- 著者
-
山本 元
- 出版者
- 一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会
- 雑誌
- 国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.2007, no.147, pp.132-148,L14, 2007
After the end of the Cold war era, domestic conflicts became a key issue facing international society. However, there exist cases actually left untouched for several years. Theorists of international politics also have not paid much attention to such cases as the subject of their research, with the result that we have not accumulated knowledge about “pretermitted conflicts” and the dynamics of the peace negotiation.<br>The purpose of this paper is to explain the sudden change in the behavior of a government in a peace negotiation even though international society sits still and watches. As Gurr points out, however, domestic conflicts have also occurred in quasi-states. This institutional character makes international intervention difficult and justifies the non-intervention of international society.<br>Making a point of being a quasi-state, the author characterizes the government as a player that tries to maximize public support. Inside the government organization, however, the army, which keeps the capability to overturn the peace agreement between the government and the proindependence militant, exists and opposes a move to the peace agreement. People not directly concerned with the domestic conflict determine support (or nonsupport) for their government after observing the will for peace and the ability to control the armed forces (civil-military relations). But the reality of civil-military relations is the private information of the government. Based upon this setting, the model on a peace negotiation was formulated as an incomplete information game.<br>After analyzing this model, the author derives two kinds of equilibrium paths to reach a peace agreement. One is a separating equilibrium, in which the government <i>H</i> aving control over the national military (<i>H</i>) proposes the peace plan, but the government <i>L</i>acking control over it (<i>L</i>) does not when the militant's belief that the government is <i>H</i> is high, and the militant will accept it. The other is a pooling equilibrium that both <i>H</i> and <i>L</i> propose when the belief is low and the militants will reject it. The first is a trivial outcome. However, <i>L</i> can propose it because <i>L</i> can appeal to the people's will for peace without exposing the low ascendancy of L on the separating equilibrium.<br>Finally, the author explains the dynamics of peace negotiations in Indonesia and the Philippines and points out that civil-military relations could be a useful explanatory variable. And as they are also policy implications for avoiding further humanitarian crisis, international society should not castigate <i>L</i> for a passive stance on the separating equilibrium, and it should notcastigate separates for it in regards to the pooling equilibrium. In this way, by seeing the effect of civil-military relations on the dynamics of a peace process, the optimal reply of international society to the government's and the militant's behavior must be changed to effect a prompt and appropriate response to avoid further massacre or the violation of human rights.