著者

三谷 芳幸

出版者

公益財団法人 史学会

雑誌

史学雑誌 (ISSN:00182478)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.120, no.7, pp.1240-1263, 2011

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The purpose of this article is to clarify the characteristic features of the institution of shikiden, arable land allocated to central government bureaucrats of Japan's ancient state as part of their salaries, through a comparison with similar institutions existing in Tang China and in the Japanese regional government bureaucracy. The author begins with a comparison of Japanese and Tang Ritsuryo (Luling 律令 codes concerning the distribution and utilization of arable land (Denryo/Tianling 田令) and reaches the following three conclusions. First, in contrast to the Tang system in which shikiden was allocated to all government bureaucrats, in Japan allocation was limited to the top decision-makers (giseikan 議政官) of the Ministry of State (Dajokan 大政官) above the post of Dainagon 大納言 (Chief Councilor). Secondly, another difference between the two systems was that the ownership of shikiden for top ministers (hereafter giseikan shikiden) was not automatically decided on the occasion of transfers of office. Finally, there was no system in Japan for paying grain in lieu of receiving land, like in China, since it was thought only natural that the whole portion of arable should be granted. Next, the author turns to the allocation procedures. In the Tang system and the Japanese regional bureaucracy, a certificate of appointment constituted proof of the ownership of shikiden. In contrast, the system pertaining to giseikan shikiden required that the emperor approve ownership through the acceptance of a petition submitted by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minbusho 民部省). This procedure indicates the function of giseikan shikiden as a confirmation of the personal relationships existing between the emperor and his top ministers of state, resembling the institution of shiden 賜田, a land grant from the emperor in appreciation for extraordinary service to the state. Furthermore, the fact that the allocation of giseikan shikiden was strictly limited to about five top ministers of state indicates the exclusionary character of the institution in comparison to the open system of Tang China that allocated land to all new government appointees. Finally, with respect to the evolutionary process of giseikan shikiden, at its inception the land allocated consisted of family-owned assets that had been inherited for all intents and purposes ; however, in 729 AD, the total amount of land for a quota of recipients was procured in the fixed place, marking the completion of giseikan shikiden as an integral part of the bureaucrat remuneration system. Nevertheless, even after 729, the land allocated as shikiden continued to exist as family-owned assets and rely institutionally on the traditional family management of those assets. In conclusion, the author argues that the institution of giseikan shikiden marked no exception to such endemic problems of Japan's Ritsuryo system as the coexistence of personal (private) and official (public) relationships and the survival of pre-Ritsuryo traditions in its style of governance.