著者

松川 克彦

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.1991, no.96, pp.35-50,L7, 1991

---

Poland's struggle to build up her independence after the Armistice, had a strong influence on her own foreign policy making process during the interwar period.<br>This struggle was against the common aim of Soviet Russia and Germany to undermine the existence of Poland, as set up under the Versailles Treaty. The armed strife on the east and west borders of Poland was closely interconnected. There was direct Russo-German military and economic co-operation which also extended to Lithuania. As the latter also had territorial differences with Poland, Lithuania chose to act, as an intermediary between Soviet Russia and Germany which had no common borders.<br>Czechoslovakia played a similar role to Lithuania on the Polish southern border. Czechoslovakia kept good relations with Russia and Ukraine which was offered a base to prepare an anti-Polish campaign over East Galicia. Thus if Poland were to antagonize Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, it would upset Russo-German co-operation.<br>Poland tried to establish closer relations with Latvia and Estonia to diminish Lithuanian influence as well as maintaining good relations with Hungary and Rumania in opposition to Czechoslovakia. Although all of these countries were created after the world war and were in a similar situation, they were unable to form a common front against the growing menaces from east and west. The struggle between Poland on one side and Lithuania and Czechoslovakia on the other, continued through the interwar period.<br>In addition, Poland was offended by the Entente, especially by the U. K. which not only refused to help Poland during her war with Soviet Russia but also compelled Poland to accept harsh Russian ceasefire terms. Britain wished to conclude a commercial agreement with Russia to be followed by British recognition of the state of Russia. For this reason, Britain tried to stop the war between Poland and Soviet Russia and to confine Poland's border to the so-called Curzon Line, which was the predecessor of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Line. As France gradually leaned towards the British view point, Poland lost confidence in both countries.<br>Lastly, this international situation widened the differences between the two main Polish political groups. Pilsudski, a leader of one of the groups, wanted to make Poland independent of foreign influence and regarded himself as the successor to traditional Polish patriots such as Mickiewicz and Kosciuszko. The leader of the second group, Dmowski, wanted to establish good relations with the U. K., France, Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia in order to confront the German menace.<br>When Dmowski's foreign policy, which was grounded on the Polish-French Alliance, lost credibility through lack of French support and the effects of the Geneva and Locarno conferences, which seriously threatened Polish security, Pilsudski took the emergency step of a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> in May 1926. He had decisive influence on military and foreign affairs and his aims were pursued by the &ldquo;colonel group&rdquo; after his death.