著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学法学会

雑誌

立命館法学 = 立命館法学 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.348, pp.736-815, 2013

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学法学会

雑誌

立命館法学 = 立命館法学 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.335, pp.62-137, 2011

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学

雑誌

立命館法学 = 立命館法学 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.349, pp.1112-1185, 2013

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学法学会

雑誌

立命館法學 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2002, no.5, pp.581-636, 2002

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学法学会

雑誌

立命館法學 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2003, no.2, pp.541-603, 2003

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

日本法哲学会

雑誌

法哲学年報 (ISSN:03872890)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2006, pp.150-157,262, 2007-10-30 (Released:2010-12-16)

参考文献数

29

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In this article, I discuss two kinds of legal conceptions that Hohfeld described in his 1913 article: duty and privilege (or [unilateral] liberty). I focus on one specific interpretation that most readers seem to share; that is, the interpretation of Hohfeld as adopting a thesis ‘duty implies liberty’ (hereinafter T1). In order to assess the validity of T1, I think it necessary to stress the analogy between duty-liberty relations in Hohfeld's analysis on the one hand, and obligation-permission relations in deontic logic on the other. From this standpoint, T1 above equals a well-known thesis in deontic logic, which maintains that 'Op D Pp should be included as an axiom of a deontic system' (hereinafter T2). Moreover, T2 is closely related to yet another one, that is, `there exist logical relations between norms' (hereinafter T3). I argue that it is possible to interpret Hohfeld as denying T1 (contrary to currently dominant approach), and that this inter-pretation has its merits when it claims itself to be a system of deontic logic. After briefly summarizing what jural ‘opposites’ (in Hohfeld's term) mean, I argue that his own text becomes perfectly consistent when read as rejecting Tl. One might wonder if, logically speaking, Hohfeld's system thus interpreted is rich enough (as pointed out by Lindahl and others). I argue that it is, particularly when connected to the deontic system of von Wright's. Here, we must be aware that von Wright made, as time went by, at least three different kinds of arguments about T2 and T3. Of these three, particularly of note is, in my opinion, the system proposed in the third period. At that time, he contended that, while one should reject T3 (and hence T2), this never means the demise of deontic logic. To support this contention, he introduces ‘rationality’ standard, and thereby tries to reconstruct deontic logic from a new perspective. Based on this, I suggest that Hohfeld be understood as ‘von Wright in the third and (in my opinion) maturest period’, although this interpretation has several unsolved problems to be dealt with.

著者

三本 卓也

出版者

立命館大学

雑誌

立命館法學 (ISSN:04831330)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2011, no.1, pp.62-137, 2011