著者

角野 浩

出版者

近畿大学経済学会

雑誌

生駒経済論叢 = Ikoma Journal of Economics (ISSN:13488686)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.9, no.2, pp.53-67, 2011-11-01

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[概要] 本稿は, 「二重配当」について環境税制改革の視点から考察する。外部不経済を考慮したsecond-best環境課税ルールと外部不経済を考慮しないnonsecond-best環境課税ルールの2つを想定する。税収中立的な後者のルール下で, 環境汚染財の増税が, (1)環境改善と, (2)私的財の減税となる事を示す。二重配当の新たな判断基準として, 環境税制改革による「環境汚染財増税と私的財減税の両立」を提示する。この判断基準は, 最適課税理論で一般的に想定する財が需要独立的な場合でも適用できる。 [Abstract] This paper examines whether revenue-neutral swaps of environmental taxes for ordinary distortionary taxes, which might offer a double dividend, not only (1) improve the environment, but also (2) financially reduce the existing distortionarytax. As related to environmental tax reform, we consider two settings. One (associated with the second-best environmental taxation) internalizes externalities, and the other (associated with the non second-best environmental taxation) does not internalize externalities. Under the latter setting and the revenue neutral policy, we confer a new double dividend notion: the environmental tax reform can yield not only an increase in the environmental tax, but also a decrease in the distortionary consumption tax. This could be also explored for the case of independent demand in optimal taxation settings.