This study clarifies why information providers conceal risk information in a continual relationship with asymmetric information, even though it possibly causes damage to the provider in long-term interaction. In an experiment, participants were divided into pairs of "provider" and "receiver," and they interacted repeatedly. The results of the experiment were as follows, (1) Information asymmetry possibly elicited risk aversion in receivers, and the providers' expectation of the degree of this risk aversion influenced the behavior of the providers. (2) Concealing risk information generated benefit as long as the receivers did not detect it, but once they learned of it, they became more risk averse and decreased trust in the provider. The providers, however, did not change their behavior, continuing to conceal the risk information instead of becoming honest. These results suggest certain circumstances in which concealing risk information might benefit providers in the short term and could prevent damage caused by a receiver's risk-averse behavior in the long term.