著者

金杉 武司

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.45, no.2, pp.47-63, 2012

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Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called "self-deception" should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.