著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.79-94,L11, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

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The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..

著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

九州大学法学部政治研究室

雑誌

政治研究 (ISSN:02898357)

巻号頁・発行日

no.43, pp.1-51, 1996-03

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The term principle of subsidiarity has been adopted as a basic principle underlying the European Union and is explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Preamble, Article B, Article G3b). Its central idea is expressed as "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen" (Article A). In other words, "the Community shall take action only if the objectives be better achieved by the Community" (Art. G3b), the idea of which has always been present in the treaties preceding the one on European Union. Why, then, has the principle been explicitly taken up at this stage of the European integration ? Why is it referred to, particularly after the first Danish referendum in 1992, as if it were deus ex machina appeasing the critics of the actions of the European Community ? The answers may be found in the prevailing conditions of the European integration and the changes such integration brought to the conventional domains of competences of local, national and supranational administration. In an attempt to clarify the concept of subsidiarity, I first explore the usage of the term by the former President of the Commission, Mr. J. Delors, for he may be considered as an ardent advocate of the principle in the Community ; I then examine the two contrasting arguments about the future of the Union in the light of subsidiarity. Concrete examples e.g. the regional policy of the EU, etc., suggest that there is an increasing influence of the EU within both national and local governments. From these studies, I suggest that the Union's competence has expanded since the Single European Act (SEA) to the point where it causes conflicts with the conventional national competences. Furthermore, the EU has now become more visible to ordinary European citizens, who had rarely felt involved in the integration process before, and who have begun to question the relevance of this to their daily lives. It is in order to counter this prevailing attitude that the Commission has emphasized the principle of subsidiarity avoiding the integration by "benign despotism" and working towards "an ever closer union". The Commission has prepared documents discussing the application of the principle. However, the arguments, so far, tend to be defensive and technical. This is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the on-going process of integration with only rather indistinctly defined goals. Yet, despite the ambiguous character of subsidiarity, the principle can clearly be seen as having great potential for developing a new form of democracy. In order to follow and practice the central idea of subsidiarity, the opinions of various groups of citizens must be channeled into the decision making process. Only in this way can the needs of such groups be adequately met and the appropriate level for decision-making be identified that is "as close as possible to the citizen". This may lead to reorganization on a large-scale and greater political empowerment of the citizens of Europe, who would then have greater transnational ties and common interests. Such a structure may gradually evolve into a democracy no longer constrained within a nation state.