- 著者
- KAZUHARU KIYONO
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.44, no.4, pp.289-310, 1993-12-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 19
The present paper clarifies an importing country's choice of a partner for a free trade area (FTA) formation in imperfect competition. Before FTA formation, the importing country is unable to impose the higher tariff on the imports from the exporting country with the lower marginal cost for preventing the outflow of monopoly rent under the“most favored nation”constraint of the GATT. However by choosing to form a FTA with the exporting country with the greater marginal cost, the importing country can undertake tariff discrimination (though incomplete) to enhance its welfare. But it definitely reduces the world production efficiency.
- 著者
- KAZUHARU KIYONO
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.44, no.3, pp.242-249, 1993-09-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 6
This paper generalizes Dansby-Willig's industry performance gradient index so as to explicitly relate the maximal feasible welfare improvement rate in imperfectly competitive markets with the number of firms perceiving market power and the industry-wide distribution of marginal costs. Two specific examples of the proposed generalized index are fully explored to obtain two results: (i) the greater number of oligopolistically behaving firms lowers but (ii) the greater variance of the marginal-cost distribution over the industry increases the maximal feasible rate of welfare improvement.
- 著者
- KAZUHARU KIYONO MASAHIRO OKUNO-FUJIWARA KAORU UEDA
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.42, no.4, pp.347-361, 1991-12-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 17
This paper inquires into the effect of choice of protection means, tariffs or quotas, on the economy's protection level for a small country within a specific-factor model when the protection level is determined by the lobbying activities by each industry (non-cooperative game) or jointly by negotiations of all the industries concerned (cooperative game). We will see that strategic interaction among lobbying industries gives rise to non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas.
- 著者
- KAZUHARU KIYONO MASAHIRO OKUNO-FUJIWARA
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.39, no.4, pp.356-377, 1988-12-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 14
- 著者
- TADASHI INOUE KAZUHARU KIYONO
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.39, no.3, pp.246-257, 1988-09-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 8