paper describes the purposes, method, and some results of those experiments. We have been forced to ponder economic methodology in every phase of this project. We considered the methods of neo-classical economists such as Walras and Pareto, for example, who tended primarily to analyze data without concern for the motives behind strategic choices, and we examined the approach of those experimentalists who put forth questions only after finishing their tests. To develop our own methodology, therefore, it seemed reasonable and legitimate to pose questions midway through our experiments in order to elicit the factors behind strategic choices. That reasoning led to questions concerning the validity of behavioral assumptions made by neo-classical economists, moving us well away from Milton Friedman, who pays little attention to whether those assumptions are valid or not. In this way, experimentalists in this area, including ourselves, have begun to study behavior in terms of whether it is altruistic, spiteful, or fair in the provision of public goods. In our experiments, we found that the first priority for several subjects was not the total payoff amount they could expect to receive but the ranking among them. Comparing American subjects with Japanese, we found that the American subjects tended to behave as game theory would predict, while some Japanese subjects adopted 'spiteful' strategies initially and demonstrated cooperative behavior later. Today, we believe that understanding human behavior is the central issue in social science. Adam Smith, David Hume, and other eighteenth-century thinkers were interested in the sentiment and emotion behind economic decisions, but for a long time neoclassical economists of the last century effectively avoided the factor of motivation behind human behavior. By describing the experimental method, I hope that this paper will help to open a new and challenging path to understand human economic behavior and may contribute to the development of a new economics for this century.
著者
渡辺 恵一
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.100-118, 2011 (Released:2019-08-21)

This paper aims to review the scholarship on Adam Smithʼs The Wealth of Nations (WN) in the past decade. The publication of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (1976―1987) led to the so-called “Adam Smith Renaissance” that has encouraged many scholars from different disciplines to con-duct interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary stud-ies on Smith. In addition to the studies on Scot-tish Enlightenment, the establishment of the In-ternational Adam Smith Society (IASS) in 1995 and the publication of the Adam Smith Review (ASR) in association with the IASS since 2004 further promoted interdisciplinary studies on Smith. Thus, the interdisciplinary wave of interest in Smithʼs moral philosophy is an outstanding feature of the latest scholarship on Smith. How-ever, as the interdisciplinary studies on Smith have advanced increasingly, there has been a definite waning of interest in his economics con-cerning WN. This phenomenon is indicated straightforwardly in Den Uyl (2008, 4) who mentions that “We can no longer say that WN is somehow the ʻessentialʼ Smith” and in Forman-Barzilai (2008, 219) who affirms that “Smithʼs political economy itself was not the centre on his thought, but rather its place in a lager project of moral philosophy.” Part I of this paper is a prologue to the man-ner in which the WN was studied in the past dec-ade. Part II discusses two excellent foreign works, Fleischackerʼs On Adam Smithʼs Wealth of Nations (2004) and Aspromourgosʼ The Sci-ence of Wealth (2009). These two books sharply contrast with each other, because the former has a philosophical approach to WN, while the latter adopts an orthodox style used by economic his-torians. Part III considers the scholarship on the WN in Japan. Inamuraʼs Reconsideration of the system of The Wealth of Nations (2003), Ta-jimaʼs Adam Smithʼs Institutional Economics (2003), and Takemotoʼs Across The Wealth of Nations (2005) will be mainly reviewed in this paper. In part III, I aim to ascertain the ortho-doxy of our scholarship on WN and its transfigu-ration in comparison with the scholarship abroad. Part IV, the epilogue, briefly surveys the origin of WN (Smithʼs political economy) in or-der to understand the nature of modern econom-ics. JEL classification number: B12, B31, A12.
著者
岡田 章
出版者
The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.137-154, 2007-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
79

This paper considers the history of game theory since von Neumann and Morgenstern published their monumental work The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. It points out changes in research themes and discusses what game theory has achieved up to the present. The aim of von Neumann and Morgenstern was “to find the mathematically complete principles which define rational behavior for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior.” Extending the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash classified all games as either non-cooperative games or cooperative games and defined the notion of an equilibrium point for a non-cooperative game. Nash also suggested a research program, now called the Nash program, to analyze a coop erative game by constructing a non-cooperative game model for negotiations. The main field of game theory was cooperative games in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thereafter, research trends in game theory in the 1970s and the 1980s shifted from cooperative games to non-cooperative games, led by the seminal works of Harsanyi on incomplete information games and Selten on perfect equilibrium in extensive games. This socalled non-cooperative revolution greatly promoted applications of non-cooperative game theory to economics. At the same time, researchers became increasingly dissatisfied with the strong assumption of rationality in traditional game theory, and consequently research interest turned toward two new fields in the 1990s. One is evolutionary game theory, developing out of evolutionary biology, and the other is behavioral game theory, which collaborates with psychology. Evolutionary game theory investigates dynamic processes of evolution and learning in economic behavior, and it reformulates game equilibrium as a stable stationary state of those dynamic processes. Behavioral game theory studies the structures of motivation, cognition, and reasoning in human decision-making using the methodology of experiments. This paper shows how present-day research in game theory is developing in divergent fields that consider both traditional theory based on unbounded rationality and behavioral theory exploring human bounded rationality. Game theory continues to be one of the most active research fields in economics.
著者
岡田 章
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.137-154, 2007-06-30

This paper considers the history of game theory since von Neumann and Morgenstern published their monumental work The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. It points out changes in research themes and discusses what game theory has achieved up to the present. The aim of von Neumann and Morgenstern was "to find the mathematically complete principles which define rational behavior for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior." Extending the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash classified all games as either non-cooperative games or cooperative games and defined the notion of an equilibrium point for a non-cooperative game. Nash also suggested a research program, now called the Nash program, to analyze a coop erative game by constructing a non-cooperative game model for negotiations. The main field of game theory was cooperative games in the l950s and the 1960s. Thereafter, research trends in game theory in the 1970s and the 1980s shifted from cooperative games to non-cooperative games, led by the seminal works of Harsanyi on incomplete information games and Selten on perfect equilibrium in extensive games. This so-called non-cooperative revolution greatly promoted applications of non-cooperative game theory to economics. At the same time, researchers became increasingly dissatisfied with the strong assumption of rationality in traditional game theory, and consequently research interest turned toward two new fields in the 1990s. One is evolutionary game theory, developing out of evolutionary biology, and the other is behavioral game theory, which collaborates with psychology. Evolutionary game theory investigates dynamic processes of evolution and learning in economic behavior, and it reformulates game equilibrium as a stable stationary state of those dynamic processes. Behavioral game theory studies the structures of motivation, cognition, and reasoning in human decision-making using the methodology of experiments. This paper shows how present-day research in game theory is developing in divergent fields that consider both traditional theory based on unbounded rationality and behavioral theory exploring human bounded rationality. Game theory continues to be one of the most active research fields in economics.
著者
江頭 進
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.2, pp.41-58, 2012-01-25

This paper aims to consider how the Chicago school of economics influenced the economic thought of Friedrich Hayek in his period at the University of Chicago, where he was a follower of the Committee of Social Thought from 1950 to 1962. This period is well known as "Hayek's transformation"-from a theoretical economist to a thinker of liberalism. Therefore, to understand the development of his thought, it is important to know who influenced him during this period. This paper will explore the relationship between Hayek and the members of the Committee of Social Thought, by analyzing his works, correspondence, and typescripts written during this period. On the one hand, the similarities and differences between Hayek's liberalism and that of the Chicago school are pointed out. Hayek and several economists of the Chicago school were members of the Mont Pelerin Society and were anti-communists. Despite the tendency to place both Hayek and the Chicago school under the general banner of anti-socialism or anti-Keynesianism, they actually diverged widely on points of methodology and liberalism. However, it is an inevitable consequence that different methodologies produce different economics, and the forms of liberalism based on these economics also differ.
著者
米田 昇平
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.2, pp.68-83, 2009 (Released:2019-08-08)
参考文献数
41
著者
佐藤 空
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.1, pp.49-68, 2016 (Released:2019-08-31)

Abstract: It is widely recognized that Edmund Burke, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, claimed that the ancient constitution of England, chivalry, and the Christian religion had con-tributed much to the formation of the civilized states of Britain and Europe at large. This arti-cle shows that a distinct perspective of the history of civilization existed in the early writings of Burke, An Essay towards an Abridgment of the English History and Fragment: An Essay towards an History of the Laws of England, and also places the ideas of Burke in these works in the context of the early modern history of English historiography. The early writings of Burke clearly assert that throughout history, a civilization could be and had actually been shaped in England through numerous international exchanges between England and other countries. In doing so, his idea seems to have included a perception of empire, which was fur-ther advanced in his later political works. Burkeʼs ideas on conquest and international ex-changes are related to the views on English history developed by the seventeenth-century scholars Spelman and Brady in their works on feudal law; however, Burke was different from these scholars in considering conquest as a powerful driving force behind the formation of the English civilization. Although other historians of the early modern period had held simi-lar ideas about conquest, Burke distinguished himself from them by putting forward a gener-alized model of the civilizing process closely linked to various types of international ex-changes. JEL classification numbers: B 31, N 01.

1 0 0 0 OA 契約理論

著者
伊藤 秀史
出版者
The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.52-62, 2007-12-25 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
41
被引用文献数
2

The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics.According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally refer-red to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection.Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts.Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, “economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions.” (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.
著者
Keith Tribe
出版者
The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.155-160, 2007-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
6

The modern market economy which we seek to build should have a decidedly social constitution. Its social character is based primarily on the fact that it is able to offer a greater and more varied quantity of goods at prices determined by the demands of the consumer, the resulting low prices raising the real value of wages and thereby permitting a greater and more extensive satisfaction of human needs.