著者
井上 泉 岡 政志 一瀬 雅夫
出版者
一般財団法人 日本消化器病学会
雑誌
日本消化器病学会雑誌 (ISSN:04466586)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.117, no.6, pp.477-484, 2020-06-20 (Released:2020-06-20)
参考文献数
40

H.pylori感染胃炎を中核とする胃癌発生の自然史に関する理解がすすみ,癌発生リスクの把握が可能になって来た.その結果,胃癌検診効率化を視野に,血液検査によるH.pylori感染胃炎ステージ診断・胃癌リスク評価に基づくリスク検診が検討されている.いまだ理論的な段階に留まるものであるが,今後,安定したシステムの登場が期待される.“いわゆるABC検診”に関しては,受診者の不利益を回避する上で,現状のシステムの導入には慎重であるべきで,実施可能なシステム・責任ある体制の構築のために,充分な検討が必要である.その他,本稿では血液検体による胃癌診断の現状・検診導入の可能性について概説する.
著者
中田 博也 加藤 順 井上 泉 玉井 秀幸 井口 幹嵩 前北 隆雄 一瀬 雅夫
出版者
一般社団法人 日本消化器がん検診学会
雑誌
日本消化器がん検診学会雑誌 (ISSN:18807666)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.53, no.3, pp.383-388, 2015 (Released:2015-06-15)
参考文献数
13

潰瘍性大腸炎(UC)においてHelicobacter pylori(H.pylori)感染率が有意に低いとの報告が以前よりある。我々はUCとH.pyloriおよび胃粘膜萎縮との関連を検討しABC分類に分けて比較した。UC群74人と, 年齢・性をマッチさせたControl群148人を検討した。H.pylori感染はControl群27.7%, UC群12.2%とUC群で, 胃粘膜萎縮の陽性率はControl群12.8%, UC群2.7%とUC群で有意に低かった。ABC分類に分け検討するとControl群(A:69.6%, B:17.6%, C:10.1%, D:2.7%), UC群(A:86.5%, B:10.8%, C:1.35%, D:1.35%)と, A群でUC群が, C群でControl群が有意に多く, H.pyloriとUCは, 逆相関することが示された。胃粘膜萎縮進展を介して, おそらく腸内細菌叢を変化させることにより, UCが減少することが推測された。
著者
井上 泉
出版者
日本経営倫理学会
雑誌
日本経営倫理学会誌 (ISSN:13436627)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.5, pp.135-144, 1998-03-31 (Released:2017-07-28)

On September 26 1995,the Daiwa Bank announced a trading loss exceeding one billion dollars at its branch in New York from 1983 to 1995. However,US further investigation revealed that Daiwa's highest officials themselves committe d crimes as they attempted to cover up the loss and decieve US authorities. As a result of such an uncredible misconducts, Daiwa was expelled from US financial market by the order of the Federal Reserve. Why did the Daiwa"s management chose a wrong way? The Daiwa's disaster is a good lesson for business ethics case study to examine which management decision was most favorable and appropriate.
著者
井上 泉
出版者
日本経営倫理学会
雑誌
日本経営倫理学会誌 (ISSN:13436627)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.24, pp.165-177, 2017 (Released:2018-04-11)
被引用文献数
1

On December 2nd 2012, concrete ceiling panels stretching for about 138 meters inside the Tokyo-bound Sasago Tunnel suddenly collapsed, crushing three vehicles and causing nine deaths and two serious injuries. The deadliest accident in Japanese highway history was caused by the gross neglect of safety standards by the Central Nippon Expressway Company Ltd. (C-Nexco). It failed to conduct thorough safety inspections of the Sasago Tunnel for 12 years and overlooked the loosening ceiling panels. C-Nexco also repeatedly refused to admit its fault and liability for the victims and their families despite its motto for“ Safety, Security and Comfort” and“ Customers first”. A series of these C-Nexco’s misconduct raised serious public doubts about its standards of ethics and social responsibilities. This article examines the actions of C-Nexco regarding this accident and discusses the social responsibilities of companies beyond their legal obligations with a view to re-emphasising the importance of a corporate culture willing to adapt to corporate social responsibility.
著者
井上 泉
出版者
日本経営倫理学会
雑誌
日本経営倫理学会誌 (ISSN:13436627)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.22, pp.209-222, 2015-01-31 (Released:2017-08-08)

Since the Organized Crime Group Prevention Act, which legally established organized crime groups as anti-social organizations, came into force in March 1992, earnest efforts have been made to block further transfer of funds to such groups and to prevent money laundering. However, last year, Mizuho Bank was found to have been lending money to anti-social organizations, which revealed that companies in Japan still do not have sufficient means to deal with such organizations appropriately. However, the closer look shows that this case is more complicated than what people understand through media and suggests there is high likelihood of Japanese big enterprises falling into tactful about dealing with anti-social organizations. This article aims to offer suggestions to improve the status quo by scrutinizing the Mizuho case in detail.
著者
井上 泉
出版者
日本経営倫理学会
雑誌
日本経営倫理学会誌 (ISSN:13436627)
巻号頁・発行日
no.22, pp.209-222, 2015-01-31

Since the Organized Crime Group Prevention Act, which legally established organized crime groups as anti-social organizations, came into force in March 1992, earnest efforts have been made to block further transfer of funds to such groups and to prevent money laundering. However, last year, Mizuho Bank was found to have been lending money to anti-social organizations, which revealed that companies in Japan still do not have sufficient means to deal with such organizations appropriately. However, the closer look shows that this case is more complicated than what people understand through media and suggests there is high likelihood of Japanese big enterprises falling into tactful about dealing with anti-social organizations. This article aims to offer suggestions to improve the status quo by scrutinizing the Mizuho case in detail.