著者
倉石 精一 梅本 堯夫 安原 宏 奥野 茂夫 村川 紀子 百名 盛之 添田 信子
出版者
一般社団法人 日本教育心理学会
雑誌
教育心理学研究 (ISSN:00215015)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.6, no.3, pp.23-31,67, 1969-10-15 (Released:2013-02-19)
参考文献数
4
被引用文献数
1 1

この研究の目的は, 数学学力の発達的な変化を, 知能との関係において分析することにあった。そのためまず小4, 小6, 中1, 中3, 高2の計491名の被験者に, 算数数学学力検査と京大NX知能検査を行なった。算数数学学力検査は学習指導要領に従って, 小中学校では数概念, 量概念, 図形概念, 関係概念, 実務, 問題解決の6下位検査からなり, 高校では数量概念, 図形概念, 関係概念, 問題解決の4下位検査からなるものを作成した。まずこのテストの内部関係を求めたところ, かなり高い相関係数がえられたが, 特に関係概念のテストは内部相関も総点との相関も高かった。また相関の比較的低いテストは低学年では実務, 高学年では図形概念のテストであつた。ついで知能検査の因子分析の結果に従い, 各生徒の因子点を算出し, この因子点と算数数学学力テストとの相関を発達的に検討した。その結果小4, 小6, 中1までは言語因子と数学学力テストの相関関係が密接にみられたが, 中3, 高2ではむしろ, 言語因子以外の因子と数学学力テストとの相関が高かつた。また知能偏差値と言語因子点の差によってGP分析を行なつたが, やはり小4, 小6では言語型群の方が算数学力テストの成績がよかったが, 中3, 高2ではむしろ非言語型群め方が数学学力テストの得点は高い傾向がみられた。これらの事実から知能と数学学力との関係は, 単に知能偏差値または知能指数と数学学力テストの総点との単純な相関では一見して発途的になんら変化しないように見えるが, 両者を分析して質的に考察をすれば, 小学校では知能のうちの言語因子と算数学力との相関が高く, それが中学, 高校となるにつれてしだいに言語因子以外の因子と関係が深くなると結論された。
著者
倉石 精一
出版者
公益社団法人 日本心理学会
雑誌
心理学研究 (ISSN:00215236)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.8, no.3, pp.353-376, 1933

The purpose of this study is to observe modalities in the process of exercises of the controlled association which dures for a considerably long period and to contribute herefrom to the study of thinking. It seems to me that, heretofore, the experimental conditions were not strict enough in the study of association for example, numbers of trials for one problem were too few . Under such conditions it is natural that we can not treat adequately the introspectional reports of the subjects.<BR>Now, of what significance are the introspected contents such as images and inner speaches to the reactions in question? And of what sign is the &ldquo;gef&uuml;hlm&auml;ssige Erlebnis&rdquo; which was brought about by the transition of the problem? When we express naively to &ldquo;think&rdquo; implies this &ldquo;Erlebnis.&rdquo; And yet the psychologists of the W&uuml;rzburg school established a special &ldquo;Denkelernent&rdquo; rejecting images and this &ldquo;gefuhl massige Erlebnis.&rdquo; But must the essence of thinking be the &ldquo;Erlebnis&rdquo;?<BR>We distinguish two sorts of reactions in the process of the controlled association, namely the passive reaction and the active reaction , according, usually, to the modes of phenomena intervened between the presentations of stimuli and the reactions. But can this distinction signify the essential difference?<BR>In the experiment of this sort we can get true knowledge of the process of the reaction only when our experimental conditions work as true conditions. It is useless to indulge in the analysis of the phenomena which appear under ambiguous conditions.<BR>To correct some of defects of the previous studies, I planned the system of my experiment in the following manner; namely, the problems were limited to the response with the superordinate concepts and the subjects exercised these problems for 30 days using 20 new stimulus-words every day. The instruction is as follows.&ldquo;Response quickly with an adequate superordinate concept to a given stimulus-word.&rdquo; After the reaction the subjects make the introspectional renorts freely.<BR>When we examine the reports of the exercise during 30 days we notice that<BR>(1)There is a remarkable reduction in the reaction time inspite of the fact that we used new stimulus-words every day.<BR>(2)The number of reports of the so-called interpolated phenomena, which get place between the presentation of the stimulus and the reaction, decreases; moreover the grade of the &ldquo;Eindringlichkeit&rdquo; of these phenomena diminishes also.<BR>(3)The reaction-word becomes more adequate either when we conoider it from the objective side or when we examine it from the introspection of the subject.<BR>Now in this advanced process we can name the superordinate concepts immediately in spite of the fact that the stimulus-words were new every day; and the so-called interpolated phenomena are diminished. Can we not assert that in an intended act it is things of no importance that there appear various &ldquo;nsychische Gebilde&rdquo; in the consciousness?<BR>Against this assertion perhaps many people may say that it is impossible to react without the understanding of the stimulus. To Lc sure a functional action of understanding of stimulus is necessary. But it is not necessary to appear in the consciousness.<BR>The more smooth is the completion of the intended act the simpler is the subjective side of this act. This simple conscious phenomena, i. e, &ldquo;Eigenbewusstsein,&rdquo; can not become the direct object of our study.<BR>I was disappointed in the analysis of the introspe tional facts of the psychological study of thinking. And I asserted that to the completion of an intended act the conscious efforts were of no importance. To this one may make the objection that the very basis of this conscious efforts is the facts of thinking.