著者

八谷 まち子

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2005, no.142, pp.79-94,L11, 2005-08-29 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

42

---

The Brussels European Council in December 2004 finally concluded to start the accession negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005. Turkey submitted its accession application in 1987 preceding all of the ten new member states of the year 2004. Why has it taken so long for Turkey? What is the basic agenda for Turkey to realize its EU membership? To find answers to these questions, the concept of “focal point” might be useful.Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of “focal point” that [most bargaining situations ultimately involve some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail to reach agreement at all. … Any potential outcome is one that either party could have improved by insisting, yet each knows that the other would rather concede than do without agreement. … These reflexive expectations somehow converge on a single point at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat.] Garett and Weingast elaborate the concept by referring to the “mutual recognition” introduced in a decision of “the Cassis de Dijon” by the European Court of Justice in 1979, and embedded in the European Single Act as a legal system for the single market project. That is, when a natural focal point does not exist, an institution may propose a constructed focal point for an enhancement of expectation towards a possible agreement of a negotiation.In the light of the above understanding of a focal point, there may have been, at least, two potential focal points between Turkey and the EU: the Copenhagen Criteria and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The former was set out unilaterally by the EU as the conditionalities for the EU membership, therefore, the Copenhagen Criteria was meant to be a constructed focal point. But it was originally set out to facilitate and control the accession of the former socialist countries which were making efforts to transform their national regimes, while Turkey with its established nationalist idea and regime had tremendous difficulties in renovating the systems in accordance with the EU criteria. The constructed focal point, unlike the former socialist countries, failed to work automatically in Turkey, but started to function with an additional impetus of the promise to give a starting date of negotiation. Turkish domestic situation required an extra motivation for a constructed focal point to be useful.The latter seemed to have had more chance to become a natural focal point, but Turkey stuck to its national interest particularly with the view to sustaining its de-facto governing influence over Cyprus. Greece, securing the interest of Cyprus, also insisted on the national interest. Under such circumstances, there was no place for the “reciprocal expectations” to develop in order to identify a focal point. Thus, a potentially existed natural focal point was unable to function.It should be expected for the EU to set a focal point in view with the Turkish membership including a solution to the divided Cyprus. What may be critical for identifying a focal point is not the problems such as a mass movement of labour, or huge financial aids to suppress the EU budget, often sited by Turkish antagonists. But whether the EU would be able to convince the European citizens of the significance of the Turkish membership, and to the same importance, whether Turkey would be able to internalize the Copenhagen Criteria that would inevitably transform the principles that Turkey has been standing on since its foundation in 1923..