著者

浜 由樹子

出版者

ロシア・東欧学会

雑誌

ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2022, no.51, pp.41-56, 2022 (Released:2023-04-21)

参考文献数

32

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Russia’s ideology concerning the invasion of Ukraine mainly comprises five components: the criticism of the “West,” historical unity of the East Slavs, self-portrait as a great multi-national/multi-religious nation, staging of the “Great Patriotic War” redux, and traditional gender and religious norms. Based on the three presidential speeches that officially explained the “special military operation” (February 21, February 24, and September 30), this study examines the origins and development of the five components of the Putinesque ideological construction, which is characterized by its haphazardness. The main body of the alleged motivation of the “operation” is the security threat posed by the “West.” In this context, Russia repeatedly criticized the double standard of the “West” as well as its neo-colonialism. More broadly, the September 30 speech expanded the accusation into a criticism of the so-called liberal international order, implying that Russia recognizes the cleavage between the “North” and the Global South and is attempting to use it as a wedge issue. The idea that the East Slavs were originally single “narod” long before the modern notion of “nation-state” emerged from Western Europe was popular in the imperial period and continues to affect parts of the contemporary Russian society. With Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as an intellectual reference point, it was revived in post-Soviet Russia and developed with the “Russkii mir” ideology. The present administration recycled it as a justification of Russia-Ukraine “historical unity.” Despite emphasizing its Slavic element, Russia still holds a multi-national nature. Its self-portrait as a huge multi-national/multi-religious state grew along with its Eurasian identity. In the 1990s, the newly born Russia rediscovered the legacy of classic Eurasianism. Since then, groups of diplomats and practitioners, as well as influential public intellectuals such as Aleksandr Panarin, have contributed to its spread in the political circle. Given the present situation of an increasing number of ethnic minorities being sent to the frontlines in Ukraine, it is essential for the Putin administration to emphasize its pride of the multi-national identity. On one hand, President Putin severely criticized the Soviet nationalities policy. On the other hand, the administration devoted much energy to choreographing the redux of the Second World War. The historical memory and family story of the “Great Patriotic War” is a valuable asset shared by the Russian society, which can unite the nation and create a patriotic atmosphere. Moreover, a considerable number of political elites maintain continuity with the Soviet period―it is no wonder the administration attempts to appeal to the Soviet nostalgia. The final ideological element comprises the traditional values of gender and religion. Since its third term, Putin administration has adopted it both as a tool to obtain support from the conservatives as well as the Orthodox Church and as an outreach strategy abroad. With anti-liberalism as the core based on strong antagonism toward the “West,” which behaves as “the winner of Cold War,” these ideological branches have been bound together in an eclectic manner. As a result, the current ideological production contains contradictions and seems complex at first glance.