著者
金杉 武司
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.45, no.2, pp.47-63, 2012 (Released:2016-01-15)
参考文献数
11

Self-deception has traditionally been conceived as a phenomenon in which one is motivated by a desire that P to deceive oneself intentionally to form a belief that P despite his/her possession of a belief that not P. It has been argued, however, that this traditional conception is confronted with two paradoxes precisely because it construes self-deception in such a manner. Consequently, in recent years, an increasing number of philosophers have come to abandon the traditional conception of self-deception to deny that a self-deceiving subject owns a belief that not P and/or that self-deception is intentional. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that some of phenomena called “self-deception” should nonetheless be conceived under the traditional framework and, further, explores a possibility for avoiding the paradoxes under the traditional conception.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.36, no.1, pp.43-55, 2003-07-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
参考文献数
10
被引用文献数
1 1

Does interpretationism leave any place for irrationality? At first sight, it seems it does not. Since interpretation requires the interpreter to assume that the subject being interpreted is rational (the principle of charity), it seems to follow that we can understand the subject only as a rational being, or otherwise the subject will have to be taken as non-rational and not really a subject at all (the paradox of irrationality). In this paper, however, I shall argue that interpretationism can understand irrationality as irrationality through the analysis of the structure of rationality.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.1, pp.39-48, 2009-11-25 (Released:2017-08-01)
参考文献数
15

Mental causation is one of the major problems in the philosophy of mind. It is a big problem not only for dualism but also for physicalism because even physicalists, as long as they accept the multiple realizability of mental properties, cannot identify mental properties with physical properties, therefore, they seem to be forced to exclude mental properties from physical causal relations. Sydney Shoemaker recently proposed interesting metaphysics of properties as a physicalist solution to this problem. According to Shoemaker, causal powers are essential to properties, and a realized property is a part of its realizer. This paper aims to assess the possibility of a physicalist solution to this problem through a critical examination of the adequacy of his solution.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.27, no.2, pp.87-92, 2000-03-31 (Released:2010-05-26)
参考文献数
6
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.51, no.1, pp.59-78, 2018-07-31 (Released:2019-05-02)
参考文献数
9
被引用文献数
1

What is “otherness”? What is “mind”? Shigeki Noya has been in pursuit of unique answers to these questions through inheriting but confronting the philosophies of Shozo Omori and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This book is positioned as an arrival point of Noya's philosophical investigations. In this paper, I examine how Noya innovatively develops his theory of “otherness” and “mind”, while referring also to the original work of Noya. In addition, introducing criticisms on Noya's previous works, I examine whether new developments in this book provide answers to those criticisms. Last of all, I examine the appropriateness of Naya's theory.
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
日本哲学会
雑誌
哲学 (ISSN:03873358)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.63, pp.201-216_L11, 2012 (Released:2012-10-16)
参考文献数
9

It is generally thought that the motivation for an action can be explained in terms of a desire (or evaluative judgment) and a belief. It is not clear, however, what kind of explanation is the explanation of the motivation for an action. This paper takes up and considers the validity of two answers to this question from different perspectives: the causal theory of action and the anti-causal theory of action. Construing practical reasoning as a simple practical syllogism, Donald Davidson argues that the motivation for an action can not be fully explained by the rationality of practical reasoning and needs to be explained by the causal relation between a beliefdesire pair and an action (the causal theory of action). Practical reasoning, however, can not be construed as a simple practical syllogism. An agent should be construed to start with a prima facie judgment about the desirability of an action and to work to reach an all-things-considered (ATC) judgment before reaching a conclusion in practical reasoning. Under such a construal, Davidson's argument that the rationality of practical reasoning can not fully explain the motivation for an action loses its validity (the anti-causal theory of action). It appears prima facie, however, that the causal theory of action is required for explaining the motivation for an akratic action. An akratic action is a free action that is contrary to an ATC judgment about the most desirable action reached at the time of performing it, and it is thus generally considered that the motivation for an akratic action is not determined by practical rationality. Rather, it is more plausibly determined by causal powers of individual desires (or evaluative judgments). Under the causal theory of action, however, an akratic action can not be construed as a free action since, under the theory, an akratic agent is a passive being who is at the mercy of the causal power of desires and hence does not have autonomy in the sense of a capacity to determine his/her motivation voluntarily, which is required for a free action. In order for an akratic action to qualify as a free action, it must be an action that is contrary to a comprehensive ATC judgment and, at the same time, arises because of a cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgment in favour of it. Furthermore, the motivation of an action, in general, must be explained by a practical rationality that includes cognitive-condition-bound ATC judgments (the anti-causal theory of action).
著者
金杉 武司他
出版者
日本科学哲学会
雑誌
科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.39, no.1, pp.97-106, 2006-06-25 (Released:2009-05-29)
被引用文献数
1
著者
金杉 武司
出版者
科学基礎論学会
雑誌
科学基礎論研究 (ISSN:00227668)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.37, no.1, pp.39-48, 2009-11-25

Mental causation is one of the major problems in the philosophy of mind. It is a big problem not only for dualism but also for physicalim because even physicalists, as long as they accept the multiple realizability of mental properties, cannot identify mental properties with physical properties, therefore, they seem to be forced to exclude mental properties from physical causal relations. Sydney Shoemaker recently proposed interesting metaphysics of properties as a physicalist solution to this problem. According to Shoemaker, causal powers are essential to properties, and a realized property is a part of its realizer. This paper aims to assess the possibility of a physicalist solution to this problem through a critical examination of the adequacy of his solution.