著者

松村 敏

出版者

国立歴史民俗博物館

雑誌

国立歴史民俗博物館研究報告 (ISSN:02867400)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.95, pp.207-227, 2002-03

---

明治期に賃織業者を主要な生産主体として発展した桐生絹織物業の抱えていた深刻な問題は、賃織業者による原料糸詐取問題であった。すなわち、織元(問屋)が前貸しした原料生糸の一部を窃取して生糸商人に売り渡すことが恒常化していたのである。これは、発注主である織元が賃織業者の生産活動を常時監視しえない問屋制固有の重大問題であり、この問題はまた日本に限らずヨーロッパ経済史研究においても注目され、工業の主要な生産形態が問屋制から工場制に移行していった一要因とみなす研究者さえいるほどである。この問題に関する最近の研究として、近世期に織元がこの不正に対処した方法として株仲間による多角的懲罰戦略(不正を働いた賃織業者に関する情報を織元仲間に周知させ、以後仲間全員がその賃織業者との取引を拒絶するという私的な規約・制度によりこの不正を防止せんとする戦略)を高く評価する見解が現れている。近代(明治期以降)のように公権力による契約履行と所有権の保証が十分でない近世期においては、商人たちが私的に契約履行と所有権を保証する必要があったというわけである。ところが、この多角的懲罰戦略が実際に有効に機能したかという検証はないし、じつは国家権力が法と裁判によってこれらを完全に保証するという建前になった明治期以降においても、桐生の織元たちは繰り返し近世以来の多角的懲罰戦略を試みていたのである。すなわち裁判に訴えるコストなどから近代においても国家権力(近代法)による所有権と契約履行の直接的な保証は、賃織業者のわずかな不正を抑止させるまでには貫徹しない。そこで織元たちは、依然同業組合による多角的懲罰戦略を試行した。しかしそれが手直しされつつ繰り返されることからもわかるように、これもまた有効ではなかったのである。本稿ではその過程を追いつつ、多角的懲罰戦略が有効に機能しなかった要因とその意味を考察した。During the Meiji era, the silk textile industry in Kiryu, which had developed with subcontracting weavers as a major production unit, suffered from the problem of the pick and steal of material yarn by the weavers. That is, they stole part of the material raw silk advanced by the putter-out and sold them to the raw silk merchants, and that was an everyday affair in those days. It was a serious problem peculiar to the putting-out system, in which the putter-out that gave an order was unable to always monitor the production activity of the subcontractors. This problem attracted the attention of researchers not only in the study of Japanese economic history but also in that of European one, and some even regard it as one of the factors for transition in the production form from the putting-out system to the factory system.For the recent study on this issue, in the early modern times, there was a view that highly appreciated the multiple punishment strategy by principals (the strategy to prevent the swindle by private rules and system prescribing that the information about the agent that committed a swindle be known to the guild of principal and that all principals refuse to trade with the agent), as a measure that principal took against such swindle. In the early modern times (before Meiji), when fulfillment of contracts and proprietorship were not sufficiently ensured by the official power, merchants had to ensure them privately. However, there is no evidence that such a multiple punishment strategy actually worked efficiently. In fact, even after the Meiji Restoration, when it was the principle that the state power should completely ensure fulfillment of contracts and proprietorship by law and trial, the textile manufacturers in Kiryu repeatedly tried such multiple punishment strategy. In other words, even in the modern times, due to the trial cost, etc., the direct assurance of proprietorship and fulfillment of contracts by the state power (modern law) did not thoroughly prevent small injustices of subcontracting weavers. So the manufacturers still continued trying the multiple punishment strategy by the trade association. However, as we have seen from the fact that it was repeated while being revised, the measure was not effective, either. This paper, following the process, considers the reason why the multiple punishment strategy did not work effectively and what it implied.