著者

高木 駿

出版者

美学会

雑誌

美学 (ISSN:05200962)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.67, no.1, 2016

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In the First Book of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Immanuel Kant says that judgments of taste are not cognitive but aesthetic, because they are grounded only in a subjective ground, or the feeling of pleasure (Vgl. V 203). Now logical cognitive judgments constitute "a cognition of the object through concepts of it" (V 211 Italics mine), therefore judgments of taste must be without concepts of object, namely nonconceptual. However, Kant's example of an object of judgments of taste, "the rose that I am gazing at" (V 215), and the judgment of taste "This rose is beautiful." seem to contradict the nonconceptuality of judgments of taste themselves, because this judgment appears to presuppose the use of concepts of understanding for empirically identifying what an object is, and the cognition "This is a rose.". In this point, does Kant make a self-contradictory statement? In this paper, by considering the meaning of Kant's conception of the nonconceptuality, I shall argue that the judgment of taste "This rose is beautiful." does not contradict the conception, and thus there is no Kant's self- contradiction.