- 著者
-
倉石 精一
- 出版者
- 公益社団法人 日本心理学会
- 雑誌
- 心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.8, no.3, pp.353-376, 1933
The purpose of this study is to observe modalities in the process of exercises of the controlled association which dures for a considerably long period and to contribute herefrom to the study of thinking. It seems to me that, heretofore, the experimental conditions were not strict enough in the study of association for example, numbers of trials for one problem were too few . Under such conditions it is natural that we can not treat adequately the introspectional reports of the subjects.<BR>Now, of what significance are the introspected contents such as images and inner speaches to the reactions in question? And of what sign is the “gefühlmässige Erlebnis” which was brought about by the transition of the problem? When we express naively to “think” implies this “Erlebnis.” And yet the psychologists of the Würzburg school established a special “Denkelernent” rejecting images and this “gefuhl massige Erlebnis.” But must the essence of thinking be the “Erlebnis”?<BR>We distinguish two sorts of reactions in the process of the controlled association, namely the passive reaction and the active reaction , according, usually, to the modes of phenomena intervened between the presentations of stimuli and the reactions. But can this distinction signify the essential difference?<BR>In the experiment of this sort we can get true knowledge of the process of the reaction only when our experimental conditions work as true conditions. It is useless to indulge in the analysis of the phenomena which appear under ambiguous conditions.<BR>To correct some of defects of the previous studies, I planned the system of my experiment in the following manner; namely, the problems were limited to the response with the superordinate concepts and the subjects exercised these problems for 30 days using 20 new stimulus-words every day. The instruction is as follows.“Response quickly with an adequate superordinate concept to a given stimulus-word.” After the reaction the subjects make the introspectional renorts freely.<BR>When we examine the reports of the exercise during 30 days we notice that<BR>(1)There is a remarkable reduction in the reaction time inspite of the fact that we used new stimulus-words every day.<BR>(2)The number of reports of the so-called interpolated phenomena, which get place between the presentation of the stimulus and the reaction, decreases; moreover the grade of the “Eindringlichkeit” of these phenomena diminishes also.<BR>(3)The reaction-word becomes more adequate either when we conoider it from the objective side or when we examine it from the introspection of the subject.<BR>Now in this advanced process we can name the superordinate concepts immediately in spite of the fact that the stimulus-words were new every day; and the so-called interpolated phenomena are diminished. Can we not assert that in an intended act it is things of no importance that there appear various “nsychische Gebilde” in the consciousness?<BR>Against this assertion perhaps many people may say that it is impossible to react without the understanding of the stimulus. To Lc sure a functional action of understanding of stimulus is necessary. But it is not necessary to appear in the consciousness.<BR>The more smooth is the completion of the intended act the simpler is the subjective side of this act. This simple conscious phenomena, i. e, “Eigenbewusstsein,” can not become the direct object of our study.<BR>I was disappointed in the analysis of the introspe tional facts of the psychological study of thinking. And I asserted that to the completion of an intended act the conscious efforts were of no importance. To this one may make the objection that the very basis of this conscious efforts is the facts of thinking.