著者

石川 徹

出版者

香川大学

雑誌

香川大学教育学部研究報告. 第I部 (ISSN:04549309)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.125, pp.33-41, 2006

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This paper is a sequel to the paper, "Thomas Reid's Philosophy of Mind (4)". We also consider his principles of action, especially rational principles of action. Reid lists two principles of this kind: the good on the whole and the duty. Reid explains what the good on the whole is in two ways. In one sense, the good on the whole is the agent's benefit in the long run. In the other sense, the good on the whole is the highest good like Epicurean's Ataraxia or Stoic Apatia. We find it difficult these two mean the same. Reid thinks the duty is a nobler and more important than the good on the whole, because people admire the actions from the duty and often we cannot act directly from the good on the whole. These explications seem to be defective, because the former cannot show it is a genuine independent principles of action, and the latter shows its rationality only insufficiently. Reid thinks these two principles are effectively the same. This is the reason he looks upon them as rational principles of action. We find he is too optimistic.