著者
東郷 育子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2006, no.145, pp.72-92,L10, 2006-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
40

Since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese government has strongly governed and controlled to constrain democratization. Despite severe limitations, China's citizens have lived better and freer than before 1989 as a byproduct of China's economic reform and opening to the outside world. The enhanced government control following the Tiananmen incident has understandably aroused the civil liberties awareness of the Chinese people vis-à-vis the government, particularly with respect to human rights.The Chinese government has basically rejected western human rights pressure, while at the same time, pursuing a positive strategy at the international level. China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and is also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although this is not yet to be ratified.In line with the continued development of the market economy, China has promoted legal reform including the adoption of the Civil Procedure Law, the revised Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Administrative Litigation Act and others. In 2004, China adopted amendments to the Current Constitution including articles for improving the protection of citizens' lawful private property and provisions on respect for human rights. However, full compliance with these legal reforms and international human rights law is a different problem to be analyzed separately.Since 1991, China has published the so-called white paper on human rights practices to advocate its own view on human rights, and to make public a limited amount of information about human rights in China. A number of NGOs and human rights research institutions have been established and are engaging, albeit under significant government scrutiny and control, in academic research and international exchange about human rights. The China Society for Human Rights Studies is a typical government sponsored NGO. It hosts the country's biggest human rights website and published the first human rights magazine in China. In China, while the number of NGOs is increasing rapidly, only NGOs permitted by the government are allowed to engage in westernized human rights development or democratization. Furthermore, international NGOs that are critical of the Chinese government are barred from operating in China.It goes without saying that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and subsequent human rights battles with Western nations have heightened awareness and concern amongst the international community of China's human rights record. As a result, the Chinese government has become more accommodating, holding over the years an increasing number of meetings and dialogue on human rights with various governments and private organizations. Tibet and Xinjiang, which had hitherto not been treated as human rights issues, are now the object of calls for improvement by the international community. At the UN Commission on Human Rights, Chinese government has fought year after year to resist Western cosponsored resolution for China's human rights abuses. However, it is significant that the Chinese government has accepted visits and activities of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs, and promoted human rights technical cooperation with the UN agencies.However, China's policies and strategies have not necessarily produced a standard of human rights sufficient to satisfy international community. The criticism from international community remains strong. With China now a member of the new UN Human Rights Council, it will come under increasing pressure to fulfill new obligations with respect to this role and the promotion and protection of human rights.Two vectors in China's human rights development can be identified. Firstly, there exists external pressure, such as calls from international community for the improvement of China's human rights situation in addition to diplomatic pressure.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.
著者
酒井 哲哉
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_70-175_83, 2014

For most Japanese IR scholars, Nagai Yônosuke is known as the most representative realist in Post-War Japan. Given the hegemony of idealism in the discursive space in 1950's Japan, it is not an exaggeration to say that his appearance as a conservative realist in 1960's was a historical event. In the studies concerned with political science in Post-War Japan, however, Nagai is usually depicted as a pioneer in behaviorism inspired by contemporary American political science. This article intends to synthesize these two aspects which were hitherto separately discussed, and by doing so resituate his works in the intellectual history of Post-War Japan.<br>Chapter I examines Nagai's works before his debut as an international political scientist. Influenced by his brother, Nagai in his teens was concerned with the philosophical trend of logical positivism. During the Pacific War, however, fascinated by German romanticism, he went further to accept anti-Semitic theory on conspiracy. Given this experience, after the war, he began to be engaged in research on political consciousness with the theoretical framework of sociological psychology and had soon established himself as a promising political scientist. Nagai's behaviorism owed heavily to Maruyama Masao's work, <i>The World of Politics</i>, published in 1952. Based on Lasswell's works, Maruyama had there presented his behavioristic model of political power and suggested the importance of the activities of voluntary associations as a remedy for political apathy in mass society. In 1950's, Nagai as well as Maruyama regarded his behaviorism as a progressive venture to establish democracy in Post-War Japan. However, Nagai was not a blind advocate of behaviorism. Reviewing Weldon's work, <i>the Vocabulary of Politics</i>, which was founded in logical positivism, he criticized the scientific assumption of American behaviorism and its inclination to social engineering. Nagai did not even conceal himself from his sympathy with Hans J. Morgenthau's criticism to social engineering. Thus Nagai's ambivalent attitude toward American political science was a prologue to his subsequent conversion to conservative realism in 1960's.<br>Chapter II investigates Nagai's works on international politics in 1960's focusing on the relationship between his concern in 1950's. and 1960's His first article on international politics, "American concept of war and the challenge of Mao Zedong" founded its theoretical framework on his behavioristic political science including key concepts such as "situation", "institution" and "organization". His criticism to American concept of war was apparently based on his antipathy to social engineering which had already appeared in late 1950's. Nagai was misunderstood by his contemporaries as an epigone of American scientific strategic studies. Discussing Nagai's ambivalence toward scientific approach, this chapter explains the reason why such misunderstandings had occurred<br>Chapter III depicts how Nagai viewed the political turmoil in 1968. As an expert in the study of mass society, Nagai was sensitive to the impact of rapid economic development commencing in early 1960's upon contemporary Japanese politics. Nevertheless, he did not advocate the end of ideology. He rather appreciated the importance of utopian ideas in the post-industrial society. In his article "Why dose socialism exist in America?", Nagai criticized the stagnant institutionalized American liberalism and appreciated utopian idealists including Riesman and Fromm. Therefore, while adopting conservative realist critique in discussing American foreign policies, Nagai took sides with "utopian socialists" in reviewing American domestic politics. His dual strategy took its root in his consistent criticism to the institutionalized American liberalism.
著者
毛利 敏彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
no.66, pp.128-147,L7, 1980

In 1871, the Japanese government sent a goodwill mission to the United States of America and the European countries. This mission was led by <i>Tomomi Iwakura</i>, vice-president of minister (<i>Udaizin</i> _??__??__??_). <i>Takayoshi Kido</i>, the member of council (<i>Sangi</i> _??__??_), was appointed a vice-ambassador of the mission.<br><i>Kido</i> who belonged to the <i>Chôshû</i> faction had rivaled with <i>Toshimichi Ôkubo</i> who was the minister of finance (<i>Ôkura-kyô</i> _??__??__??_) and belonged to the <i>Satsuma</i> faction. <i>Kido</i> had opposed <i>Ôkubo's</i> policies.<br>So <i>Ôkubo</i> tried to reduce <i>Kido's</i> influence in the government. Then <i>Ôkubo</i> succeeded to isolate <i>Kido</i> from the government as a vice-ambassador of the mission.
著者
吉川 洋子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1983, no.75, pp.130-149,L13, 1983-10-20 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
58

Japanese-Philippine negotiations on war reparations lasted from 1951 through 1956, often interrupted by disagreements on the terms of payment. Significantly, the diplomatic deadlocks were often broken by informal channels of communications and secret talks. A host of political and business leaders who had varying degrees of interests in each other's country participated.A most important breakthrough in deadlocked talks was made in New York and Washington in November 1954 by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Senator Jose P. Laurel, whose secret meetings were arranged by the Premier's confidants on Philippine affairs, Nagano Mamoru and Shiohara Tamotsu. Nagano, a leading steel industrialist, had business interests in the Philippine iron mines and other resources, and had his own proposal on a variety of development projects to be financed by reparation funds. Shiohara, Executive Director of the Philippine Society of Japan, had been a personal friend of Senator Laurel since the Japanese occupation period when Laurel was President of the Republic and Shiohara served his government as an advisor on internal affairs.Nagano played several other roles during the whole process, including one as a member of the Japanese delegation for reparations talks. So did many other leaders such as former Ambassador Murata Shozo, Minister Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, and businessmen like Furukawa Yoshizo who had lived in the Philippines before the war and claimed to be experts about the country.Another diplomatic breakthrough was achieved in May 1955 by Ferino Neri, chief Philippine reparations negotiator, who ran a series of secret meetings in Tokyo with political and business influentials regarding the terms of payment. He finally obtained Prime Minister Hatoyama's confidential endorsement of his proposed terms. This success was made with the skillful help of Hatoyama's Deputy Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto Takizo, who apparently had many Philippine acquaintances primarily through the Free Masonry whose members pointedly included Hatoyama, Senator Camilo Osias, and most probably Senator Laurel.The long negotiations demonstrated the significant roles played by informal contact-makers on both sides. Many of them were those with official capacity seeking secret contacts, but some without official capacity also volunteered secretly to help the talks. Both Japanese and Philippine political cultures weigh personal ties, particularly, ties based on clientelism, in political dealings. The interaction of the two cultures over such difficult negotiations multiplied the effectiveness of informal contact-makers.
著者
植田 麻記子
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2008, no.151, pp.54-72,L9, 2008-03-15 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
99

This paper examines “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum” with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system.It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that “international partnership” would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward “international partnership” by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II.Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of “international partnership.” Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the “Ashida Amendment”. At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war.The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The “Ashida Memorandum” was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in “Ashida Memorandum” was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces.Ashida had an intention that the “Ashida Amendment” should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of “Ashida Memorandum”, the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, “Ashida Memorandum” limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces.By examining the process of making “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum”, this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.
著者
池内 恵
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2014, no.175, pp.175_115-175_129, 2014

Jihad is one of the most controversial concepts in the Islamic political thought. This paper shed light on two dominant trends in the theories of Jihad in Modern Islamic World. Modernist thinkers, on the one hand, were concerned with political consequences of waging Jihad against the Western Powers and devised a theory intended to avoid the implementation of Jihad doctrine in the modern international arena. This "avoidance theorists" conducted meticulous research on the history of early Islam and forcefully concluded each and every wars and conflicts fought by the prophet Muhammad and his disciples were acts of selfdefense. By doing so, modernist thinkers presented Islam as an entity reconcilable with international laws and norms. Fundamentalist thinkers, on the other hand, criticized the modernist thinkers and its "subservient" style. Fundamentalists are not opposed to the "defensive" nature of Islam but expanded the concept of "defense" beyond the ordinary bound and redefined it to encompass fighting to root out the un-Islamic political and social institutions and entities from the earth. Although political implications of the two trends are diametrically opposed to each other, theoretically they are mutually supporting, at least in part. Modernists have paved the way to supremacist notion of Jihad by definitively approving the historical acts of war by the early Muslim nation as totally defensive and righteous. Fundamentalists rode on this theory and expanded the realm of the "defense" to such an extent that even most of the offensive warfare can be legitimized as "defense" in the context of eternal struggle for the sake of the cause of spreading Islam.
著者
井上 勇一
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1982, no.71, pp.173-188,L14, 1982-08-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
30

Railway construction by rival powers led to conflicting economic and political claims at the close of the 19th century. At the bottom of Russian and Japanese clashes over the issue of the Seoul-Wiju railway lay international competition for control of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Britain and Japan constructed the Peking-Mukden, the Seoul-Pusan and the Seoul-Wiju railways respectively to counter a Russian threat in the Far East through the control of the Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways. This is the basic background of the Russo-Japanese War.Additionally, from the view point of railway construction, the Russo-Japanese War may be said to be a battle over different gauges, because both Russian railways were broad gauged whereas the British and Japanese railways were standard gauged.Even the technological aspect of railway building had political implications. It was no coincidence that the Anglo-Japanese railways were both standard gauged in opposition to the broad gauged Russian railways.
著者
松永 泰行
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.167, pp.167_42-56, 2012-01-30 (Released:2013-09-21)
参考文献数
35

Why has Iran been refusing to comply with the binding U.N. Security Council resolutions and to halt its uranium enrichment program? Why has the apparent cost that it incurs by defying the international community not deterred Iran from furthering its nuclear program? Why has postrevolutionary Iran been opposing the U.S.-led peace processes between Israel and the Palestinians and made it a rule to counter any U.S. influence in the region?In this article, I posit that postrevolutionary Iran's principled opposition to the U.S. is not just rhetoric or an ideologically-driven self-image, but that it may well be considered its self-constructed strategic cultural proclivity. While mindful not to fall into the trap of essentialist or cultural determinist arguments, I find the concept of strategic culture as a context useful. Following scholars such as Stuart Poore, I posit that decision makers perceive and interpret their strategic environment culturally, while what may be considered their constituted strategic culture give meaning to material factors.As a first step toward identifying postrevolutionary Iran's strategic culture, I examine the views of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the paramount leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement and the first head of the postrevolutionary Islamist state, as regards contemporary international relations and the roles of the superpowers therein. Convinced that part of the mission of the Islamic revelation was about providing salvation against oppression and fighting injustice, Khomeini went on to construct postrevolutionary Iran's dominant strategic discourse anchored in the perceived obligation to avoid and counter earthly hegemony or domination. Khomeini preached that Iran must resist the “satanic” moves of the both superpowers and find only sanctuary under the banner of Islam. While finding it logical and necessary to build and maintain good neighborly and mutually respectful relations among states, Khomeini ruled out submitting to any international hegemon.Iran in its post-Khomeini period continued to maintain its counterhegemonic stance. Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor to Khomeini as the head of the Islamic state of Iran, cultivated its counter-hegemonic strategic culture in part to secure his own authority and build his power base. The strategic alliance constructed between Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved to perpetuate post-Khomeini-era Iran's anti-American strategic culture.In conclusion, I argue that Iran may be best regarded as a counterhegemon, not an aspiring hegemon and that the kind of power that postrevolutionary Iran has found necessary to possess is not the power for hegemony and domination, but the power to resist and persevere. This proclivity helps explain why Iran has continued its nuclear program despite the cost it incurs by defying the U.N. Security Council resolutions. It also helps explain why it has maintained its principled anti-U.S. stance for the last three decades. It does not, however, seem logical to conclude that Iran's apparent pursuit of the deterrent capabilities through its nuclear or other programs is directly influenced by its counter-hegemonic strategic culture. The argument, nonetheless, supports a view that Iran's strategic posture is almost exclusively defensive and that its apparent pursuit of the means of deterrence should not necessarily be considered posing a threat to the region or the international community.
著者
西 和彦
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.1996, no.113, pp.90-102,L12, 1996-12-30 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
12

The purpose of this paper is to present a historical and geographic macroperspective on the changes in global politics and economics being brought about by communications networks. The Internet is playing a major role in this revolution. We are in the midst of an momentous age, in which two cultures, which began in ancient Egypt about 6, 600 years ago and spread around the globe, are meeting again in the Asia-Pacific region, which includes Japan. The information revolution is making this possible.We can use the Venetian civilization as the dividing line between the Middle Ages and the modern industrial world. Since then, the phases of global prosperity were punctuated by the industrial, manufacturing, and commercial revolutions made possible by the development of the steam engine, and later the internal combustion engine. The fourth phase of global prosperity began when the American-invented transistor was reborn as the microprocessor.A key aspect of the information revolution is the migration of publishing onto online services, and making those resources available in real time. This is being made possible by the microprocessor. In turn, this provides us with the ability to use communications networks to improve dialogue among nations, access to education and health care, and solutions for the planet's ecology.The roots of this information revolution lie in the US's attempt to deal with such problems as its budget deficit, trade deficit, and increasing difficulties with its systems of education and health care. But as the US makes the transition from a National Information Infrastructure to a Global Information Infrastructure, this information revolution also offers opportunities for solving East-West and North-South problems. Communications networks are now linking not only the world's major economic powers, but also post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the Asian-Pacific region, South America, and Africa. From the standpoint of this information revolution, the major power in the twenty-first century—in terms of human resources, language, economic strength, military ability, and communications technology—will not be China or India, it will be the US. The US is the only nation with sufficient resources to leverage communications networks as a means toward peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century. The US can use the information revolution to extend its dominance and prosperity for another hundred years. Rather than compete against the US, Japan should choose to support the cause of world peace by contributing to the expansion of information networks.
著者
樋口 敏広
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2003, no.134, pp.103-120,L14, 2003-11-29 (Released:2010-09-01)
参考文献数
66

The Bikini incident of 1954, ushering in a new era of atomic plenty, aggravated nuclear fear and a danger of neutralism among the Japanese public. This article examines how the Japanese and U. S. governments tackled a problem of antinuclear sentiment which emerged as a hotbed for neutralism in 1954-1957. Focusing on a unique nature of Japanese antinuclear sentiment as a form of nationalism, this article sheds light upon a role of diplomacy as a communication tool to address antinuclear sentiment and nationalism.This study argues that the Yoshida administration succeeded in settling an immediate problem of the Bikini incident but failed to address the question of nationalism deeply rooted in spreading antinuclear sentiment among the public. Worried about a weak leadership of the Japanese conservative government, the Eisenhower administration could not simply overlook this failure. Then it tried to directly confront the growing antinuclear sentiment through a coordinated public relations diplomacy it regarded as “education.” With “education, ” it intended to lead Japan to embrace continued nuclear-testing. This “education” failed, however, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi embarked upon anti-nuclear-testing diplomacy. By positively responding to the growing nationalism embedded in the antinuclear sentiment, Kishi thought, he could win popularity for pro-American conservative LDP and therefore contain a danger of neutralism. Containment of neutralism was, ironically, exactly what the Eisenhower administration had envisaged. Kishi's diplomacy, therefore, shared the goal with U. S. educational efforts, but adopted a different approach. His diplomacy finally nullified “education, ” which raised a voice inside the Eisenhower administration calling for changing U .S. policy on nuclear testing rather than changing Japan through “education.” The eventual course of antinuclear nationalism in U. S. -Japan relations once again remained to be seen.
著者
村上 友章
出版者
JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
雑誌
国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.2012, no.170, pp.170_93-170_108, 2012

The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of "Soviet territorial waters". These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within "Soviet territorial waters". This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.<br>It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.<br>The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People's Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize "residual sovereignty" of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki's "residual sovereignty" plan.