- 著者
-
Himi Kiyoshi
鈴鹿国際大学
Suzuka International University
- 出版者
- 鈴鹿国際大学
- 雑誌
- 鈴鹿国際大学紀要Campana = Suzuka International University journal campana (ISSN:13428802)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.14, pp.169-180, 2007-01-01
In Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Kant elaborates on his idea of freedom. According to him, freedom is cognizable only through the awareness of the moral law. Therefore the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, while the latter is the ratio essendi of the former. Although such reciprocal substantiation sounds quite paradoxical, we can understand his idea when we look back on his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), examine the development of his conception of freedom and then put his statement in Critique of Practical Reason into its proper context. In this paper I explicate two types of Kant's concept of freedom that are regarded as representing by turns the stages of his philosophical development: (1) practical freedom, (2) transcendental freedom. In the 1770's Kant mainly talked about the former and expected that he could manage with it in his moral philosophy. This expectation was also carried over into Critique of Pure Reason, as is typically found in the chapter 'The canon of pure reason'. Yet he also argued in Critique of Pure Reason about antinomy of pure reason and elaborated in consequence of the resolution of the third antinomy the concept of transcendental freedom in its probability. On account of that some people describe Critique of Pure Reason as a patchwork. However, I argue in this paper that we can learn from the whole text of Critique of Pure Reason the decisive development of Kant's thinking on freedom. Namely, practical freedom is completely excelled by transcendental freedom. Then I consider how he could succeed in demonstrating transcendental freedom in its peculiar reality. In my opinion Kant drew for that purpose in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) an important distinction between the hypothetical and categorical imperative. It was in consequence of this elaborate consideration that he could propose the reciprocal substantiation between the moral law qua categorical imperative and freedom in Critique of Practical Reason.