著者

鹿 錫俊

出版者

島根県立大学

雑誌

北東アジア研究 (ISSN:13463810)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1, pp.17-41, 2001-03

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During the time of the Rehe Crisis in early 1933, the Chinese Nationalist Government, having been disillusioned with Britain, USA and the League of Nations, was forced to rely on USSR to check the movement of Japan. However, it turned out to be even largerr disillusionment than the one experienced with Britain and USA, which led to the conclusion of the "Tanggu Cease-fire Agreement." Thenceforth the Nationalist Government started to cool off the relations with USSR while employing a policy of partial compromise toward Japan. Establishment of diplomatic relations between USA and USSR in 1933 made a substantial impact on the political climate of the rest of the world including the Nationalist Government. While showing some understanding of the necessity to compromise with Japan, some advocated progressive diplomatic alliance with USSR, USA and the League of Nations to "make friends" anew under new international situations. They regarded the policy that solely focused on improving relations with Japan as "too feeble." Yet despite initiatives taken by USSR to approach China under the heightening tensions with Japan, Wang Jingwei strongly opposed to the emerging "coalition with USSR" argument. His assertion was based on the idea of making a realistic view that entering alliance with foreign countries for containment of Japan might further irritate that country and reflected a growing sense of fear that China's destiny might become subject to communist influence by USSR. Thus the party opposing to the compromise policy disappeared from the main stage of diplomacy after "Tanggu Cease-fire Agreement." Within the party affirming the "partial compromise policy toward Japan, " however, politicians were divided to two schools on the questions of "alliance with foreign countries for containment of Japan" which was backed by their judgment on USSR and the direction of the future Sino-Japanese relations which was backed by their judgment on Japan. Therefore, although all supported a policy of compromise and shared the common aim of giving priority to domestic stability over eliminating the Japanese invasion, party members remained divided on what course of action to take. Consequently, they held, as a matter of course, different attitudes toward the three lines taken by USSR, USA and the "international organization." Existence of these two schools demonstrates the fact that the Nationalist Government implicitly contained two orientations in their "partial compromise polity toward Japan." On the other hand, Jiang Jieshi of those days showed strong confidence and immense expectation in the "diplomatic potentials" of China and advocated their tactical operations. In this sense Jiang was more optimistic than pessimist Wang. Furthermore, attention should be given to the fact that Jiang Jieshi learned about Russian methods of domestic and international policies while harboring even more fears against USSR than Japan did, and asserted to have both Japan and USSR check the movement of the other party. On the question of "alliance with foreign countries, " Wang Jingwei generally stood at "no profits at the moment and no hope of success in the future, " while Jiang Jieshi viewed it as "no problem in action at the moment and definite hope of success in the future, " and firmly held the basic strategies of "internationalization of Sino-Japanese Dispute" and "resolution of Sino-Japanese problems within the international sphere." The divergence of opinion between Wang and Jiang lead to a "dual structure" of diplomacy in the Nationalist Government, namely the explicit Wang Jingwei's line that existed in parallel with that of the implicit Jiang Jieshi's. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the contents of Jiang's view that served to bridge the gap between opposing views through a kind of mutual compensation. In other words, he made efforts to actualize one possibility while having to be fully prepared to appease the opposing other. Therefore, the "dual diplomacy" of the Nationalist Government owed its divergent character not only to the ideological division between Wang and Jiang but also to the "multiple perspectives" that belonged to Jiang himself. The Chinese authority started to seek "coalition with USSR for containment of Japan" during Jiang Tinghu's visit to USSR under the circumstances of policy line confrontations mentioned above. The four following elements were also taken up : recurrence of Sino-Russo disputes over Xinjiang problems in August 1934, joining of USSR to the League of Nations in September, successful 5th attempt to suppress the Chinese Communist Party by the Nationalist Government around the same period of time and aggravation of anti-American sentiment caused by American policy to buy up silver.