著者

太子堂 正称

出版者

The Japanese Society for the History of Economic Thought

雑誌

経済学史学会年報 (ISSN:04534786)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.43, no.43, pp.52-67, 2003 (Released:2010-08-05)

参考文献数

27

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The purpose of this paper is to compare the arguments of D. Hume and A. Smith with those of F. A. Hayek, a representative of modern liberalism, based on analysis of the justice theory, and to explain common ideas and differences between them.While the thought of Hayek is based on a Kantian position, that of Hume and Smith is based on Scottish tradition. They share, however, a common viewpoint of “Empirical natural jurisprudence.” As such, although they differ in their ideological bases, there are ways in which Hayek paid close attention to Hume and Smith.Hayek names his liberalism “anti-rationalism” and believes Hume and Smith to be his pioneers. The arguments of these three philosophers have in common the concept of a negative justice theory based on the natural law tradition. Hayek inherited the idea of “the sense of justice” from Hume's notion of “a general sense of common interest” grounded on “conventions.” In addition, he succeeded in criticizing the “man of system” who will design or construct social order by a human's pure reason, and Smith's concept of a “great society.”While these three philosophers dismiss the notion of a human's pure reason (ex., Descartes), the foundation of reason from a theological perspective (ex., Hutcheson), and law positivism (ex., Kelsen), they ask for an historical and secular formation of the foundation of a natural law (or natural jurisprudence). The above constitutes their “Empirical natural jurisprudence”. The traditions of natural law before Hume were based entirely on teleology or Platonism. But Hume and Smith eliminated both teleology and Platonism from their notion of natural jurisprudence. Hayek inherited this perspective from both and combined it with his Kantian position. More specifically, Hayek's social theory belongs to a genealogy of natural jurisprudence that has historical and Kantian-transcendental character. “The sense of justice” that is historically formulated operates as a “Kantian-regulative idea.”The justice theories of Hayek, Hume, and Smith are all based on the “limited generosity” of humans, a “scarcity of a sufficient means of desire, ” and “self-interest.” For the three philosophers, general “law” appears to be a “reasonable expectation” formed over the long run throughout history.There are, however, differences among these three with regard to what they believed to be the appropriate role of government and to “cultural evolution.” Although Hayek believes in the idea of spontaneous order, in which evolution occurs as an unintended result of human action, Hume and Smith were deeply aware of the need for artificial roles in the evolution of various institutions.In Hayek's theory, there is no concept of “sympathy” or “virtue, ” as seen in Hume and Smith. This point greatly separates both Hume and Smith from Hayek. If we compare Hume and Smith, Smith respected virtue more than Hume, and Hume considered custom to be more important than did Smith. Such differences in their theory result from methodological differences, and they are important to their differences in their social theory, especially concerning the problems of government and the public sphere. Smith's concept of “sympathy” was more sophisticated than that of Hume, and he established the unique concept of an impartial spectator. In contrast, Hayek developed the idea of abstract knowledge (based on Kantian-apriorism).