著者

下谷内 奈緒

出版者

日本平和学会

雑誌

平和研究 (ISSN:24361054)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.58, pp.119-142, 2022-10-15 (Released:2022-10-13)

参考文献数

38

---

1990年代以降、世界各地で過去の戦争や数世紀前の植民地支配の責任を追及する動きが広がっている。本稿では、この時期に訴えが表面化することになった要因を明らかにし、被害者から提起されるこれらの動きを、より広範な社会的な和解につなげる条件について考察する。近年の責任追及の動きを特徴づけるのは、被害者個人が相手国や第三国にある法律事務所を介して政府や企業を提訴する形態をとっていることである。本稿ではその背景として、冷戦終結とともに国家間の戦略的妥協としての和解を支えた構造的要因の消失と、個人による責任追及を可能にする3つ条件(①民主化、②国際人道法の発展と国際的な被害者の権利の伸長、③新独立国の経済成長)を指摘する。そして過去の植民地支配や戦争の責任を追及する訴訟のうち、原告に有利な判断が出された例外的な2つの事例(インドネシア独立戦争期のオランダ軍による住民虐殺[ラワグデ事件]に関するオランダ・ハーグの地方裁判所判決[2011年]と、ケニア独立闘争[マウマウ団の乱]時の拷問被害者からの訴えに裁判所の管轄権と審議入りを認めたロンドン高等法院の判断[2011年、2012年])を、対日戦後補償裁判と比較分析することで、加害国の側で社会の広範な関心を喚起する出来事の有無が、広範な国民的議論を喚起し社会的な和解に繋げるうえで重要な要因となっていることを明らかにする。

著者

下谷内 奈緒

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.194, pp.194_125-194_140, 2018-12-25 (Released:2019-05-16)

参考文献数

51

---

This article examines the nature of the rule of law in international criminal justice through a critical evaluation of deterrent theory, the most widely accepted argument supporting international criminal tribunals today. Contrary to the assumptions of deterrent theory, the premise of which is centralized enforcement of international law, it argues that the rule of law in international criminal justice is decentralized in two ways. First, it requires the consent of sovereign states to establish jurisdiction and the cooperation of states to enforce international criminal law. Second, beyond the direct execution of international criminal law, the legal norm embodied by international criminal courts to end impunity for the perpetrators of grave human rights abuses encourages states to conduct human rights trials in their domestic courts.The article begins by reviewing the logic of deterrence. Deterrent theory has become prominent as an increasing number of international prosecutions are directed at the perpetrators of ongoing violence. It is assumed that the threat of punishment will deter the perpetrators from further criminal acts and, thus, prevent the escalation of conflict. In this instance, deterrent effects are viewed as conveyed in a manner that applies domestic deterrent theory of punishment at an international level. While this domestic analogy tends to emphasize the coercive power of law, this article demonstrates that the power of international tribunals to constrain the conduct of sovereign states and individuals has been weakening. While the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were executed on the strength of the victors’ overwhelming power, today, international tribunals as exemplified in the ICC and hybrid courts basically require the consent of states.The article then investigates the normative aspect of international criminal justice. It has a high level of legitimacy—it is recognized as legitimate by a majority of states in the world. This fact encourages voluntary compliance of international criminal justice at a national level. However, the problem is what to do with the remaining countries. Grave human rights abuses are committed in a minority of undemocratic states whose levels of political liberties are extremely low. These countries tend to remain outside the international criminal system. It is difficult to prosecute atrocious state leaders without regime change, but international criminal justice as it is implemented now merely “complements” the functions of sovereign states. It has neither the power to coerce regime change nor the normative power to encourage voluntary human rights trials in national courts.