- 著者
- 
             
             KAZUHARU KIYONO
             
             MASAHIRO OKUNO-FUJIWARA
             
             KAORU UEDA
             
          
- 出版者
- JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
- 雑誌
- The Economic Studies Quarterly (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.42, no.4, pp.347-361, 1991-12-20 (Released:2007-10-19)
- 参考文献数
- 17
        This paper inquires into the effect of choice of protection means, tariffs or quotas, on the economy's protection level for a small country within a specific-factor model when the protection level is determined by the lobbying activities by each industry (non-cooperative game) or jointly by negotiations of all the industries concerned (cooperative game). We will see that strategic interaction among lobbying industries gives rise to non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas.