著者

前田 義郎

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.32, pp.1-10, 2014 (Released:2018-02-01)

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In this paper, I discuss the significance of informed consent( IC) at the time of its origin in the United States. There are two settings wherein IC is applied ― human research and clinical medicine. In clinical medicine, two legal principles ― battery and negligence ― are relevant in lawsuits. I show that the core of IC comprises the principle of “negligence,” whose significance is clarified in this paper in detail. This principle means “an enlargement of the scope of doctors’ responsibility”, which urges us to redefine the relationship between doctors and patients. Finally, on these grounds, I consider the ethical implications of “self-determination of patients.” The essence of IC is that it changes the order of priority, from the previous relation, “the benefit of the patient > the will of the patient,” to the current relation “the will of the patient > the benefit of the patient”. In other words, the essence of IC is to respect the will of patients and provide medical benefits by assisting them.

著者

前田 義郎

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, pp.87-96, 2005-10-26 (Released:2018-02-01)

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As a result of recent developments in reproductive and regenerative medicine, the moral status of the zygote and the embryo is becoming increasingly important. This paper considers them from the perspective of "potential persons" and investigates issues arising from this perspective. In particular I critically examine Tooley's personhood theory. First, I examine the "interest principle" as a core of Tooley's theory. (1) On the normative character of "interest", Tooley insists interest is necessary for an entity to have a right to life, but I insist interest is a necessary and sufficient condition for invoking others' moral consideration toward the interest-holder. (2) On the interest of potential persons, I prove the possibility of acknowledging it. (3) On the "particular interests principle", I argue conscious interest isn't the only possible interest for persons. Thus I show the "interest principle" isn't sufficient for determining personhood. I then propose another principle for determining personhood: an "ends in itself" argument based on "moral ability". Those who destroy an entity regard it as merely a means, and then being an end in itself is decisive for a person. Next, I discuss being "end in itself" based on moral ability and conclude we can regard potential persons as potential holders of that ability. Finally, I consider the concept of "potentiality". Tooley argues that the destruction of potential persons is morally equivalent to contraception. I clarify the assumptions underlying this argument by examining his "three potentialities" argument and "moral symmetry principle". He considers potentiality in terms of causality (the cause-effect relationship). When considering living entities, however, I propose we consider potentiality in terms of teleology (the parts-whole relationship, and the process aiming at goals). This paper aims to establish a framework for protecting potential persons as potential moral agents. It concludes that this is fully possible.

著者

前田 義郎

出版者

日本医学哲学・倫理学会

雑誌

医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.20, pp.139-153, 2002-11-10 (Released:2018-02-01)

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The 'personhood' argument is one of the basic principles of bioethics. But various forms are possible within this principle. The high evaluation of the patient's will is one form of personalism. The superiority of a person's value over a life's value is another form. But the famous 'personhood' argument today maintains a personhood is 'a necessary condition for the right to life'. This argument is linked with 'the denial of the right to life for potential persons' and 'the criticism against the speciesism'. This argument indeed provides some guidelines for abortion and the vegetative state, but it will admit almost any cases of the recent reproductive technology, especially ES cells. So, I want to define the person again from the viewpoint of 'moral personalism'. In this paper, I want to introduce my interpretation of Kant's 'categorical imperative', and then try to define a person on the basis of it. 'A categorical imperative' can be interpreted as 'a practical categorical syllogism'. We can discover two conditions for valid categorical syllogisms. And from these conditions moral practical laws can be deduced. Then, I define 'a person' as 'one who can perform such practical reasoning and act according to it'. A person means a moral being. This definition makes a new understanding on 'autonomy' possible, too. This definition of person is made from the viewpoint of the 'faculty', not the 'actual will'. Therefore we can consider the difference between 'a human being' and 'a chimpanzee', and also can view 'a potential person' as a person potentially possessing this faculty. This argument is not based upon a necessary condition for right to life, but upon the moral value we must esteem. I believe that from this point of view we can give some guidelines to the recent reproductive technology, ES cells.

著者

前田 義郎

出版者

産業医科大学学会

雑誌

産業医科大学雑誌 (ISSN:0387821X)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.23, no.4, pp.369-380, 2001-12-01

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西欧近代とはどのような時代だったか.この問題は近代科学の意味と本質的に関係している.近代科学の成立時には科学革命が起こったが, この革命においていかなる物の見方の変革が行われたのか.そしてこの問いに対する答えは同時に近代哲学の基本性格を決定するものでもあった.アリストテレスの天動説, 運動学を検討すると, 彼の自然学の欠点は, 目に見える感覚像をそのまま実在の反映であると速断したことであることが分かる.この点から, 「対応説」と呼ばれる伝統的な真理観は不十分なものであることを示す.そこで, 私は本稿で「現象の中で実在をどのように観るか」という方法論的, 哲学的問いが重要であることを示す.この問いはプラトンが取り組んだ問いであり, カントを導いた問いでもある.この問いは, 実在の理論としての新たな形而上学的基礎の模索であると言うことのできる.