著者

小泉 直美

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_1-14, 2011

---

This article analyzes whether civilian control over the Russian military has been reestablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian control had been firmly established under the communist regime by the Brezhnev era and functioned very well. It was a kind of division of labor based upon the common ideology, in which the Communist Party leadership decides the overall direction of foreign and security policy, while the General Staff with its exclusive military expertise provides option formation and implementation. The Party leadership gave the military everything they need and want, and the military in turn does not interfere into the politics.<br>With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this controlling system also ceased to function. The political leadership can no longer look after the military's interests, while the military got fully politicized in and outside the Duma. Then the former President Putin tried to reestablish the control system, although it was not a democratic one, but the control by the president. Putin wanted to transform the military into a small but highly efficient and usable one in the local and regional conflicts. Although Putin's plan did not frame well, in 2007 with the new defense minister Anatolii Serdyukov appointed the situation began to change.<br>This article examines the three aspects of Putin's (and Medvedev's) reform efforts, namely the reform of military bureaucracy, the fulfillment of the military's interests, and the change of the official threat perceptions. First, in terms of civilianization of the defense ministry and the subordination of the General Staff to the civilian defense ministry, much efforts has been made, but still not enough. Due to lack of civilian military experts, it will take some more time to overcome the General Staff's exclusive status and power inherited from the Soviet era. Second, the political leadership attaches a great emphasis to the modernization of military equipment and the improvement of material conditions for military service. Still, the lack of capital and an inefficient way of using it have impeded visible progress. Third, after long procrastination finally the new official strategic documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, have been approved. They revised the official threat perception from a large scale attack from the West to local and regional conflicts along the borders. Nevertheless, we should notice that a deep distrust against the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, is rooted in the newly attained consensus.<br>In sum, civilian control in Russia is working far better than in the 1990's, but is still incomplete. There is much room for the military's dissatisfaction or distrust against the U.S. to exert its influence to the political decisions.