著者

堀内 俊郎

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.13, pp.87-101, 2006-03

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In his Vyākhyāyukti (VyY), Chapter 4, Vasubandhu maintains that Śākyamuni Buddha, a historical figure, is an illusory manifestation (nirmāṇakāya). Having dealt with the former half of Vasubandhu's discussion in my preceding paper, I tried to elucidate here the latter half of the same topic. In this article, first I pointed out that the latter half of Vasubandhu's Buddhakāya-theory found in his VyY was later cited in Sāgaramegha's Bodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā (BBhVy). In his discussion of Buddhakaya-theory, Vasubandhu clarifies the theory of upāyakauśalya ""skillful means"" in detail. By citing two scriptures relevant to this theory, Vasubandhu illustrates the fact that the upāyakauśalya theory is proclaimed not only in Mahāyāna, but also in Śrāvakayāna. Before the citation from those scriptures, a sentence of four lines is also quoted with an introductory phrase gzhan yang ""furthermore"". Comparing the sentence with its corresponding passage found in BBhVy, the sentence composed of four lines in VyY may possibly be understood as originally a verse. Then, what can be questioned is the identification of the citation from both scriptures. As for the second sūtra therein called Ri dags zlog gi mdo, Skilling [2001] assumes that Ri dags zlog must be Migalaṇḍika who is said to have committed the fourth pārājika, i.e. killing, and concludes that the corresponding texts to this sutra are found in Vin, Vol.III.68 and SN, Vol.V.320 (54.9.Vesālī). I am indebted to him for the assumption of Ri dags zlog as Mi(ṛ)galaṇḍika; however, I rather conclude that the source of this Ri dags zlog gi mdo is Saṃyuktāgama, No.809, the Chinese correspondent of SN, Vol.V.320 (54.9.Vesālī). In order to demonstrate this fact, I examined the Chinese translation of the personal name ""Migalaṇḍika-samaṇakuttaka/Mrgadaṇḍika-parivrājaka"" who is said to have been the first person in the Buddhist community that has committed the fourth pārdāika, i.e. killing. From this examination, I have drawn the conclusion that the name Lù-lín-fàn-zhì-zĭ 鹿林梵志子 found in Saṃyuktāgama, No.809 must originally be Lù-lín-fàn-zhì-zĭ 鹿林梵志子, which exactly corresponds to ""Mṛgadaṇḍika-parivrājaka"".

著者

土田 龍太郎

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.16, pp.1-24, 2009-03

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大叙事詩マハーバーラタのおほよその成立年代を推定しようとする場合は、同叙事詩の叙述の枠組およびそれぞれの枠組を具へた傳本の形成の過程にも注目せねばならない。諸傳本の成立については次の諸段階が想定される。一. ジャナメージャヤ王のサルパサトラ祭場におけるヴァイシャムパーヤナによるヴィヤーサ叙事詩朗誦を枠とする傳本Vの成立。二. ナイミシャ林におけるウグラシュラヴァスとシャウナカとの對話を枠とする傳本Uの成立。この枠は傳本Vにアースティーカ物語が附加された時に設けられたものである。三. 現行ハリヴァンシャの一部を成すバヴィシヤトの編者による傳本Uの枠組の踏襲。四. パルヴァサングラハパルヴァンが傳本Uに附加されたことによるナイミシャ林對話の「二重導入」の成立。バヴィシヤトでは、婆羅門出身であつたとおぼしきシュンガ王朝開祖プシャミトラ王のアシュヴァメーダ祭擧行が暗示され、アシュヴァメーダ祭からのクシャトリヤ階層の疎外といふ未曾有の事態のもたらした危機感が全篇の主題となつてゐる。この危機感や興奮のいまだ醒めやらぬシュンガ朝中期後期がバヴィシヤトの成立時であつたと思はれる。とすればバヴィシヤトに先行するはずのマハーバーラタU傳本がシュンガ王朝期より後に成つたとは考へられない。U傳本は遅くともシュンガ朝初期中期には成立してゐたと見るべきであり、U傳本よりさらに古いV傳本はすでにマウリヤ朝時代には形成されてゐたと考へるのが妥當である。ただし、このV傳本の成立が前マウリヤ朝期まで遡るかいなかは定かではない。一方パルヴァサングラハパルヴァンなど現行マハーバーラタの初三章はシュンガ王朝期より後に順次追加されていつたはずである。すなはち「二重導入」は後シュンガ朝期になつてはじめて成立したと想はれる。本稿では、もつぱら語りの枠組に留意して構想された大叙事詩成立年代論を提示した。本来は、ほかのさまざまなマハーバーラタ成立年代論をも吟味檢討すべきであつたが、その作業は別の機會に俟たねばならない。

著者

Saitō Akira

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.17-25, 2013-03-31

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チャンドラキールティ作『プラサンナパダー(明句論)』Prasannapadāの第25「涅槃の考察」章には,校訂者のラ・ヴァレ・プサンも完全なかたちの校訂を断念した2つの経典引用がある.2つの経典引用は,それぞれ第1偈(涅槃の可能性をめぐる,反論者による空批判)および第3偈(ナーガールジュナによるニルヴァーナの特徴づけ)をチャンドラキールティが注釈する中で引用される.ラ・ヴァレ・プサンが校訂を断念した背景には,校訂者が利用した『プラサンナパダー』の3写本(カルカッタ,ケンブリッジ,パリ)が比較的新しい類似写本で,カトマンドゥ・ケーサル図書館蔵の紙写本,オクスフォード大学・ボドレー図書館蔵の貝葉写本,およびラサ・ポタラ宮殿蔵の貝葉写本等の古層の写本が発見されていなかったという事情もあった.これに加えてまた,今日では『プラサンナパダー』に対する著者不明の貴重な複注文献も公にされ,米澤嘉康によって研究が進められている.本研究は,『プラサンナパダー』をめぐる以上のような研究環境の進展と,近年におけるパーリ語仏典(本稿との関連では『ウダーナ』)および初期大乗仏典(同じく『聖般若波羅蜜多宝徳蔵偈』,以下『宝徳蔵般若』と略す)の研究の蓄積を踏まえ,あらためて上記の2つの経典引用のテキストとその典拠を考察した.その結果,第1の経典引用は『ウダーナ』8.9に対応するもので,現行のパーリ本と比較するとき,いくつかの特徴が注目される.チャンドラキールティの引用は基本的にパーリ文であったと推定されるが,部分的にサンスクリット化され,されにまた動詞(アオリスト)表現の一文に代わって,名詞構文が採用されている事実も確認された.第2の経典引用は『宝徳蔵般若』22.6に対応するもので,異なる系統の写本にもとづきA(湯山本)とB(オーバーミラー本)2つの校訂本が公にされるなか,基本的にVasantatilakā 韻律に従い,部分的ながらも,A,B 両校訂本のいずれとも異なる読みを採用している点は注目される.本引用の典拠が確認されたことにより,『プラサンナパダー』に引用される『宝徳蔵般若』偈は,従来の研究で知られていた2つの偈の他に,新たに当該偈が加わり,総計で3偈の引用が確認されることになった.本論文では,20近くの存在が報告される『プラサンナパダー』写本の中で,とくに重要と目される古層の3本を含む6写本をもとに,上述の複注文献およびチベット語訳を参照しながら,チャンドラキールティが引用した際の両経典のテキストの復元を試みた.本研究の成果が,今後の『プラサンナパダー』所引経典の精査とともに,典拠となった経典の再検討をうながす一つの契機となれば,本稿の主要な目的は果たされたといえよう.

著者

岡田 文弘

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.21, pp.105-117, 2014-03

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The Dai Nihonkoku Hokekyō Genki (大日本国法華経験記), is an eleventh-century collection of Buddhist tales written by the monk Chingen (鎮源). In this Genki, there are many stories concerning non-human beings (called irui, 異類), and this study is aims to examine how such beings are depicted in this work. Specifically, it focuses on the story of "Iga o kuni hō'on zennan" (伊賀国報恩善男, Episode no. 106). This tale depicts a beggar-monk who by elucidates the fate of a woman had been reborn as a cow, and by doing so, saves her. In this paper, I discuss how non-human beings feature in Genki episode 106, and show how these unique features may have arisen from Chingen's Lotus Sūtra-inspired thought. Chingen wrote this tale based on one of the stories in the Nihon-ryōiki (日本霊異記, vol. 2, story no. 15) and the Sanbō-ekotoba (三宝絵詞, vol. 2, story no. 11). Furthermore, a version of this story appears later in the Konjaku Monogatari shū (今昔物語集, vol. 14, story no. 13). By comparing these four tales, this research aims to find what elements are original to Chingen's Genki. For example, we find that Chingen cut out a description of the miraculousness of the Heart Sūtra (Hannya-Shingyō, 般若心経) and replaced it with text in praise of a monk (i.e. zanbun, 賛文), based on a section of the Lotus Sūtra (Hoke-kyō, 法華 経). Next, I considered what meaning these unique aspects of episode 106 of Chingen's Genki would have had in context, with respect to his specific audience. In other variations of the story, the merit gained from copying the Lotus Sūtra by the son of the woman who had been reborn as cow, is combined with the merit from the hannya darani (般若陀羅尼) said by the monk, and given to the cow. That is to say, the one who is saved (the cow-woman), and the ones who do the salvific act (the monk and the cow-womans son) are depicted in simple contradistinction. However, in the Genki, the monk is regarded to have received the power of the Lotus Sūtra, and advanced from a common human being to a saint, and as a result, both the cowwoman and the monk have come to be arranged in parallel as subjects who receive the Lotus Sūtra's power. That is to say, in the Genki, the one who does the saving (the monk) and one who is saved (the cow-woman) are not in a simple contradistinction as above, but are dependent on each other for salvation by the power of the Lotus Sūtra. Furthermore, I suggest that the "ten worlds theory" (jūkkai-setsu, 十界説) which Chingen refers to in the preface, is one background factor that may have influenced how these special features of Genki no.106 came about.

著者

西本 照真

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.3, pp.61-75, 1995-10-31

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There are some Tun-huang manuscripts of the San-chieh-chiao (三階教) that have not been introduced by Keiki Yabuki and others. One of them is Pelliot 2849 (P2849), which I presume was transcribed in the 7th or 8th century. There are three texts in it. One of them is titled the Chih-fa (制法 Enacted Regulations, hereafter CF) and consists of twenty provisions with a prologue, the first five prescribing general remarks and the remaining fifteen enumerating particular cases. This paper starts with the hypothesis that the CF presents regulations for the San-chieh-chiao monastic life, and proves it through the analysis of mainly the first five provisions in comparison with other San-chieh-chiao texts. The results are as follows: 1. The model type of monk that the CF describes is called the "dumb sheep monk'(CF 1&2). "Dumb sheep" is a metaphor for monks who are very slow in reacting in religious matters and remain. silent. In the terminal age (末世) no judgments can be correct; therefore it is best for monks not to judge at all. If one is a "dumb sheep monk" then there is no fear of one's distinguishing between good and evil. The "dumb sheep monk" is also listed as a model for fellow trainee in the Tui-ken ch'i-hsing fa (対根起行法, TK). 2. While the San-chieh-chiao texts, as a whole, make great account of the teaching of the "four standards" (Catvāri pratisaraņāni), the CF 3 emphasizes that the trainee should depend on the sūtra, not on persons, since there are many perverse people and very few righteous in the terminal age. This attitude is reflected in the fact that a rigid distinction is made between the sūtra's words and the text writer's words. 3. The phases of the stage that the CF shows are those of "bad world," "bad time," and "bad people" (CF 4). Under the situation called "the Third Stage" in the San-chieh-chiao teaching, the ways of practicing to enter the realm of enlightenment are to reflect on one's own evil, to venerate others'goodness, to concentrate on just one practice, to train oneself for one's own benefit, and so forth. 4. The sentences about fellow trainees in the CF 5 almost agree with those in the manuscripts of the San-chieh fo-fa (三階仏法, SC, written in 592) 4 in Japan. The style is imperative and fits with regulations, which is essential to the content of the CF but somewhat alien to the SC. It is presumable that the CF was enacted before 592, and the SC quoted the sentences from the CF. These studies verify the hypothesis mentioned above, that the CF gives regulations for the San-chieh-chiao monastic life. According to Hsin-hsing's biography in the Hsü kao-seng chuan (続高僧伝), he wrote a work named the Shang-tung so-chip chung-shih chu-fa (山東所制衆事諸法 ST) before moving to Ch'ang-an in 589. This is also presumed to contain regulations for the San-chieh-chiao, and it might be the CF itself. Even if the CF is different from the ST, it must have been written not long after he moved to Ch'ang-an. The latest date of the CF's enactment was presumably not long after 589. On the other hand, in some of the catalogues, such as the K'ai-yüan-shih-chiao-lu (開元釈教録), one of the San-chieh-chiao texts named the Ta-chung chih-fa (大衆制法) is listed. This text can probably be identified with the CF.

著者

中西 俊英

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.17, pp.57-72, 2010-03-31

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“The non-obstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal”(shi shi wu’ai 事事無〓)is a representative concept of Huayan Buddhism and a way of thinking that emphasizes the phenomenal (shi 事) paying maximum attention to the phenomenal world.// The doctrine of four kinds of dharmadhātu (fajie 法界) wherein this notion of the “nonobstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal” is placed at the highest level, has been regarded as a distinctive expression of the thought of the Huayan school in China. However, Fazang 法藏(643–712), the third patriarch and the systematizer of Huayan doctrine not only did not place the concept of “non-obstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal” at the top, but did not even use the term in his writings. The same is true for his disciple Huiyuan 慧苑(673?–743?).// In this paper, we focus on the concept of “non-obstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal,” taking into consideration the attitude of Huayan scholars toward the phenomenal world in terms of its history of development. Additionally, in reference to this concept, we examine the placement in the history of ideas of the text Huayan wujiao zhiguan 華嚴五敎止観, the authorship and dating of which have up until now not been adequately clarified. Our findings can be summarized as follows.// In Fazang’s five kinds of dharmadhātu doctrine, he did not place the concept “nonobstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal” on top. Rather, he regarded as paramount the non-obstruction of the phenomenal and the absolute (li 理), the absolute and the phenomenal , one and all as unhindered (wu zhang’ai 無障〓), as conceived in the worldview of the Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra. Further, this attitude can be confirmed from his disciple Huiyuan.// Differing on this point was Chengguan 澄觀(738–839), the fourth patriarch, and the one who established the doctrine of four kinds of dharmadhātu, placing emphasis on the notion of “non-obstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal” taking the One Mind (yixin―心) as its basis. He applied himself in the explication of this concept using a rigorous approach, one which was similar to an awareness of the issues of the contemporaneous Chan Buddhists.// In addition, we work out the history of ideas from Fazang to Chengguan with a central focus on the notion of “non-obstruction between the phenomenal and the phenomenal,” within the framework of which we examine the Huayan wujiao zhiguan, clarifying the fact that this text was composed within the time period starting from 740 up to the date when the northern school of Chan Buddhism (Beizong 北宗) faded into the background.

著者

渡邉 眞儀

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.49-64, 2014-03-31

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The Vaiśeṣika system is known for its static concept of time. In this system, time (kāla) is listed as one of the eternal and all-pervading substances like space (diś) and ether (ākāśa). According to Wilhelm Halbfass, time is marginalized in the classical Vaiśeṣika system completed by Praśastapāda. It plays the limited role in causal processes; it is a mere coordinate that determines when things are produced or destroyed and when events occur. It is neither a supreme cosmic power nor a fundamental cause of changes. In some aspects, the Vaiśeṣika concept of time seems similar to the concept of “Absolute Time” in modern physics. But there are major differences between them. According to Praśastapāda, the realization of time’s existence depends on our ordinary notions which relate to time, like “quick/slow” or “simultaneous”. It is not an “absolute” substance, but a theoretical requirement for such temporal and relative notions. Although time does not take on much importance in the system, there have been some attempts to justify its theoretical significance in it. For example, the concept of the three times, i.e. past, present, and future, is ignored in Praśastapāda’s original system, but his successors tried to formalize them in the system. In this paper, I investigate the theory of the three times which was established by one of the Praśastapāda’s commentators, Udayana, and consider how significant it is in the later Vaiśeṣika system. Basically keeping the classical Vaiśeṣika system, he used unique analystic tools, existence (sattā)/non-existence (abhāva), and a bearer (dharmin)/an attribute (dharma), by which the three times are definitely ordered. He also adopted more or less grammatical explanation so that his theory might agree with actual uses of temporal expression. I conclude that his theory successfully integrated both the classical Vaiśeṣika concept of time and the discussions in other schools such as Nyāya or Grammarian school. Although his achievement was remarkable, his theory had little influence on later Vaiśeṣika scholars. They formally cited only a part of his elaborate theory, and ignored the implication that time has a more prominent and dynamic function than Praśastapāda’s theory. They preferred to maintain Praśastapāda’s static view of time rather than admit Udayana’s innovative theory.

著者

韓 尚希

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.27-41, 2013-03-31

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In the various teachings found in the Nikāyas, there is no consistent, systematic explanation about the process or method for how Buddhist practitioners achieve the “fruits of the saints” or attain emancipation. Since the descriptions of the same subject in different parts of the Nikāyas do not show clear correlation, and are somewhat fragmented, it would seem that the elements of the system of practice outlined in the Nikāyas are discordant with each other to a certain degree. However, by analyzing the different contexts that a certain subject is taught in, it is possible to understand these various teachings as a unified system. With this framework in mind, this paper explores the concept and attainment of cetovimutti (emancipation of the heart) and paññāvimutti (emancipation by wisdom), both states achieved by arahants, based on their relation to the system of “The Four Noble Truths” and “The Noble Eightfold Path.” Doing so will clarify the following points. It is thought that cetovimutti is derived from the expression of meaning “release in the mind,” or in other words “complete emancipation.” However, it does not appear to carry the same meaning in every case. When cetovimutti and paññāvimutti appear as a pair, cetovimutti is placed at the midway point to emancipation, while complete emancipation is identified as achieving paññāvimutti. In this way, when cetovimutti and paññāvimutti both appear as a pair they both are regarded as the state of complete emancipation of an arahant. In other contexts, cetovimutti means “the release of the heart from lust (rāga) by achieving the eighth item in the Noble Eightfold Path (i.e sammāsamādhi or the four jhānas),” while paññāvimutti means “the release from ignorance (avijjā) by the attainment of wisdom that is the complete realization of the Four Noble Truths, attained by completing the Noble Eightfold Path.” It is thought that by achieving the ninth and the tenth qualities of the ten qualities of arahant (dasa asekhā dhammā), right knowledge (sammāñāṇa) and right emancipation (sammāvimutti), the first eight items of this system are none other than the Noble Eightfold Path. In this case, paññāvimutti comes after cetovimutti, in the same way that wisdom (paññā) comes after meditation (samādhi).

著者

佐藤 もな

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.80-92, 2002-09-20

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Dohan 道範(1178?-1252) was a monk of the Shingon school 真言宗 on Mt. Kōya 高野山 in the early Kamakura 鎌倉 period. The aim of this paper is to investigate his ideas on the Pure Land 浄土 in the Himitsu-nenbutsu-shō 秘密念仏抄, one of his representative works on Amida Buddha 阿弥陀仏 and the Pure Land from the viewpoint of Esoteric Buddhism. In this work, Dōhan quotes some passages from the works of Nakanogawa Jippan 中川実範(?-1144) and Kakuban 覚鑁(1095-1143) as pioneers of the esoteric interpretation of the Pure Land. He presents a new system of ideas on the basis of their works. I examine them from three points of view, that is, his ideas on Amida Buddha, the Pure Land, and myōgō 名号 or the Buddha's name, and consider how Dohan accepted earlier ideas and what the characteristics of his ideas were. According to Dōhan, conventional ideas about the Pure Land and Amida are at an immature stage of understanding, and at a deeper level Amida is thought to be the same as Dainichi Nyorai 大日如来, the main Buddha of Esoteric Buddhism. He also states that the land of Gokuraku 極楽浄土 is not actually in the west but in the minds of all creatures, and that raigō 来迎, or Amida's coming to meet a dying person, does not mean that Amida actually comes to take him to the real Pure Land, but that with some training he sees the Buddha in his mind. With regard to myōgō, he developed Kakuban's idea that every word is a mantra 真言, and asserts that chanting Amida's name and chanting mantras have quite the same meaning. In addition, Dohan asserts that various virtues are included in the three letters of A-mi-da. And in conclusion, he even says that the entire world of a maņdala is included in the name of Amida. One might venture to say that the interpretation of the name of Amida in the Shingon school attained its ultimate stage in his system. In this way, Dōhan radically reinterpreted the concepts of Amida, the Pure Land, myōgō, and so on from his position based on the doctrines of Esoteric Buddhism. He considered that the ideas of the Pure Land and Amida Buddha were part of Shingon doctrine and insists on the superiority of Esoteric Buddhism by subsuming these ideas under the system of Esoteric Buddhism. Thus, his ideas were different from a "fusion" of Esoteric Buddhism and Pure Land Buddhism, which was a characteristic of the interpretation of the Pure Land in the Shingon school before him.

著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.19, pp.73-89, 2012-03

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Sarvāstivādins assert all factors (dharma) exist in all times. In their ontology, the way factors pass through the present time seems problematic if they "exist" in the three times : future, present, and past. To answer this problem, the Abhidharma scholar Vasumitra defined the present time as the time when factors have their activities (kāritra). Although his theory was accepted by Sarvāstivādins in general, it was still unclear what he meant by the word "activity". Therefore, another Abhidharma scholar, Saṃghabhadra, the author of *Nyāyānusāriṇī, redefined it "the power to project its own effect (*phalākṣepaśakti)" that all conditioned (saṃskṛta) factors must have in the present. Modern scholars such as G. Sasaki explained *phalākṣepa as phalapratigraha, an ability that a conditioned factor fixes itself as a cause of its own effect. Contrary to this explanation, T. Fukuda reasoned that not every phalapratigraha is *phalākṣepa, and concluded that *phalākṣepa corresponds only to those phalapratigraha affecting the effect that arises after its cause arose ("*phalākṣepa≠phalapratigraha theory"). The present article reconsiders Fukuda's hypothesis. By this reconsideration the article clarifies that his understanding unconsciously presupposes a few notions Saṃghabhadra does not accept. From this discussion, it is concluded that every phalapratigraha is *phalākṣepa which Saṃghabhadra regarded as deciding the present.

著者

岡田 文弘

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.105-117, 2014-03-31

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The Dai Nihonkoku Hokekyō Genki (大日本国法華経験記), is an eleventh-century collection of Buddhist tales written by the monk Chingen (鎮源). In this Genki, there are many stories concerning non-human beings (called irui, 異類), and this study is aims to examine how such beings are depicted in this work. Specifically, it focuses on the story of “Iga o kuni hō’on zennan” (伊賀国報恩善男, Episode no. 106). This tale depicts a beggar-monk who by elucidates the fate of a woman had been reborn as a cow, and by doing so, saves her. In this paper, I discuss how non-human beings feature in Genki episode 106, and show how these unique features may have arisen from Chingen’s Lotus Sūtra-inspired thought. Chingen wrote this tale based on one of the stories in the Nihon-ryōiki (日本霊異記, vol. 2, story no. 15) and the Sanbō-ekotoba (三宝絵詞, vol. 2, story no. 11). Furthermore, a version of this story appears later in the Konjaku Monogatari shū (今昔物語集, vol. 14, story no. 13). By comparing these four tales, this research aims to find what elements are original to Chingen’s Genki. For example, we find that Chingen cut out a description of the miraculousness of the Heart Sūtra (Hannya-Shingyō, 般若心経) and replaced it with text in praise of a monk (i.e. zanbun, 賛文), based on a section of the Lotus Sūtra (Hoke-kyō, 法華 経). Next, I considered what meaning these unique aspects of episode 106 of Chingen’s Genki would have had in context, with respect to his specific audience. In other variations of the story, the merit gained from copying the Lotus Sūtra by the son of the woman who had been reborn as cow, is combined with the merit from the hannya darani (般若陀羅尼) said by the monk, and given to the cow. That is to say, the one who is saved (the cow-woman), and the ones who do the salvific act (the monk and the cow-womans son) are depicted in simple contradistinction. However, in the Genki, the monk is regarded to have received the power of the Lotus Sūtra, and advanced from a common human being to a saint, and as a result, both the cowwoman and the monk have come to be arranged in parallel as subjects who receive the Lotus Sūtra’s power. That is to say, in the Genki, the one who does the saving (the monk) and one who is saved (the cow-woman) are not in a simple contradistinction as above, but are dependent on each other for salvation by the power of the Lotus Sūtra. Furthermore, I suggest that the “ten worlds theory” (jūkkai-setsu, 十界説) which Chingen refers to in the preface, is one background factor that may have influenced how these special features of Genki no.106 came about.

著者

佐藤 もな

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, pp.80-92, 2002-09-20

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Dohan 道範(1178?-1252) was a monk of the Shingon school 真言宗 on Mt. Kōya 高野山 in the early Kamakura 鎌倉 period. The aim of this paper is to investigate his ideas on the Pure Land 浄土 in the Himitsu-nenbutsu-shō 秘密念仏抄, one of his representative works on Amida Buddha 阿弥陀仏 and the Pure Land from the viewpoint of Esoteric Buddhism. In this work, Dōhan quotes some passages from the works of Nakanogawa Jippan 中川実範(?-1144) and Kakuban 覚鑁(1095-1143) as pioneers of the esoteric interpretation of the Pure Land. He presents a new system of ideas on the basis of their works. I examine them from three points of view, that is, his ideas on Amida Buddha, the Pure Land, and myōgō 名号 or the Buddha's name, and consider how Dohan accepted earlier ideas and what the characteristics of his ideas were. According to Dōhan, conventional ideas about the Pure Land and Amida are at an immature stage of understanding, and at a deeper level Amida is thought to be the same as Dainichi Nyorai 大日如来, the main Buddha of Esoteric Buddhism. He also states that the land of Gokuraku 極楽浄土 is not actually in the west but in the minds of all creatures, and that raigō 来迎, or Amida's coming to meet a dying person, does not mean that Amida actually comes to take him to the real Pure Land, but that with some training he sees the Buddha in his mind. With regard to myōgō, he developed Kakuban's idea that every word is a mantra 真言, and asserts that chanting Amida's name and chanting mantras have quite the same meaning. In addition, Dohan asserts that various virtues are included in the three letters of A-mi-da. And in conclusion, he even says that the entire world of a maņdala is included in the name of Amida. One might venture to say that the interpretation of the name of Amida in the Shingon school attained its ultimate stage in his system. In this way, Dōhan radically reinterpreted the concepts of Amida, the Pure Land, myōgō, and so on from his position based on the doctrines of Esoteric Buddhism. He considered that the ideas of the Pure Land and Amida Buddha were part of Shingon doctrine and insists on the superiority of Esoteric Buddhism by subsuming these ideas under the system of Esoteric Buddhism. Thus, his ideas were different from a ""fusion"" of Esoteric Buddhism and Pure Land Buddhism, which was a characteristic of the interpretation of the Pure Land in the Shingon school before him.

著者

岡田 文弘

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.105-117, 2014-03-31

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The Dai Nihonkoku Hokekyō Genki (大日本国法華経験記), is an eleventh-century collection of Buddhist tales written by the monk Chingen (鎮源). In this Genki, there are many stories concerning non-human beings (called irui, 異類), and this study is aims to examine how such beings are depicted in this work. Specifically, it focuses on the story of “Iga o kuni hō’on zennan” (伊賀国報恩善男, Episode no. 106). This tale depicts a beggar-monk who by elucidates the fate of a woman had been reborn as a cow, and by doing so, saves her. In this paper, I discuss how non-human beings feature in Genki episode 106, and show how these unique features may have arisen from Chingen’s Lotus Sūtra-inspired thought. Chingen wrote this tale based on one of the stories in the Nihon-ryōiki (日本霊異記, vol. 2, story no. 15) and the Sanbō-ekotoba (三宝絵詞, vol. 2, story no. 11). Furthermore, a version of this story appears later in the Konjaku Monogatari shū (今昔物語集, vol. 14, story no. 13). By comparing these four tales, this research aims to find what elements are original to Chingen’s Genki. For example, we find that Chingen cut out a description of the miraculousness of the Heart Sūtra (Hannya-Shingyō, 般若心経) and replaced it with text in praise of a monk (i.e. zanbun, 賛文), based on a section of the Lotus Sūtra (Hoke-kyō, 法華 経). Next, I considered what meaning these unique aspects of episode 106 of Chingen’s Genki would have had in context, with respect to his specific audience. In other variations of the story, the merit gained from copying the Lotus Sūtra by the son of the woman who had been reborn as cow, is combined with the merit from the hannya darani (般若陀羅尼) said by the monk, and given to the cow. That is to say, the one who is saved (the cow-woman), and the ones who do the salvific act (the monk and the cow-womans son) are depicted in simple contradistinction. However, in the Genki, the monk is regarded to have received the power of the Lotus Sūtra, and advanced from a common human being to a saint, and as a result, both the cowwoman and the monk have come to be arranged in parallel as subjects who receive the Lotus Sūtra’s power. That is to say, in the Genki, the one who does the saving (the monk) and one who is saved (the cow-woman) are not in a simple contradistinction as above, but are dependent on each other for salvation by the power of the Lotus Sūtra. Furthermore, I suggest that the “ten worlds theory” (jūkkai-setsu, 十界説) which Chingen refers to in the preface, is one background factor that may have influenced how these special features of Genki no.106 came about.

著者

西沢 史仁

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.16, pp.69-82, 2009-03

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rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364–1432) is the one of the main disciples of rJe Tsong kha pa (1357–1419), the founder of the dGe lugs pa. The fundamental doctrine of the dGe lugs pa was established mainly by so-called rJe yab sras gsum, i.e., rJe Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen, and mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang (1385–1438). Among them, Dar ma rin chen is famous for his writings on pramāṇa/tshad ma, especially for his commentary on Pramāṇavārttika, named rNam bshad thar lam gsal byed, which has been regarded as one of the most standard and authoritative texts in the dGe lugs pa's pramāṇa tradition. In this small essay, I will focus on his interpretation on the definition of pramāṇa which is found in Thar lam gsal byed and rNam nges dar ṭik, his detailed commentary on Pramāṇaviniścaya. We can find his explanation of the definition of pramāṇa in Thar lam gsal byed pp. 340.18–350.14, the commentary on PV II. 1–6, and in rNam nges dar ṭik pp. 19.5–55.1, the commentary on the passage of PVin I. (Skt.) p. 1.10: na hy ābhyām arthaṃ paricchidya pravartamāno 'rthakriyāyāṃ visaṃ vādyate. The point is how to interpret these two definitions, i.e., avisaṃvādakatva shown in PV II. 1a and ajñātārthaprakāśakatva shown in PV II. 5c. On these two definitions, as indicated by Sa paṇin his Tshad ma rigs gter, Indian commentators, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and Dharmottara, made different interpretations, and Tibetan scholars developed this argument in more detailed and enlarged ways. Dar ma rin chen obviously kept this argument in mind when he explained the definition of pramāṇa. My analysis of these two texts composed by Dar ma rin chen leads to the following conclusions: 1. Dar ma rin chen regards "gsar du mi slu ba'i shes pa (a newly [understanding and] non-belying knowledge)" as the definition of pramāṇa. This definition is the combination of the two definitions, avisaṃvādakatva and ajñātārthaprakāśakatva. However, it is noteworthy that he explained avisaṃvādakatva as "ngo bo (*svarūpa, nature)" of pramāṇa, and ajñātārthaprakāśakatva as "khyad par (*viśeṣaṇa, restriction)". That means that he stressed on avisaṃvādakatva as the main nature of pramāṇa, not ajñāntārthaprakāśakatva. Therefore we can conclude that Dar ma rin chen regarded the non-belying knowledge restricted by novelty as the definition of pramāṇa. This interpretation has been widely accepted as the standard definition of pramāṇa in the dGe lugs pa monasteries. 2. According to Dar ma rin chen, PV II. 1a shows the complete definition of pramāa, not a part of it, although it shows avisaṃvādakatva alone in a direct way. That means, he recognized that PV II. 1a also includes ajñātārthaprakāśakatva, another part of the definition, in an indirect way. 3. The necessity of the restriction of ajñātārthaprakāśakatva is to exclude bcad shes (re-understanding knowledge).

著者

Davin Didier

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.15, pp.115-129, 2008-03-31

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In his anthology the Kyôun-shû, Ikkyû wrote four stanzas dedicated to the so-called four distinctions of Linji, a famous passage from the Record of Linji, which consists in suppressing the man (人) without suppressing the environment (境), suppressing the environment without suppressing the man, suppressing both the man and the environment, suppressing neither the man nor the environment. To examine these stanzas a thorough philological analysis is indispensable, and the precious commentaries on the Kyôun-shû, mainly by Yanagida Seizan and Hirano Sôjô, were the basis of our reading, even if we did not necessarily agree with all of their interpretations. We tried to reinterpret the poems as a whole by means of original research on their literal meaning. For these reasons, and because Ikkyû's thinking is only expressed in verses referring to Zen texts and Chinese poetry, mostly from the Tang, our article is mainly a philological reexamination of Ikkyû's stanzas in order to suggest a new reading of them. We aimed, by a concrete analysis of Ikkyû's use of citations, to bring out the primary but obviously not most important meaning of the verses and, by a contextualization with the theme of the four distinctions of Linji, to determine their doctrinal purpose. We thus reached the conclusion that Ikkyû unfolds in these stanzas a temporal process involving a double definition of terms. There is a "man" before the suppression different from the "man" after the suppression, and likewise for the "environment". Another originality of Ikkyû lies in the fact he illustrates the profane level, the level before suppression, by examples usually considered as belonging to the already enlightened world, famous Zen monks for "man" or a temple for the "environment". The level of enlightenment is then depicted as a new ideal whose very model of "man" is Ikkyû himself while the "environment" is the whole world, even in its crudest parts. Of course this conclusion needs to be refined by a wider examination of the Kyôun-shû, but we hope that we were able to demonstrate the pertinence of the method and the necessity of continuing in this way.

著者

Saito Akira

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.13-22, 2011-03-31

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初期サーンキヤ派が導入した学説の一つにpratibimba(影像)説がある。この学説は、原質(prakṛti)と純粋精神(puruṣa)との二元論に立脚する同学派にとって、いかにして、原質由来の非精神的な知性(buddhi)等が知覚という精神的ともいえる行為をなし、他方また、行為主体でないと規定された純粋精神が対象を知覚しその結果を享受する行為をなしうるのか、という根本問題への回答という文脈において導入された。じっさい同学派において純粋精神は、行為主体でなく、変化することがなく、遍在すると規定される一方、見る者、知る者、結果を享受する者等と伝統的に特徴づけられている。// サーンキヤ派のpratibimba 説については従来の研究も少なくない。『中観心論』Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā およびその注釈『論理炎論』Tarkajvālā を通して、バヴィヤによる同学説批判を論じた研究も複数ある。しかしながら、これらはいずれも『中観心論』のサンスクリット語写本の公開と本格的な校訂研究以前の成果であり、同写本とその校訂作業を基礎にした本論題に関する再検証が待たれていた。一方また、同派のpratibimba説は、イーシュヴァラクリシュナ(4–5世紀)作『サーンキヤ・カ-リカー』には見られず、伝説では第二祖のアースリ頌に帰せられるという。しかしながら、じっさいに同偈頌が引用されるのは、後代のヴァイシェーシカ派やジャイナ教徒等の手になる論典あるいは注釈文献であり、そのテキストと解釈についても今なお問題を残している。// このような意味で、『中観心論』およびその注釈『論理炎論』の第6 章「サーンキヤ派の真実[説への批判的]入門」は、サーンキヤ派による最初期のpratibimba 説を伝える資料としてきわめて重要である。本稿では、総計65偈からなる同章の中から、pratibimba 説の前主張を示す第2偈、および後主張にあたる第22,23両偈を、それぞれに対するバヴィヤの注釈内容とともに分析する。これと併せ、『中観心論』第3章「真実知の探求」第53偈と同偈に対する注釈を手掛かりとして考察し、以下のような結論を得た。// (1) バヴィヤが紹介するサーンキヤ派のpratibimba 説によれば、純粋精神は、その上に月の影像などが映し出される静かな水に喩えられる。すなわち、影像を映す水に喩えられるのは知性(buddhi)ではなく純粋精神(puruṣa)である。// (2) したがって、このばあい静かな水に喩えられる純粋精神は、知性によって確認された知覚対象を間接的に映し出すのであり、あたかもその映像の前後において水自体に変化がないように、純粋精神そのものに変化はないとサーンキヤ派は主張する。// (3) 以上のような前主張に対して、pratibimba 説は「他のものを生じる原因とはならない」「変化しない」等といわれる純粋精神の特質に矛盾する、とバヴィヤは批判する。// (4) バヴィヤはまた、初期のサーンキヤ派には、純粋精神が知性に似てはたらくことの理由を、pratibimba 説とならび、純粋精神の変異(pariṇāma)によると説く学説があったことを紹介する。この学説に対してバヴィヤは、精神性、非原因、遍在性という純粋精神本来の特質との矛盾を指摘して批判を加える。

著者

土田 龍太郎

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.17, pp.1-16, 2010-03

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シュンガ王朝没落の後に,四代四十五年にわたって續いたカーヌヴァーヤナ王朝の實態は不明である。プラーナ中のカリユガ王朝テキストによれば,第十代シュンガ王デーヴァブーミの大臣であったヴァスデーヴァが,主君を斃して創始した王朝がカーヌヴァーヤナ王朝である。// 同じカリユガ王朝テキストには,パウラヴァ王朝のジャナメージャヤ王のアシュヴァメーダ祭擧行の顛末がやや詳しく述べられてゐる。この叙述にはシュンガ王朝開祖たるプシュミトラ王の同祭擧行の實情が反映してゐると推測される。この推測に従へば,ヴァージャサネーイン派の支派たるカーヌヴァ派の婆羅門がブラフマン祭官としてプシャミトラの大祭祀の成功を助け,これをきつかけとしてかれの一族が政府宮廷内に勢力を扶植することをえ,つひには大臣となつたヴァスデーヴァがシュンガ王権を簒奪した,と考へられるのである

著者

丸井 浩

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.19, pp.19-59, 2012-03-31

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As the fourth of the Nyāya’s twelvefold prameya (the objects to be rightly known for the attainment of liberation), the “artha” is defined or simply described at the NS 1.1.14: gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ pṛthivyādiguṇās tadarthāhḥ. According to Vātsyāyana, the sūtra seems simply to imply that smell, taste, colour, touch and sound, which are the qualities of earth, etc., are respectively the objects of the five (external) sense-organs. But the sūtra was interpreted differently by different scholars of Nyāya in later times. What attracts our attention, first of all, is a totally different way of analyzing the compound “pṛthivyādi-guṇāḥ.” Uddyotakara criticizes the interpretation of ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa (pṛthivyādīnāṃ guṇāḥ) as too narrow and strongly argues for dvandva (pṛthivyādīni ca gunṇāś ca), insisting that the sūtra should be taken to be the exhaustive presentation of all the perceptible entities as the artha or the indriyārtha, including three kinds of substances (pṛthivyādīni = pṛthivyaptejāṃsi), all the perceptible properties (the “guṇāḥ” in its proper sense) other than smell and the like, such as number, etc., along with motion, the higher or lower universals and even the principle of inherence, all of which are implied by the term “guṇāḥ” in its wider sense. Vācaspati clearly supports his view. On the other hand Jayanta definitely rejects the interpretation of dvandva and shows the relevance of tatpuruṣa analysis, whereas Bhāsarvajña tries to justify the dvandva interpretation. But it would be superficial to assume two lines of interpretation simply in terms of the two opposing ways of analyzing the compound. The fundamental difference lies in two divergent viewpoints of treating the concept of artha as a prameya. Both Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña emphasize the soteriological significance of valid cognition of the artha or the objects of sense-organs. Jayanta, in particular, refers to them as a cause of attachment (saktihetu) and states that those who seek liberation should contemplate them as the objects to be abandoned (heyatayā bhāvayitavyāḥ). Jayanta supports the tatpuruṣa analysis because the sūtra is meant to mention only the predominant causes of attachment. Bhāsarvajña, in contrast, insists on the dvandva interpretation because in his view it is necessary to read the sūtra as the exhaustive list of causes of “defects” (doṣa=rāgadveṣa-moha). In spite of the formal difference in the compound analysis, both of them share a soteriological viewpoint in the context of the artha as a prameya. It is difficult to conclude decisively the chronological order of their discussion, but Jayanta’s argument seems to represent a later stage. Uddyotakara’s explanation, on the other hand, concentrates on the epistemological aspect of the artha. He claims the irrelevance of tatpuruṣa interpretation on the ground that it would exclude, for instance, three substances (dravya) that should be admitted as perceptible by the authority of NS 3.1.1. He tries to justify the sūtra’s separate mention of five objects of sense from smell to sound by saying that it is specifically to show the particularity of the one-to-one relationship between each of them and its corresponding sense-organ. He never refers to the soteriological importance of the concept. Moreover, he evidently depends on the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of six categories for his enumeration of perceptible entities with a slight modification. Heavy dependence of his account of the artha upon Vaiśeṣika categories also provides a sharp contrast with Jayanta, who explicitly denied the relevance of six categories in the context of prameya, just as Vātsyāyana had done. It is relevant in this connection to examine the treatment of the artha in two representative compendiums of Nyāya System, probably written not long after Udayana (11th cent.), namely Varadarāja’s Tārkikarakṣā[-sārasaṃ graha] (12th cent.) and Keśavamiśra’s Tarkabhāṣā (around 1300 A.D.). Varadarāja defines the artha as “what can be grasped by senseorgans” (indriya-grāhya) and tries to make an exhaustive list of perceptible entities according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories without reference to the soteriological implication of the artha. Thus, like Uddyotakara, he concentrates on its epistemological dimension. But he goes a little further by introducing the detailed account of the Vaiśeṣika doctirine of seven categories as an appendix to the description of Nyāya’s twelvefold prameya. Keśavamiśra, on the other hand, goes so far as to extend the conceptual sphere of the artha up to the whole six or seven categories of Vaiśeṣika, thus totally abandoning the soteriological meaning peculiar to the Nyāya’s idea of artha. Therefore it may safely be said that Nyāya’s concept of artha as a prameya was shifted toward the direction of diminishing emphasis on its soteriological relevance and at the same time toward the direction of a closer and closer relation with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories. Against this stream Jayanta tried to retain the traditional soteriological significance of the concept. This conclusion fits in well with the general observation that Jayanta’s account of Nyāya System generally represents its earlier phase. Incidentally, the Nyāyakalikā provides precisely the same soteriological account of the artha as we have seen above in the Nyāyamañjarī. The similarity in wording is also outstanding. These facts seem to speak for Jayanta’s authorship of the text. Even if we were to admit that someone else had composed it by extracting relevant sentences from NM with some modification, it is not likely that a compendium of such an archaic nature was written long after Udayana.

著者

He Huanhuan

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.18, pp.23-37, 2011-03-31

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『思択炎論』Tarkajvālā を構成する全11章の中で、第7章「ヴァイシェーシカ派の真実[説]の確定」に関しては、従来、比較的研究が乏しかった。その主な理由は、同論が注釈対象とする根本偈、すなわち『中観心論』Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā のサンスクリット写本が、同章のほぼ全体を収める第18フォリオ(葉)を欠いているからである。総計で29偈からなる同章の中では、最後の2偈のみは第19フォリオの第1行目に置かれるため、サンスクリット語で入手可能であるが、それ以前の27偈は、残念ながらチベット語訳のみに拠らざるを得ないのが現況である。// 『思択炎論』の第7章における著者バヴィヤの主要な意図は、初期ヴァイシェーシカ派の典籍で主張されるアートマンおよび六原理(padārtha、句義)に対する批判的な分析を通して、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を考察、批判することにあった。バヴィヤは、序説および第1偈においてヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論を紹介し、その前主張、とくに第1偈にとりまとめた解脱論を、第2偈以降に置かれた後主張の中の第23偈から第28偈において、句(pāda)ごとに批判を加える。バヴィヤによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介と批判は、初期ヴァーシェーシカ派の主要な思想を伝えるばかりでなく、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論に対する当時の仏教徒による批判の一端を示している点できわめて興味深く、貴重な資料である。// バヴィヤは、ヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論をいかに理解したのか。かれによるヴァイシェーシカ派の解脱論の紹介は、はたして『ヴァイシェーシカ・スートラ』のみに依拠したのであろうか。あるいは、プラシャスタパーダ作の『パダールタダルマサングラハ(諸原理と法の綱要)』(Padārthadharmasaṃgraha)等のヴァイシェーシカ派の他の著作の影響があったのであろうか。さらにまた、かれは議論に際して、意図して仏教の教理を援用し、結果としてヴァイシェーシカ学説を歪曲するようなことはなかったと言えるであろうか。// 本論文では、とくにバヴィヤに伝えられたヴァイシェーシカ学説の典拠を探り、かれの批判の内容に分析を加えながら、以上のような関連する複数の問いに対する基礎的な回答を提示したい。

著者

徐 海基

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.6, pp.46-59, 1999-03-30

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The central problem addressed in this paper is the explanation of the dharma-dhātu (法界) as it is presented by Cheng-guan (澄観, 738-839), the fourth patriarch of the Hua-yan (華厳) school of Chinese Buddhism. The Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit word dharma-dhātu developed into a central idea expressing the ultimate truth and the world view of the Hua-yan sūtra as presented by Zhi-yan (智儼, 602-668) of the Hua-yan school. After passing through the systemization of Hua-yan doctrine by Zhi-yan and Fa-zang (法蔵, 643-712), this Hua-yan view of the dharma-dhātu was completed by Cheng-guan, and it is called the four kinds of dharma-dhātu. The present paper focusses on the following points: How did Cheng-guan understand the dharmadhātu and how did he explain it? By considering all his commentaries related to Hua-yan thought, I will show that his predominant interest was focussed on the problem of the dharma-dhātu, and I will try to show that the explanation given by Cheng guan is divided into three parts: 1) The dharma-dhātu as characterized by non-obstruction of noumenon and phenomena (理事無碍). This is the basis of Cheng-guan's understanding of the dharma-dhātu, and he comprehends these two as inexhaustible and non-obstructed. He develops the concept further, culminating the "Four dharma-dhātus theory". Here he was influenced by the text "On the meditation of Hua-yan dharmadhātu (法界観門)" ascribed to Du-shun (杜順). 2) The dharma-dhātu of cause and effect (因果) and dependent origination (縁起). When discussing the principal chararcteristics of the Hua-yan sūtra, he explains cause and effect and dependent origination as being placed on one line. He does this because he analyzes the sūtra as consisting of sequences of cause and effect. Consequently, if one considers the relationship of this idea to Bodhisattva practices (菩薩行), then the Hua -yan sūtra itself takes the position of practice, and the sequence of practice expressed as the circularity of the five steps of cause and effect (五周因果) becomes a concept of great importance. 3) The dharma-dhātu as the origin (根源性) and the ultimate (究極性). This is an interpretation starting from the point of view of nature-origination (性気), meaning that the dharma-dhātu is not only the truth one has to attain finally, but is at the same time the origin that brings forth all things. Cheng guan says about the dharma-dhātu that from the ultimate viewpoint it is not only the basis of the Hua-yan sūtra but of all other sūtras and dharmas as well, and it is from a fimdamental viewpoint the basis of the delusion (迷) and enlightenment (悟) of beings, from which the Buddha as well as Bodhisattvas appear. Because it is further regarded as not being separate from the Pure One Mind, it is defined as the basis of Bodhisattva practices. The way Cheng-guan understood the concept of "the dharma-dhātu viz. the one mind" is basically founded on the traditional "Awakening of faith" - like understanding predominant in the Hua-yan school, but one can detect some influence of the meditation of śūnyatā (空観) as well. Further, the understanding of the "Ten mysterious gates (十玄門) " as being the concrete content of the dharma-dhātu is considered to be based on the concept of "cittamātra (唯心, consciousness-only)", and this had a big influence in giving direction to the further development of Hua-yan doctrine after Yan shou (永明延寿, 904-75) later in the Song period (宗代). As mentioned above, we can interpret Cheng-guan's understanding of the dharma-dhātu as having three forms and categories. In addition, by means of interpretation one would recognize more clearly and deeply that the dharma-dhātu is an important feature of Hua-yan thought.