著者

田中 耕一

出版者

関西学院大学

雑誌

関西学院大学社会学部紀要 (ISSN:04529456)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.96, pp.121-136, 304, 2004-03-25

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As has been argued before, social constructionistic studies are based on the erroneous assumption of representationalism (cognitivism). In this paper, I am concerned with the difference between conversation analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA). DA is closely related to social constructionism. I shall show the pitfall of cognitivism into which DA studies fall in spite of their efforts to keep away from it. In the first chapter, I shall examine the controversy between CA (E. Schegloff) and DA (M. Wetherell and M. Billig). Schegloff insists that conversation ("talk-in-interaction") should be endogenously analyzed "in terms of the relevance and the orientation" which the participants display in their interactional details. In chapter two, I shall show how Wetherell and Billig deny the possibility of Schegloff's analysis. They emphasize the importance of the elements which are neither oriented to by the participants nor relevant to them. They maintain that the elements which are not endogenous in their interaction ought to play a greater role in the analysis. In chapter three, in order to make clear what is meant by "in terms of the relevance and the orientation of the participants", we need attend to the studies of interaction in institutional settings: "conversation analysis in institutional settings". These studies show that the institutional contexts of interaction are not described and formulated as a topic of that interaction, but displayed in the forms of the speech-exchange system and other sequential organization; these forms are variously transformed from those of ordinary conversation. In the final chapter, I shall note that DA studies reject the existence of psychological cognition as an inner process, whereas they assume that every fact is socially constructed through the descriptions in discourse. They seem to try to substitute the social and discursive description for the psychological cognition. However, since both discursive description and psychological cognition assume only a representative (=cognitive) mode of human relation to the world of external and internal objects, the main issue then is not whether it is social description or psychological cognition, but whether it is cognition and description or display. Therefore, on the erroneous assumption of cognitivism, DA studies are forced to lose sight of the possibility of the analysis of contexts displaying and of the endogenous analysis of interaction and discourse.