著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

no.19, pp.73-89, 2012-03

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Sarvāstivādins assert all factors (dharma) exist in all times. In their ontology, the way factors pass through the present time seems problematic if they "exist" in the three times : future, present, and past. To answer this problem, the Abhidharma scholar Vasumitra defined the present time as the time when factors have their activities (kāritra). Although his theory was accepted by Sarvāstivādins in general, it was still unclear what he meant by the word "activity". Therefore, another Abhidharma scholar, Saṃghabhadra, the author of *Nyāyānusāriṇī, redefined it "the power to project its own effect (*phalākṣepaśakti)" that all conditioned (saṃskṛta) factors must have in the present. Modern scholars such as G. Sasaki explained *phalākṣepa as phalapratigraha, an ability that a conditioned factor fixes itself as a cause of its own effect. Contrary to this explanation, T. Fukuda reasoned that not every phalapratigraha is *phalākṣepa, and concluded that *phalākṣepa corresponds only to those phalapratigraha affecting the effect that arises after its cause arose ("*phalākṣepa≠phalapratigraha theory"). The present article reconsiders Fukuda's hypothesis. By this reconsideration the article clarifies that his understanding unconsciously presupposes a few notions Saṃghabhadra does not accept. From this discussion, it is concluded that every phalapratigraha is *phalākṣepa which Saṃghabhadra regarded as deciding the present.

著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科・文学部インド哲学仏教学研究室

雑誌

インド哲学仏教学研究 (ISSN:09197907)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.16, pp.39-54, 2009-03-31

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In early buddhist sūtra texts “asaṃskṛta” is a term used as a synonym for nirvāṇa, the ultimate purpose of buddhists. Disciples in Sarvāstivāda, one of the most influential buddhist sects in india, regarded asaṃskṛta as dharma, and in their abhidharma texts they classified three kinds of dharma, that is to say pratisaṃkhyānirodha, apratisaṃkhyānirodha and ākāśa, into asaṃskṛtadharma. According to the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy these three asaṃskṛtadharmas are real-entities ( dravyasat ); on the other hand scholars of Sautrāntika / Dārṣṭāntika denied the real-entityness of them. This article deals with the controversy about real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas appeared in abhidharma texts, in particular *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』, MV ), *Tattvasiddhi (『成實論』, TS ), Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ( AKBh ) and *Nyāyānusāriṇī (『阿毘達磨順正理論』, NA ). The argument for acknowledging the real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas in TS, AKBh and NA is grounded on the possibility of cognizing intrinsic nature ( svabhāva ) of asaṃskṛtadharmas.And scholars who accepted this argument considered that the possibility can be reasoned from the possibility of cognizing results of activities of intrinsic nature. Saṅghabhadra, the author of NA, affirmed that ākāśa has an activity of receiving ākāṣadhātu and that apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has an activity of constant obstruction to the arising of those factors whose nature is to arise ( 可生法, *utpattidharmaka ). On the other hand in TS, AKBh and NA pratisaṃkhyānirodha is considered as the dharma whose intrinsic nature and an activity can not be cognized by anybody except āryas. Then Vaibhāṣikas who appear in AKBk and Saṅghabhadra reinforced the argument of real-entityness of asaṃskṛtadharmas with finding out their characteristics which are inherent only in beings. According to NA non-beings are neither distinguishable, cognizable, nor describable, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is not accepted as such a thing, so it is a being. And furthermore, it is not a being as a provisional designation ( prajñaptisat ) by any possibility, therefore it must be a real-entity. From the viewpoint of those who denied the real-entityness of three asaṃskṛtadharmas each of them is a non-being. In TS ākāśa has an active influence on spatial beings with its non-beingness, but pratisaṃkhyānirodha is a mere non-being. And according to AKBh a statement that pratisaṃkhyānirodha exists is only a negation ( pratiṣedhamātra ) and indicate non-beings. Saṅghabhadra considered this “existence” is not only existence as a real entity, but also existence as a provisional designation.

著者

一色 大悟

出版者

東京大学

雑誌

特別研究員奨励費

巻号頁・発行日

2008

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平成二十年度当初においては『阿毘達磨倶舎論』第二章「根品」の因果論該当箇所のサンスクリット・テクスト再校訂を継続することと、有部系諸文献における縁起説の輪廻論的側面についての検討を行なうことを計画した。『倶舎論』第二章「根品」の因果論該当箇所のサンスクリット・テクスト校訂作業にあたって、まず『倶舎論』関係の和漢撰述・チベット撰述文献の資料収集を継続した。その結果として、存在は確認しつつも入手しえていなかった資料を数点複写の形で得ることができた。また『倶舎論』第四章「業品」、第五章「随眠品」、第九章「破我品」.において議論が関連する箇所、および『倶舎論』に対する反駁書として重要な『阿毘達磨順正理論』の三世実有説(説一切有部の存在論の基礎となる説、一切のものは一切時に存在すると説く)を論ずる箇所の訳注を行い、因果論に関するそれらの内容との比較検討を行なった。結果として「根品」因果論該当箇所のサンスクリット・テクスト校訂は、上記の情報収集に時間を費やす必要があったため、完遂し得なかったものの、精度の高い校訂のための基礎固めを十分に行なうことができた。第二に、縁起説の輪廻論的側面について検討し、『倶舎論』「破我品」における無我説を踏まえつつ、『阿毘達磨識身足論』『阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論』『阿毘達磨順正理論』などの有部系諸文献との比較検討を行なった。また、上記文献において対論者として現れる犢子部の議論については、さらに正量部の『三彌底部論』、及び後代に書かれた諸論書における議論を調査した。