著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.176, pp.176_140-176_151, 2014-03-31 (Released:2015-10-20)
参考文献数
17
著者
鹿 錫俊 Xijun LU
雑誌
北東アジア研究 (ISSN:13463810)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.199-208, 2001-10-01
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
大東文化大学
雑誌
基盤研究(C)
巻号頁・発行日
2015-04-01

本研究は、蒋介石ら中国要人達の日記と関係国公文書との相互検証に基づき、公文書の制約性からくる虚像を是正すること、日中戦争期の中国の実像を復元すること、新資料を提供すること、という目的の実現を試みた。三年にわたる研究期間において、本研究は著書、論文の出版と国際学会での発信によって、「抗日」と「防共」の優先順序をめぐる蒋介石の葛藤、対ソ認識と抗日戦堅持との関連、対ドイツ政策の変遷、戦時外交の多面相、私文書と公文書の相互検証による研究の在り方、といった一連の問題について新しい知見を提示し、学術研究の深化に寄与した。
著者
鹿 錫俊 Xijun LU
雑誌
総合政策論叢 (ISSN:13463829)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.61-74, 2002-03-25
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.187, pp.187_62-187_79, 2017

<p>China's transition process in its manner of approaching the Anti-Japan War history (known as the Second Sino–Japanese War in China) in different stages is characterized by the following features. (1) From 1949 to 1978, "history" was understood to be Revolutionary history; the Anti-Japan War history was not accorded much importance and addressing historical facts was determined by political considerations. (2) From 1978 to 1989, even though the Anti-Japan War history received greater emphasis, it was mainly necessary to counter historical revisionist currents in Japan and work toward unification with Taiwan; further, all this while, China was committed to maintaining friendly relations with Japan. (3) The era of rocketing patriotism that began in 1989 witnessed a steady increase in the Chinese emphasis on the history of the Anti-Japan War; thus, currently, along with countering historical revisionism from Japan's viewpoint, domestic political considerations, modifications to foreign policy, and a revised perception regarding the two countries' relationship in the wake of China's rise as a major world power are the main driving forces.</p><p>China's approach to the history of the Anti-Japan War is not a simple historiographical problem; the fact that it is a general problem with a high degree of political sensitivity suggests that, for the reasons provided below, it is one that is fraught with side effects for the Chinese authorities. First, the close relation of the Anti-Japan War's history to a more multifaceted history implies that the rise of interest in the former will not stop with the China–Japan relations but will highlight the Communist Party of China's (CPC) history and its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT). On the other hand, the diversification and increased availability of sources of information indicates that information with a bearing on history can no longer be controlled as in the past. Thus, the expanding interest into historical problems associated with the anti-Japan war's history suggests that the Chinese populace is gaining awareness regarding some historical facts avoided by the ruling authorities until now. Second, applying a "proper view of history," which China had demanded from Japan, is certainly also being demanded from China. Thus, how China recognizes and responds to its own history has been questioned inside and outside the country.</p><p>Manifestation of these side effects is palpable in the China–Taiwan dispute regarding claims to leadership in the anti-Japanese war and the internal Chinese controversy about the authenticity of its "historical nihilism." Considering the China–Japan interactions, China's demand to take a "direct view of history" has not only spurred improvements in Japan's historical awareness but also served to promote improvement in China's own historical awareness.</p>
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
島根県立大学
雑誌
北東アジア研究 (ISSN:13463810)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1, pp.17-41, 2001-03

During the time of the Rehe Crisis in early 1933, the Chinese Nationalist Government, having been disillusioned with Britain, USA and the League of Nations, was forced to rely on USSR to check the movement of Japan. However, it turned out to be even largerr disillusionment than the one experienced with Britain and USA, which led to the conclusion of the "Tanggu Cease-fire Agreement." Thenceforth the Nationalist Government started to cool off the relations with USSR while employing a policy of partial compromise toward Japan. Establishment of diplomatic relations between USA and USSR in 1933 made a substantial impact on the political climate of the rest of the world including the Nationalist Government. While showing some understanding of the necessity to compromise with Japan, some advocated progressive diplomatic alliance with USSR, USA and the League of Nations to "make friends" anew under new international situations. They regarded the policy that solely focused on improving relations with Japan as "too feeble." Yet despite initiatives taken by USSR to approach China under the heightening tensions with Japan, Wang Jingwei strongly opposed to the emerging "coalition with USSR" argument. His assertion was based on the idea of making a realistic view that entering alliance with foreign countries for containment of Japan might further irritate that country and reflected a growing sense of fear that China's destiny might become subject to communist influence by USSR. Thus the party opposing to the compromise policy disappeared from the main stage of diplomacy after "Tanggu Cease-fire Agreement." Within the party affirming the "partial compromise policy toward Japan, " however, politicians were divided to two schools on the questions of "alliance with foreign countries for containment of Japan" which was backed by their judgment on USSR and the direction of the future Sino-Japanese relations which was backed by their judgment on Japan. Therefore, although all supported a policy of compromise and shared the common aim of giving priority to domestic stability over eliminating the Japanese invasion, party members remained divided on what course of action to take. Consequently, they held, as a matter of course, different attitudes toward the three lines taken by USSR, USA and the "international organization." Existence of these two schools demonstrates the fact that the Nationalist Government implicitly contained two orientations in their "partial compromise polity toward Japan." On the other hand, Jiang Jieshi of those days showed strong confidence and immense expectation in the "diplomatic potentials" of China and advocated their tactical operations. In this sense Jiang was more optimistic than pessimist Wang. Furthermore, attention should be given to the fact that Jiang Jieshi learned about Russian methods of domestic and international policies while harboring even more fears against USSR than Japan did, and asserted to have both Japan and USSR check the movement of the other party. On the question of "alliance with foreign countries, " Wang Jingwei generally stood at "no profits at the moment and no hope of success in the future, " while Jiang Jieshi viewed it as "no problem in action at the moment and definite hope of success in the future, " and firmly held the basic strategies of "internationalization of Sino-Japanese Dispute" and "resolution of Sino-Japanese problems within the international sphere." The divergence of opinion between Wang and Jiang lead to a "dual structure" of diplomacy in the Nationalist Government, namely the explicit Wang Jingwei's line that existed in parallel with that of the implicit Jiang Jieshi's. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the contents of Jiang's view that served to bridge the gap between opposing views through a kind of mutual compensation. In other words, he made efforts to actualize one possibility while having to be fully prepared to appease the opposing other. Therefore, the "dual diplomacy" of the Nationalist Government owed its divergent character not only to the ideological division between Wang and Jiang but also to the "multiple perspectives" that belonged to Jiang himself. The Chinese authority started to seek "coalition with USSR for containment of Japan" during Jiang Tinghu's visit to USSR under the circumstances of policy line confrontations mentioned above. The four following elements were also taken up : recurrence of Sino-Russo disputes over Xinjiang problems in August 1934, joining of USSR to the League of Nations in September, successful 5th attempt to suppress the Chinese Communist Party by the Nationalist Government around the same period of time and aggravation of anti-American sentiment caused by American policy to buy up silver.
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
島根県立大学
雑誌
総合政策論叢 (ISSN:13463829)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.3, pp.61-74, 2002-03-25

Jiang Zerning, as the leader of The Communist Party of China, recently proposed three influential theories of Chinese political reform in the future: l) the development requirements of advanced social productive forces, 2) the progressive courses of Chinese advanced culture, and 3) the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority people in China. The theories appear to be accepted by China as well as the rest of the world. The paper analyzed how Chinese historical factors affect the three theories as follows: 1) the historical backgrounds of the three major theories, 2) the viewpoints of the three major theories, 3) the meaning of the three theories, 4) the conservative's criticism of the theories and the values of the criticism, 5) the limitation and the radical dissatisfaction of the theories, 6) the four main issues on Chinese political reform.
著者
鹿 錫俊
出版者
島根県立大学
雑誌
北東アジア研究 (ISSN:13463810)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2, pp.199-208, 2001-10