著者

渡邉 眞儀

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.21, pp.49-64, 2014-03-31

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The Vaiśeṣika system is known for its static concept of time. In this system, time (kāla) is listed as one of the eternal and all-pervading substances like space (diś) and ether (ākāśa). According to Wilhelm Halbfass, time is marginalized in the classical Vaiśeṣika system completed by Praśastapāda. It plays the limited role in causal processes; it is a mere coordinate that determines when things are produced or destroyed and when events occur. It is neither a supreme cosmic power nor a fundamental cause of changes. In some aspects, the Vaiśeṣika concept of time seems similar to the concept of “Absolute Time” in modern physics. But there are major differences between them. According to Praśastapāda, the realization of time’s existence depends on our ordinary notions which relate to time, like “quick/slow” or “simultaneous”. It is not an “absolute” substance, but a theoretical requirement for such temporal and relative notions. Although time does not take on much importance in the system, there have been some attempts to justify its theoretical significance in it. For example, the concept of the three times, i.e. past, present, and future, is ignored in Praśastapāda’s original system, but his successors tried to formalize them in the system. In this paper, I investigate the theory of the three times which was established by one of the Praśastapāda’s commentators, Udayana, and consider how significant it is in the later Vaiśeṣika system. Basically keeping the classical Vaiśeṣika system, he used unique analystic tools, existence (sattā)/non-existence (abhāva), and a bearer (dharmin)/an attribute (dharma), by which the three times are definitely ordered. He also adopted more or less grammatical explanation so that his theory might agree with actual uses of temporal expression. I conclude that his theory successfully integrated both the classical Vaiśeṣika concept of time and the discussions in other schools such as Nyāya or Grammarian school. Although his achievement was remarkable, his theory had little influence on later Vaiśeṣika scholars. They formally cited only a part of his elaborate theory, and ignored the implication that time has a more prominent and dynamic function than Praśastapāda’s theory. They preferred to maintain Praśastapāda’s static view of time rather than admit Udayana’s innovative theory.