- 著者
-
上島 康弘
- 出版者
- 学術雑誌目次速報データベース由来
- 雑誌
- 季刊理論經濟學 (ISSN:0557109X)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.41, no.1, pp.78-87, 1990
In this paper, we build a two-period model which focuses on On-the-Job training and derive the effects of specific training on wage profiles and on dismissals. The main results we obtain are as follows:<br>(i) Our two period wage-employment contract dominates the familiar repetitive spot contract in the environment of restricted information.<br>(ii) In this contract, the employees are not necessarily dismissed even if a business deficit is incurred.<br>(iii) In principle, greater amounts of specific training make wage profiles steeper and restrict dismissals.