著者

中村 麻里子

出版者

慶應義塾大学

雑誌

哲學 (ISSN:05632099)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.108, pp.45-66, 2002-02

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投稿論文1. 序2. 初期の心理学における内観と行動主義による批判 2-1. 初期の心理学における内観 2-1-1. ヴントの心理学 2-1-2. ティチェナーの心理学 2-1-3. ヴュルツブルグ学派 2-2. 行動主義による内観批判と内観心理学3. 哲学における内観の検討 3-1. 内観に関する高階の表象説 3-2. ドレツキによる表象主義 3-2-1. 置き換えられた知覚とメタ表象 3-2-2. 3つの気づき(awareness)の区別を用いた内観の特徴づけ 3-2-3. 表象内容の外在説と内在主義的な高階説の比較 3-3. 色に関する外在説と内在説 3-3-1. 色に関する内在説 3-3-2. 色に関する外在説4. 結論Introspection has been used to study mental states or consciousness. In psychology, the method of introspection was criticized by behaviorists because the method of introspection was subjective and so not reliable, though introspection is used in some psychological experiments even today. What we should be careful here is the target of the criticism; whether introspection or the content of introspection is subjective. Here we are talking of only the introspection of perceptive content. The content of introspection has been thought as something like a mental image, which is inevitably subjective. According to internalism, introspection is the internal process, so the content of introspection is also internal and subjective. Dretske suggests that the content of introspection be objective. When we are aware of experience having some properties, we are aware of something objective having these properties. We aren't aware of something subjective when we introspect our perception. This idea can make the content of introspection objective, and reliable in psychological researches. However, such idea doesn't perfectly exclude subjectivity from introspection. Introspection has the subjective property in that it is always experienced by one person. But the content of introspection itself, different from the introspective event, is objective. For we are aware of facts when we introspect.