著者
小泉 直美
出版者
梅花女子大学・大学院児童文学会
雑誌
梅花児童文学 = The Baika Journal of Children's Literature (ISSN:13403192)
巻号頁・発行日
no.30, pp.26-39, 2023-03-15

平成期(1989-2019)の「ヘンゼルとグレーテル」の邦訳は現在106 話確認している。それらを分析すると、収録されている形態に変化が生じていることが判明する。昭和期には児童向け雑誌に多く収録されていたものが、平成期には雑誌での収録は激減し、読み聞かせ物語集への収録が増える。そこでは話が短縮され、子どもたちが鴨(家鴨)に救助される場面では、グレーテルの的確な判断を示す言葉が削除されている。女の子の賢さが描かれていないのである。一方、話は短縮されても「お菓子の家」は昭和期よりも華やかに描かれ強調されている。あたかもこの話は「お菓子の家」の話であるかのように、視覚的表現で読者に印象づけているのである。また原典では子どもたちが帰宅したとき母親は死亡しているが、平成期には「家出する」「実家に戻る」「父親に追い出される」という表現が出現する。子どもと両親との関係だけでなく、夫婦の在り方が児童書の中に組み入れられているのである。さらにパロディ版も出現する。平成期は昭和期からの読書推進活動が実を結んだ時代である。さまざまな方法で読書への興味を持たせようとしたことが読み取れる。
著者
小泉 直美
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2017, no.189, pp.189_81-189_97, 2017-10-23 (Released:2018-12-19)
参考文献数
58

The question why the Soviet Union radically changed its foreign policy course which led to the end of the Cold War has been the subject of controversy in various academic journals on international relations. Realists argue that the economic downturn brought Gorbachev and other conservative leaders including the military to rethink its antagonistic policy toward the United States seeking for some respite. Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that the radical change in foreign policy was caused by the new idea and identification which Gorbachev had acquired through learning of the Common Security concept from Western peace researches. While these debates have shed light on how the end of Cold War began, they have been indifferent to how the U.S.-Soviet Cold War really ended. This paper focused on this missing point of these controversies.From the perspective of Russian regional studies, the Gorbachev initiative including bold unilateral concessions were extremely rare in the history of a country with deep concerns on its national security like the Soviet Union. Those unilateral concessions were their tactics to make the Western nations believe in the Soviet sincerity to overcome mutual distrust and make Europe more safer place for their conducting economic reform. Even Gorbachev noticed mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the West would not disappear overnight. Therefore what the Gorbachev’s team really aimed at was the lower -leveled parity of strategic forces between the West and the East. Since this simple fact was forgotten in the euphoria of Russian renouncement of communism and the alleged U.S. victory over the Soviet Union, the ‘ending’ of the end of the Cold War became quite ambiguous. START II was hastily signed in January 1993 by Boris El’tsin and George H. W. Bush. This treaty was to sum up a series of arms control negotiations which was to create the strategic stability between the two sides, but in reality it was much disadvantageous to weakened and confused Russia and only left a sense of unfairness to Russians.
著者
小泉 直美
出版者
ロシア・東欧学会
雑誌
ロシア・東欧研究 (ISSN:13486497)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2001, no.30, pp.55-77, 2001 (Released:2010-10-27)
参考文献数
44

During 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a middle-class power, while the United States as the only superpower is increasingly inclined to behave on its own way in the international scene. How is Russia trying to cope with the US? This question is closely related to a broader issue, i.e. how Russia is making its adaptation during the system change of international relations.This article attempts to answer this question by addressing itself to the issue of strategic stability. Under the Cold War system the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union was attained by controlling offensive nuclear weapons with defensive nuclear weapons promised not to develop and deploy by both sides. But since the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become perceived bigger threats, which pushed the US to the development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) . Thus Russia wants to maintain the old strategic stability, while the US wants to develop the NMD. The negotiation started between the two.First we analyze Russian behavior in the nuclear arms negotiation and the intention of various actors with the specific emphasis on the arguments on the military reform. Then at the latter half of the article we examine Russian attitude toward the issue of non-proliferation problems. This time we focus on the situation of military industrial complex and its reconstruction process, and also the specialists' arguments on the matter. We will analyze them from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001. The reason why we stop at September 11 is to show that Russia did not suddenly change on September 11.As conclusions we argue that first, Russia initially tried to maintain the old strategic stability but it turned out to be impossible to do so because of her financial constraints and the urgent need for military reform. President Putin slowly began to stop Russia's pretending a superpower by renouncing his previous goal to maintain the strategic parity with the US. Then, on September 11, 2001, he grasped at the chance and decided to become a big power in the new US-led international system.Second, when it comes to a new threat, nuclear proliferation, Russia was also slow to recognize its significance because its huge military industry needs to export military weapons in order to survive. And we find that while making efforts to secure the US non-proliferation commitments, Russia is also trying to sell more weapons to even the 'rouge nations' like Iran. But now the US can't stop those commitments for its Key words; strategic stability/START/NMD/nuclear non-proliferation/Iran
著者
小泉 直美
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2011, no.164, pp.164_1-14, 2011

This article analyzes whether civilian control over the Russian military has been reestablished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian control had been firmly established under the communist regime by the Brezhnev era and functioned very well. It was a kind of division of labor based upon the common ideology, in which the Communist Party leadership decides the overall direction of foreign and security policy, while the General Staff with its exclusive military expertise provides option formation and implementation. The Party leadership gave the military everything they need and want, and the military in turn does not interfere into the politics.<br>With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this controlling system also ceased to function. The political leadership can no longer look after the military's interests, while the military got fully politicized in and outside the Duma. Then the former President Putin tried to reestablish the control system, although it was not a democratic one, but the control by the president. Putin wanted to transform the military into a small but highly efficient and usable one in the local and regional conflicts. Although Putin's plan did not frame well, in 2007 with the new defense minister Anatolii Serdyukov appointed the situation began to change.<br>This article examines the three aspects of Putin's (and Medvedev's) reform efforts, namely the reform of military bureaucracy, the fulfillment of the military's interests, and the change of the official threat perceptions. First, in terms of civilianization of the defense ministry and the subordination of the General Staff to the civilian defense ministry, much efforts has been made, but still not enough. Due to lack of civilian military experts, it will take some more time to overcome the General Staff's exclusive status and power inherited from the Soviet era. Second, the political leadership attaches a great emphasis to the modernization of military equipment and the improvement of material conditions for military service. Still, the lack of capital and an inefficient way of using it have impeded visible progress. Third, after long procrastination finally the new official strategic documents, the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, have been approved. They revised the official threat perception from a large scale attack from the West to local and regional conflicts along the borders. Nevertheless, we should notice that a deep distrust against the West, especially the U.S. and NATO, is rooted in the newly attained consensus.<br>In sum, civilian control in Russia is working far better than in the 1990's, but is still incomplete. There is much room for the military's dissatisfaction or distrust against the U.S. to exert its influence to the political decisions.
著者
小泉 直美
出版者
一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1992, no.100, pp.104-125,L12, 1992

The East European countries waged the Cold War as members of the Eastern block. But they also waged the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The Purpose of this paper is to analyze the beginning and end of this Cold War of East Europe from the viewpoint of the Soviet perception.<br>The Soviet rule over East Europe was the result of the Soviet threat perception, as well as the vacuume of power and Soviet capability to fill it up. In other words, the Soviets felt strong threat from the West and came to a conclusion that East Europe is a special and vital area for the Soviet national security through the experience over the Second World War. Then the end of this Cold War must be based upon the overcome of this perception by the new Russian leadership and the society. The paper will address to these processes.<br>As for the beginning of the Cold War of East Europe, we are going to pay attention to the period from August 1939 to June 1941, namely from the conclusion the Soviet-German Non-Agression Pact to the start of the Soviet-German War. This is because we think that these years got a decisive meaning for the formation of the Soviet security perception after WWII.<br>Then after fifty years, the time for change came with the <i>Perestroika</i> started by Gorbachev. The Soviet Union (then Russia) no longer has the capability to hold the East European nations as her protege nor alliance. Her threat perception is also being mitigated under the new post-Cold War situation in Europe. For all of this the paper will still give a suggestion for uncertainty over whether Russia has finally overcome her perception of vulneravility and of East Europe as her special zone.