著者
伊藤 潔志
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
桃山学院大学キリスト教論集 = St. Andrew's University Journal of Christian Studies (ISSN:0286973X)
巻号頁・発行日
no.51, pp.45-70, 2016-02-18

In Wittgenstein's diaries, manuscripts, and so on, he makes numerous references to religion. From this, we can see that Wittgenstein had a strong interest in religion, and that this interest continued consistently right from his `early phase' to his `late phase.' However, these are no more than fragmentary writings, and they do not go so far as to clearly indicate exactly what Wittgenstein's religious understanding was. In this paper, in order to pursue the essence of Wittgenstein's interest in religion, and to clarify the characteristics of his religious understanding, I focus on Tolstoy, who exerted a powerful influence on Wittgenstein. By considering Wittgenstein's religious understanding centered on the influence exerted by Tolstoy on him, we see that, for Wittgenstein, religion was truly an` issue of life.' Accordingly, Wittgenstein's religion can be called a `religion of life.'
著者
伊藤 潔志
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
桃山学院大学キリスト教論集 = St. Andrew's University journal of Christian studies (ISSN:0286973X)
巻号頁・発行日
no.50, pp.85-112, 2015-03-23

The purpose of this paper is to examine and elucidate the distinctive features of the religious aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical thought. Few people generally regard Wittgenstein as a religious thinker, but research has been carried out on his views on religion and attempts have been made to apply his philosophical thought to theology. Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking is commonly divided into two phases ─ the early phase and the later phase ─ and even as it showed a certain consistency, it also underwent considerable transformation. Accordingly, in the early and later phases of Wittgenstein's philosophy there are both elements that are the same and elements that are markedly different. In this paper I will look at the early phase of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought, picking out certain ideas about religion that run throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy and elucidating the distinctive features of such ideas. Wittgenstein held that language has limits, and that accordingly there are also limits to thought. Further, he held that since language and the world exist with and through one another, the world also has limits. Accordingly, it is impossible to speak anything regarding what exists beyond the limits of language, and impossible to speak anything that lies outside the world. This means that though it is possible to speak of things when they have to do with facts, it is not possible to speak of things when they have to do with values ─ since values lie outside the world. Thus, it is not possible to speak things like religion, faith, revelations, and God (they are `unspeakable'). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues, even though it is not possible to` speak' these things, it is still possible to `show' them. According to Kierkegaard, `showing' is a particular state of affairs, and to `show' is a way of indirectly `speaking' something. We might perhaps call this showing a `religion of silence.' Wittgenstein was a philosopher who worked out a religion of silence, a religion that exists on the other side of the limits of language, thought, and the world.
著者
伊藤 潔志
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
桃山学院大学キリスト教論集 (ISSN:0286973X)
巻号頁・発行日
no.50, pp.85-112, 2015-03-23

The purpose of this paper is to examine and elucidate the distinctive features of the religious aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical thought. Few people generally regard Wittgenstein as a religious thinker, but research has been carried out on his views on religion and attempts have been made to apply his philosophical thought to theology. Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking is commonly divided into two phases ─ the early phase and the later phase ─ and even as it showed a certain consistency, it also underwent considerable transformation. Accordingly, in the early and later phases of Wittgenstein's philosophy there are both elements that are the same and elements that are markedly different. In this paper I will look at the early phase of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought, picking out certain ideas about religion that run throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy and elucidating the distinctive features of such ideas. Wittgenstein held that language has limits, and that accordingly there are also limits to thought. Further, he held that since language and the world exist with and through one another, the world also has limits. Accordingly, it is impossible to speak anything regarding what exists beyond the limits of language, and impossible to speak anything that lies outside the world. This means that though it is possible to speak of things when they have to do with facts, it is not possible to speak of things when they have to do with values ─ since values lie outside the world. Thus, it is not possible to speak things like religion, faith, revelations, and God (they are `unspeakable'). Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues, even though it is not possible to` speak' these things, it is still possible to `show' them. According to Kierkegaard, `showing' is a particular state of affairs, and to `show' is a way of indirectly `speaking' something. We might perhaps call this showing a `religion of silence.' Wittgenstein was a philosopher who worked out a religion of silence, a religion that exists on the other side of the limits of language, thought, and the world.
著者
伊藤 潔志
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
人間文化研究 = Journal of humanities research, St. Andrew's University (ISSN:21889031)
巻号頁・発行日
no.3, pp.29-53, 2015-10

This paper aims to reconsider, from the viewpoint of educational ethics, the "religious neutrality of education" that is a fundamental principle of Japan's Basic Act on Education. Religious neutrality in education is a concrete example of the principle of the separation of church and state. The history of the relationship between church and state in the USA and Europe reveals that separation of the two has been enacted in each individual country as a result of a wide range of developments, and could therefore be called a political "product of compromise." The relationship among the three fundamental principles - separation of church and state, freedom of belief, and the spirit of tolerance - can be describedas follows. First, freedom of belief has the definitive meaning of having freedom to follow one's own personal beliefs. However, when this freedom is expanded to mean freedom of belief for both oneself and others, it becomes a right with universal value. What makes such an expansion possible is the spirit of tolerance. For this reason, it can be said that the spirit of tolerance is a condition for freedom of belief, and that the result of the systemization of this spirit of tolerance is the separation of church and state. The separation of church and state thus becomes a means to safeguard freedom of belief. These three elements are inter-related. Tolerance appears to be a universal concept, but it is based on an extremely Protestant philosophy. The same can also be said of freedom of belief, and of the separation of church and state. Moreover, the limits inherent in the separation of church and state are inextricably linked to the limits of religious neutrality in education.
著者
伊藤 潔志
出版者
桃山学院大学
雑誌
人間文化研究 = Journal of humanities research St. Andrew's University (ISSN:21889031)
巻号頁・発行日
no.3, pp.29-53, 2015-10-27

This paper aims to reconsider, from the viewpoint of educational ethics, the "religious neutrality of education" that is a fundamental principle of Japan's Basic Act on Education. Religious neutrality in education is a concrete example of the principle of the separation of church and state. The history of the relationship between church and state in the USA and Europe reveals that separation of the two has been enacted in each individual country as a result of a wide range of developments, and could therefore be called a political "product of compromise." The relationship among the three fundamental principles - separation of church and state, freedom of belief, and the spirit of tolerance - can be describedas follows. First, freedom of belief has the definitive meaning of having freedom to follow one's own personal beliefs. However, when this freedom is expanded to mean freedom of belief for both oneself and others, it becomes a right with universal value. What makes such an expansion possible is the spirit of tolerance. For this reason, it can be said that the spirit of tolerance is a condition for freedom of belief, and that the result of the systemization of this spirit of tolerance is the separation of church and state. The separation of church and state thus becomes a means to safeguard freedom of belief. These three elements are inter-related. Tolerance appears to be a universal concept, but it is based on an extremely Protestant philosophy. The same can also be said of freedom of belief, and of the separation of church and state. Moreover, the limits inherent in the separation of church and state are inextricably linked to the limits of religious neutrality in education.