著者
大鹿 勝之
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.20, pp.154-165, 2002-11-10 (Released:2018-02-01)

If the meaning of self-determination is 'voluntary determination about one's own fate and course of action while remaining free from controlling interferences from others', the following patient decisions are comprehended as self-determination: (1) choosing unwillingly one treatment considering various circumstances; (2) choosing one treatment from choices represented by a doctor; (3) choosing one treatment from more choices than the above, getting information on various treatments from other sources than the doctor's information; (4) leaving one's own decision about treatment to the doctor. An explanation of these four situations follows:(l) an unwilling decision is self-determining, because this decision is derived from free will. With regard to (2) and (3), (3) is maybe more self-determining than (2), fer a patient gets the information through his/her own efforts. However, both are self-determining because both are voluntary decisions. (4) Though the patient gives up his/her own determination to choose the treatment, he/she decides voluntarily to give up his/her choice to the doctor. Therefore, patient decisions are self-determining in these four situations. For this reason, if self-determination is understood to be of great advantage to a patient, it needs to consider its relationship with the various situations, for example, how to inform the patient about his/her condition and various treatments, and the circumstances.
著者
大鹿 勝之
出版者
日本医学哲学・倫理学会
雑誌
医学哲学 医学倫理 (ISSN:02896427)
巻号頁・発行日
vol.18, pp.24-34, 2000-12-15 (Released:2018-02-01)

In the case of organ transplantation of a cadaver, the donor's family members may say "He/She is still alive in recipient's body" in order to make redeeming sense out of their tragic experience. Is this statement derived from mere personal emotion? Or is it acknowledged as truth? In fact, as long as an organ is regarded as a mere spare part, the donor is dead. But, if an organ is regarded as a person, can it rightly be said that the donor is alive? Locke says, "upon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body,'tis evident the little finger would be the person, the same person." Though this opinion may be unacceptable, substituting organ for the little finger in this sentence, consciousness goes along with the organ, therefore it would be the person. From the point of view of that consciousness is caused by the brain, it is nonsense. But from the standpoint of the donor's family, it is not absurd to conceive the donor's character in an organ which is implanted into a recipient. Furthermore, if the recipient should be conscious of the donor's memory, character, and so on, it seems that the organ has psychic and social qualities. So is it possible to admit that an organ is a person? If so, this has a grave consequence. If an organ is regarded as a person, it follows that the recipient recognizes the other person in his/her body, and then, it is impossible to distinguish the recepient from the donor by body alone. In order that the recipient may be identical as the same person before transplantation without becoming two or more persons, an organ must not be a person.
著者
大鹿 勝之
出版者
東洋大学大学院
雑誌
東洋大学大学院紀要 = Bulletin of the Graduate School, Toyo University (ISSN:02890445)
巻号頁・発行日
no.55, pp.55-67, 2019-03

ヒュームの議論において、自然とは、人間本性によってとらえられる自然であり、また、その人間本性が自然と理解されている箇所がある。例えば、『人間本性論』A Treatise of Human Nature第1巻第3部第10節で、「自然は人間の精神に、一切の行動の主要な発生と動機付けの原理として、善ないし害悪の知覚、換言すれば快苦の知覚を植え付けた」と述べられているが、このことは、人間の精神には自然に快苦の知覚が植え付けられているという人間本性のあり方を示している。では、人間以外の自然の存在は人間本性としての自然において、どのように把握されるのだろうか。ロは、ヒューム的な分析が、内在的価値を人間以外の自然の存在者に帰する非-人間中心的な環境倫理学の理論を支持しうるかどうかを吟味する。ロは、価値についてのヒューム的分析を試み、そして、人々が自然の中に価値を創造しうるのは、人々が、対応する心理学的性向を上首尾に涵養し、内在化する場合、その場合にのみ限る、という。しかし、ヒュームの議論においては、自然は人間本性によって把握された自然であり、その点で、人間以外の自然の存在者は、人間という存在の本性としての自然に依存している。