著者
伊藤 秀史
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.2, pp.52-62, 2007-12
被引用文献数
2

The purpose of this article is to offer an overview of contract theory, a highly successful and active research area in microeconomics, with particular emphasis on its history and influence on modern economics. According to Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), currently a standard textbook in this field, the theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions is generally referred to in short as contract theory. Contract theory is thus a theory of imperfect markets, mainly because of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection. Contract theory is also a theory of economic institutions and as such applies far beyond markets. The basic model of moral hazard and that of adverse selection both use agency (or principal-agent) relationships as the main analytical framework, in response to various attempts to lay open the black-box nature of the firm in the standard neoclassical model. Furthermore, theories of boundaries of the firm, originating out of Coase's classical work, are today analyzed in the framework of incomplete contracts that leads to the third basic model of contract theory, along with those of moral hazard and adverse selection. Although these basic models are games with specific extensive forms, they are formulated as optimization problems subject to incentive compatibility and participation conditions, and are solved without explicit reference to equilibrium concepts. Contract theory is thus related to both price theory and game theory, but it has developed its own analytical frameworks and tools to solve problems under conditions of asymmetric information or incomplete contracts. Contract theory is also a theory of incentive design. Incentive design is not important under perfect competition but is crucial when there is asymmetric information or contractual incompleteness. Myerson claims that today, "economists can define their field more broadly, as being about the analysis of incentives in all social institutions." (Myerson 1999) I argue that it is contract theory that enables us to define today's field more broadly.
著者
西條 辰義
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.51-66, 2006-12-20

Over the past decade, a number of economists at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, including myself, have been conducting experiments to test theories regarding the provision of public goods. One of our more interesting findings to date is evidence among Japanese of a trait that can be described as "spite" in the way it impacts the provision of public goods. This paper describes the purposes, method, and some results of those experiments. We have been forced to ponder economic methodology in every phase of this project. We considered the methods of neo-classical economists such as Walras and Pareto, for example, who tended primarily to analyze data without concern for the motives behind strategic choices, and we examined the approach of those experimentalists who put forth questions only after finishing their tests. To develop our own methodology, therefore, it seemed reasonable and legitimate to pose questions midway through our experiments in order to elicit the factors behind strategic choices. That reasoning led to questions concerning the validity of behavioral assumptions made by neo-classical economists, moving us well away from Milton Friedman, who pays little attention to whether those assumptions are valid or not. In this way, experimentalists in this area, including ourselves, have begun to study behavior in terms of whether it is altruistic, spiteful, or fair in the provision of public goods. In our experiments, we found that the first priority for several subjects was not the total payoff amount they could expect to receive but the ranking among them. Comparing American subjects with Japanese, we found that the American subjects tended to behave as game theory would predict, while some Japanese subjects adopted 'spiteful' strategies initially and demonstrated cooperative behavior later. Today, we believe that understanding human behavior is the central issue in social science. Adam Smith, David Hume, and other eighteenth-century thinkers were interested in the sentiment and emotion behind economic decisions, but for a long time neoclassical economists of the last century effectively avoided the factor of motivation behind human behavior. By describing the experimental method, I hope that this paper will help to open a new and challenging path to understand human economic behavior and may contribute to the development of a new economics for this century.
著者
江里口 拓
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.1, pp.23-40, 2008-07-31 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
65

The purposes of this paper are, first, to present a critique of B. Semmel's social imperialist inter-pretation of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's theories, and second, to establish the compatibility of the Webbs' ideas on “national efficiency” with the “internationalism” of the world economy. Pivotal to their program of national efficiency were the idea of “national minimum” and strategies developed at the London School of Economics (LSE).As they argued in Industrial Democracy (1897), the Webbs believed that national minimum policy should be based on free trade, and from that standpoint they criticised the protectionism of W. Ashley. However, the Webbs did not recognise the necessity for an “international minimum” as proposed by A. C. Pigou in The Economics of Welfare (1920) because effective use of the national minimum policy would by itself ensure efficiency in the British economy. This idea was affirmed with the founding of LSE (1895), which was established with the objective of promoting the application of scientific knowledge and skills (especially in areas of commerce and public administration) to the British economy. The Webbs hoped that their policies of national efficiency, which they saw as compatible with free trade, would be adopted by every civilised nation.Behind the Webbs' approach to the social imperialists were the realities of British party politics at the turn of the century, just before the blossoming of the “new liberalism.” That was the context in which they sought to realise their policies of national efficiency. It is therefore important to carefully distinguish their political behaviour from their economic thought.After the Second World War, G. Myrdal (1960) criticised the welfare state on grounds of its nationalist bias. However, the Webbs' idea of national efficiency based on free trade continues to offer an important clue to the resolution of that aporia in the logic of modern welfare states.
著者
岡田 章
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.49, no.1, pp.137-154, 2007-06-30 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
79

This paper considers the history of game theory since von Neumann and Morgenstern published their monumental work The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. It points out changes in research themes and discusses what game theory has achieved up to the present. The aim of von Neumann and Morgenstern was “to find the mathematically complete principles which define rational behavior for the participants in a social economy, and to derive from them the general characteristics of that behavior.” Extending the theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash classified all games as either non-cooperative games or cooperative games and defined the notion of an equilibrium point for a non-cooperative game. Nash also suggested a research program, now called the Nash program, to analyze a coop erative game by constructing a non-cooperative game model for negotiations. The main field of game theory was cooperative games in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thereafter, research trends in game theory in the 1970s and the 1980s shifted from cooperative games to non-cooperative games, led by the seminal works of Harsanyi on incomplete information games and Selten on perfect equilibrium in extensive games. This socalled non-cooperative revolution greatly promoted applications of non-cooperative game theory to economics. At the same time, researchers became increasingly dissatisfied with the strong assumption of rationality in traditional game theory, and consequently research interest turned toward two new fields in the 1990s. One is evolutionary game theory, developing out of evolutionary biology, and the other is behavioral game theory, which collaborates with psychology. Evolutionary game theory investigates dynamic processes of evolution and learning in economic behavior, and it reformulates game equilibrium as a stable stationary state of those dynamic processes. Behavioral game theory studies the structures of motivation, cognition, and reasoning in human decision-making using the methodology of experiments. This paper shows how present-day research in game theory is developing in divergent fields that consider both traditional theory based on unbounded rationality and behavioral theory exploring human bounded rationality. Game theory continues to be one of the most active research fields in economics.
著者
黒木 亮
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.21-43, 2011 (Released:2019-08-21)

One of the most distinguished features of Frank Knightʼs liberal thought seems to be his eco-nomic, political, and ethical criticisms both of the case for and against the free-enterprise com-petitive system. Through this multi-level, poly-angular analysis and on a resignation that the system appears as the best or “least worst” as possible human beings build on earth, Knight continued to identify many defects in the sys-tem, and disclose many absurdities in the way of thinking on which we rest unwittingly. For “menʼs errors,” he believed, “mostly lie in their premises, not in bad logic.” In this paper, I select the following five top-ics through which Knight repeatedly discussed our premises: (1) uneconomic aspect of compe-tition, (2) normative and conservative character of positive economics, (3) imaginary nature othe idea of natural rights, (4) self-deconstructive tendency of business and the power game, and (5) plural meanings of love in liberal society.This paper proposes that Knightʼs radical yet constructive criticisms aimed to refine, rather than advocate, the free-enterprise competitive system and warn against the fallacy of “absolut-ism: holding that a statement must be either true or false and that, if false, antithesis must be true.” So this essay not only destructs the image of Knight as a neo-classical economist, but also clarifies the differences and similarities between him and later Chicagoans. That is, it illuminates the contrary directions of their perspectives and the identical iconoclastic propensity for disclos-ing implicit postulates. JEL classification numbers: B 19, B 31, B 41.
著者
斉藤 尚
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.61, no.1, pp.45-65, 2019 (Released:2019-10-01)

Abstract: This article aims to demonstrate Yuichi Shionoya’s theory of economic ethics by classifying his study into early, middle, and later stages and focusing on his conception of perfectionism. His theory is composed of ethics and economics. In early and later stages, Shionoya proposes his notion of ethics as one category of liberal perfectionism by demonstrating the relationship between the concepts of justice, goodness, and virtue. Part of its originality is that it is defined as being compatible with the pursuit of common good, which is the main purpose of welfare economics. Moreover, he proposes three kinds of economics: economic sociology, economic statics, and economic dynamics in the middle and later stages. He argues that a society in which liberal perfectionism prevails can be realized by the elitist method that he demonstrates in economic sociology. Thus, Shionoya attempts to construct his economic ethics as “universal social science” by integrating the ideas of political philosophy and welfare economics and showing consistency in his entire study. This article questions the consistency of Shionoya’s theory of economic ethics. The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, we classify Shionoya’s study and show that his main purpose is to construct an alternative theory by criticizing neoclassical economics. Second, we clarify his view of perfectionism by showing his ethical system. We then outline his theory of economic ethics by analyzing his economics and clarifying his method of institutional reform. Finally, we express doubt as to whether reform can lead to his concept of an ideal society. JEL classification numbers: B31, O31.
著者
布施 豪嗣
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, no.2, pp.1-19, 2019 (Released:2019-09-04)

Abstract: Although the relationship between liberalism and his political thought has been emphasized, the classical aspect of his economic theories has been underestimated. This has, in my view, several reasons: To be sure, Ishibashi was one of those who had introduced Keynesian economics and his idea of positive fiscal policy. At the same tine, Ishibashi also admitted the rigidity of the market system. But this aspect of his economics did not prevent him to be committed to the classical economic theories, based on free market. It is characteristic of Ishibashi that these aspects existed together in theory and in practice. Based on this understanding, this paper attempts to reveal his optimism about price adjustment. This, in my understanding, led to his basic optimism about inflation. Thus, the study contributes to the better understanding of Ishibashi’s economic thought in particular and also to the better understanding of the many-layered disputes in his age in general. JEL classification number: B31.
著者
渡辺 恵一
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.1, pp.100-118, 2011 (Released:2019-08-21)

This paper aims to review the scholarship on Adam Smithʼs The Wealth of Nations (WN) in the past decade. The publication of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (1976―1987) led to the so-called “Adam Smith Renaissance” that has encouraged many scholars from different disciplines to con-duct interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary stud-ies on Smith. In addition to the studies on Scot-tish Enlightenment, the establishment of the In-ternational Adam Smith Society (IASS) in 1995 and the publication of the Adam Smith Review (ASR) in association with the IASS since 2004 further promoted interdisciplinary studies on Smith. Thus, the interdisciplinary wave of interest in Smithʼs moral philosophy is an outstanding feature of the latest scholarship on Smith. How-ever, as the interdisciplinary studies on Smith have advanced increasingly, there has been a definite waning of interest in his economics con-cerning WN. This phenomenon is indicated straightforwardly in Den Uyl (2008, 4) who mentions that “We can no longer say that WN is somehow the ʻessentialʼ Smith” and in Forman-Barzilai (2008, 219) who affirms that “Smithʼs political economy itself was not the centre on his thought, but rather its place in a lager project of moral philosophy.” Part I of this paper is a prologue to the man-ner in which the WN was studied in the past dec-ade. Part II discusses two excellent foreign works, Fleischackerʼs On Adam Smithʼs Wealth of Nations (2004) and Aspromourgosʼ The Sci-ence of Wealth (2009). These two books sharply contrast with each other, because the former has a philosophical approach to WN, while the latter adopts an orthodox style used by economic his-torians. Part III considers the scholarship on the WN in Japan. Inamuraʼs Reconsideration of the system of The Wealth of Nations (2003), Ta-jimaʼs Adam Smithʼs Institutional Economics (2003), and Takemotoʼs Across The Wealth of Nations (2005) will be mainly reviewed in this paper. In part III, I aim to ascertain the ortho-doxy of our scholarship on WN and its transfigu-ration in comparison with the scholarship abroad. Part IV, the epilogue, briefly surveys the origin of WN (Smithʼs political economy) in or-der to understand the nature of modern econom-ics. JEL classification number: B12, B31, A12.
著者
西條 辰義
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.48, no.2, pp.51-66, 2006-12-20 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
26

Over the past decade, a number of economists at the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, including myself, have been conducting experiments to test theories regarding the provision of public goods. One of our more interesting findings to date is evidence among Japanese of a trait that can be described as “spite” in the way it impacts the provision of public goods. This paper describes the purposes, method, and some results of those experiments.We have been forced to ponder economic methodology in every phase of this project. We considered the methods of neo-classical economists such as Walras and Pareto, for example, who tended primarily to analyze data without concern for the motives behind strategic choices, and we examined the approach of those experimentalists who put forth questions only after finishing their tests. To develop our own methodology, therefore, it seemed reasonable and legitimate to pose questions midway through our experiments in order to elicit the factors behind strategic choices.That reasoning led to questions concerning the validity of behavioral assumptions made by neo-classical economists, moving us well away from Milton Friedman, who pays little attention to whether those assumptions are valid or not. In this way, experimentalists in this area, including ourselves, have begun to study behavior in terms of whether it is altruistic, spiteful, or fair in the provision of public goods.In our experiments, we found that the first priority for several subjects was not the total payoff amount they could expect to receive but the ranking among them. Comparing American subjects with Japanese, we found that the American subjects tended to behave as game theory would predict, while some Japanese subjects adopted 'spiteful' strategies initially and demonstrated cooperative behavior later.Today, we believe that understanding human behavior is the central issue in social science. Adam Smith, David Hume, and other eighteenth-century thinkers were interested in the sentiment and emotion behind economic decisions, but for a long time neoclassical economists of the last century effectively avoided the factor of motivation behind human behavior. By describing the experimental method, I hope that this paper will help to open a new and challenging path to understand human economic behavior and may contribute to the development of a new economics for this century.
著者
南森 茂太
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.50, no.1, pp.62-78, 2008-07-31 (Released:2010-08-05)
参考文献数
41

Takahira Kanda, with his lifelong interest in economic problems, was a pioneering scholar, teacher, and translator of Western economics in Japan. His Keizai shogaku [Elementary Economics] (1867), for which he translated Western-language sources, is particularly well-known. But it is an earlier work, Noshoben [An Exact Explanation of an Agrarian Nation and a Merchant Nation], published in 1861 that is the focus of this paper. In this book, Kanda's economic thinking appears radical by the standards of the time. It has drawn the attention of economic historians for what they see as a liberal side, and its arguments have often been compared with Western economics. What scholars have tended to overlook, however, is the side of Noshoben that clearly reflects the economic thought prevailing in Japan at the time.Contrary to the current image of Noshoben, this paper attempts to demonstrate that Kanda's thought was largely based on the economic thought of the Edo era. In that book, he argued that taxes on farmers were the cause of the budget deficit and the poverty of farmers, and that those conditions invited aggression by foreign countries, which meant, he said, the necessity of reforming the existing tax system. He proposed tax reform by treating revenue from farm products as commercial profits, and he argued that promoting foreign trade would be effective to increase commercial profits. Those ideas were not new. We can find them in the work of Toshiaki Honda, for example, who wrote most of his treatises in the late 18th century. Nonetheless, Noshoben had considerable originality. For instance, while many Edo era economists regarded merchants as wily and untrustworthy, encouraging the shogunate or feudal rulers to maintain strict control over trade with foreign countries, Kanda recognized the important role merchants could play in external trade, and, consequently, in strengthening the domestic economy. His idea of imposing a tax on the profits of merchants was radical at that time.
著者
今池 康人
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.62, no.1, pp.1-25, 2020 (Released:2020-10-16)

This paper examines Michael Polanyi’s views on liberty. Polanyi was a scholar with expertise in several fields of study. He began his academic career as a physical chemist and later became a philosopher. He then studied economics, liberalism, and philosophy. Many researchers have shown interest in his arguments on religion and knowledge. However, an inquiry into his views on liberty is seemingly lacking. Polanyi distinguished between personal (including that classified as negative) and public liberty (including that classified as positive) and believed that we should protect public liberty. His theory comprises three elements. First, Polanyi emphasized moral belief among people living in a free society. He focused on British traditions and suggested that morality is also influenced by British tradition. Second, Polanyi clarified the role played by spontaneous order in society. He placed particular emphasis on an intellectual order (law, science, and so on). In a free society, people’s actions yield better results because their behaviors are mutually adjusted as a function of the spontaneous order. The third premise in Polanyi’s theory asserted that a free society requires that its leaders be professionals, which I call “professionalism.” After writing The Logic of Liberty, Polanyi moved on to other fields of research, such as knowledge, religion, and so on. Here, it should be mentioned that all of Polanyi’s research across various fields is related to his study on liberty. JEL classification numbers: A12, B31.
著者
Timm Graßmann
出版者
The Japanease Society for the History of Economic Thought
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.60, no.1, pp.58-78, 2018 (Released:2019-09-03)
被引用文献数
1 2

Abstract: With the continuing publication of the complete works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, MEGA), a bulk of new material concerning Marxʼs studies of economic crises has been made available-with further releases expected to follow. These publications have revealed Marxʼs enormous efforts to examine in detail every economic cri-sis through which he lived. The most prominent examples are the three Books of Crisis (Kris-enhefte), which he compiled in 1857-58 amidst the first truly global economic crisis. This paper sets out to, first, provide an overview of new MEGA-texts regarding Marxʼs studies of contemporaneous 19th century revulsions. In the main part, a closer look will be taken at the origin of Marxʼs crisis studies in the 1840s. A comparison between his notes on James Millʼs Elements of Political Economy, written in the Paris Notebooks (1844), and his excerpts from John Stuart Millʼs Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, taken in his Manchester Notebooks (1845), reveals Marxʼs changing stance on classical political econo-myʼs ʻgeneral glut controversy,ʼ i.e., the debate over the (im)possibility of overproduction cri-ses in commodity-producing societies. In between his stays in Paris and Manchester, Marx took extensive notes on the works of Simonde de Sismondi in his Brussels Notebooks (1845), which played a major role in his break from anthropological-essentialist thinking. JEL classification numbers: B 00, B 51, E 32
著者
佐藤 空
出版者
経済学史学会
雑誌
経済学史研究 (ISSN:18803164)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.58, no.1, pp.49-68, 2016 (Released:2019-08-31)

Abstract: It is widely recognized that Edmund Burke, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, claimed that the ancient constitution of England, chivalry, and the Christian religion had con-tributed much to the formation of the civilized states of Britain and Europe at large. This arti-cle shows that a distinct perspective of the history of civilization existed in the early writings of Burke, An Essay towards an Abridgment of the English History and Fragment: An Essay towards an History of the Laws of England, and also places the ideas of Burke in these works in the context of the early modern history of English historiography. The early writings of Burke clearly assert that throughout history, a civilization could be and had actually been shaped in England through numerous international exchanges between England and other countries. In doing so, his idea seems to have included a perception of empire, which was fur-ther advanced in his later political works. Burkeʼs ideas on conquest and international ex-changes are related to the views on English history developed by the seventeenth-century scholars Spelman and Brady in their works on feudal law; however, Burke was different from these scholars in considering conquest as a powerful driving force behind the formation of the English civilization. Although other historians of the early modern period had held simi-lar ideas about conquest, Burke distinguished himself from them by putting forward a gener-alized model of the civilizing process closely linked to various types of international ex-changes. JEL classification numbers: B 31, N 01.