著者

山田 高敬

出版者

財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2004, no.137, pp.45-65,L9, 2004-06-19 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

75

被引用文献数

1

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The challenges of global governance in the contemporary world are becoming increasingly complex in that solutions to many global issues ranging from poverty alleviation to environmental protection require the reformulation of the relationships among many competing policy goals. To the extent that such a reformulation of policy goals requires a change in a global public order (GPO), what makes the transformation of a GPO possible? More importantly, what kind of social mechanism is at work in creating a new “common knowledge” which integrates a new policy goal into the previous one? Is the same mechanism in effect for the entire process of GPO transformation?These are precisely the questions that this paper purports to answer. In so doing, it draws on the growing theoretical literature of constructivism with particular emphasis on the process of “socialization.” While “socialization” is generally believed to have two distinct mechanisms, namely “social influence” and “social persuasion, ” this paper argues that it is the combination and sequencing of these mechanisms that holds the key to the transformation of the existing GPO. It hypothesizes that a GPO is transformed in three evolutionary stages; at the first stage, a challenge is posed by a network of NGOs to the existing GPO through social influence; at the second stage, a new, more comprehensive GPO is germinated by stakeholder representatives through social persuasion, and at the final stage, the new GPO becomes propagated to the critical stakeholders through the mechanism of “social elucidation, ” which is a variant of social influence. Moreover, the paper argues that a different set of organizations is either used or created at each stage of development. For instance, at the second stage, a small, but inclusive organization is created to promote social learning among stakeholders' representatives.This evolutionary logic is then illustrated through a case study, which empirically traces the process that led to the formation of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), and to the creation of the Dams and Development Project (DDP) within UNEP. The former set the guidelines for the construction of large dams, and the latter “reinterpreted” them within each national context.The paper concludes with theoretical implications, which point to the fallacy of searching for a single covering law in explaining actors' behavior, often found in rational-choice theories, the fallacy of prescribing only one “optimal” organizational design, and also the myth of international anarchy in the world, which is increasingly characterized by various nongovernmental networks of “complex governance.”