著者

ROBERT T. PENNOCK

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.28, pp.31-45, 1995-11-15 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

22

被引用文献数

1 2

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This paper reviews some recent work on issues connecting the theories of scientific explanation and confirmation. Beginning with Harman and Hempel and continuing with Salmon, Miller, Pennock and Ruben, I consider different explications of the explanatory relation that could be used in an Inference to the Best Explanation (I.B.E.) confirmation theory. Causal theories of explanation are currently the most promising and I discuss the strengths of an I.B.E. theory based upon an objective "ontic" view of explanation like Salmon's over an "epistemic" causal view such as Miller's. Finally I show how a causal theorist can address two purported weaknesses of the causal approaches that arise from Humean and Sellarsian arguments.

著者

Robert T. Pennock

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.31, no.1, pp.101-119, 1998-05-10 (Released:2009-05-29)

参考文献数

23

被引用文献数

1

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Goodman's Grue Paradox may be intransigent as a version of the problem of induction, but may be resolved within the more limited context of confirmation theory in which the task is to explicate the basic notion of evidential relevance. Although the green and grue hypotheses are equivalently confirmed if we follow Goodman's use of the Hempelian instance confirmation relation, there are asymmetries than can be exploited if we adopt an "ontic" confirmation theory that uses a causal notion of evidential relevance. I sort out a variety of interpretive confusions about the intended content of the definition of grue and show how the causal approach resolves each in a way that is not paradoxical.