著者

酒井 真道

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.77-93, 2013-03-31

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For hundreds of years following the appearance of Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna i.e., the inference of momentariness from the existence of things, his successors were challenged to carefully analyze his argument. They did so by identifying its various parts and defending their formulation from a variety of opponents. Dharmottara is one such successor of Dharmakīrti. This paper focuses on Dharmottara’s contribution to the discussion of the inferential reason—existence (sattva)—and his attempts at resolving problems with it. In his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, Dhamottara introduces and then argues against the view of his opponents that the inferential reason, ‘existence,’ is a pseudoreason. According to his opponents: 1) If this inferential reason were established by a source of knowledge (pramāṇa), it would be opposed (viruddha), since, according to them, existence has to be characterized by permanence (nityatva), which is opposed to the property to be proved i.e., momentariness. They argue that when a source of knowledge is used to ascertain that something is existent (sat), it also ascertains that that thing is permanent (nitya); 2) In contrast, if this inferential reason were not established by a source of knowledge, it would be unestablished (asiddha). Thus, in both cases, the inferential reason would be a pseudo-reason, since it would either be opposed or unestablished. Dharmottara responds to these objections by explaining the functioning of a source of knowledge (pramāṇavyāpāra). He argues that it is not possible for the same source of knowledge to be used to make two different judgments (adhyavasāya). This is because making a judgment can only consist in a single exclusion (ekavyāvr tti). Suppose that a source of knowledge e.g., perception is used to judge that something is existent. This source of knowledge leads to this judgment by excluding that thing from whatever is non-existent (asat)—that is, from things that do not fulfill a specific purpose (anarthakriyā) for the perceiver. The functioning of this source of knowledge is said to come to an end with this exclusion. Thus, it is impossible for this source of knowledge, which has already been used to judge, through exclusion, that something is existent, to itself generate the further judgment that this same thing is permanent. In his overall argument, Dharmottara explains the role that perception plays in ascertaining the existence of a thing, which then serves as the inferential reason from which a thing’s momentariness is inferred. In the intellectual history of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, Dharmottara’s explanation appears to be influential. For example, it seems to have influenced Jñānaśrīmitra when he discusses the issue of how to establish the “inferential reason in the site of the inference (pakṣadharmatā)” for the sattvānumāna. In concluding this paper, I explore Dharmottara’s influence on this aspect of Jñānaśrīmitra’s discussion.