著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

一般財団法人 アジア政経学会

雑誌

アジア研究 (ISSN:00449237)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.66, no.4, pp.39-59, 2020-10-31 (Released:2020-11-19)

参考文献数

82

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How should today’s Japan-ROK relations be interpreted which is said the worst in their history? This paper discusses the logic of Moon Jae-in administration from the perspectives of its “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy.”Under the constraints of the nation’s division and the Cold War, ROK successfully maintained the “justification” of politics as a result of its democratization that took place immediately after the economic development. However, this “justification” was maintained with the lack of political “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” the dilemma of which was inevitably brought to the surface after the end of the Cold War and the democratization.It was brought to the surface with the movement of going back their history in a way of trying to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” of their politics by liquidating remnants of “pro-Japanese,” the collaborators with the Japanese colonial government. It was Moon Jae-in administration that played the central role of such movement, the administration that was born as a result of the “Candle Revolution,” which led president Park Geun-hye to her impeachment and dismiss.President Moon Jae-in took it as his mission to establish the “orthodoxy/legitimacy” and to bring ROK back to the state of what the nation needs to be like, by eradicating deeply-rooted evils and wiping out “the pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests.”After the liberation, those “pro-Japanese” collaborators were supposed to be condemned, but they were instead protected under the Cold War and turned into a power of pro-Japanese conservatives with vested interests, as the mainstream of the politics and society, by colluding with the authoritarian governments for the sake of anti-communism and economic development. The true liberation and decolonization process, according to the logic, become complete only when successfully having eradicated those pro-Japanese and replaced the mainstream in order to secure the “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which has been long absent and undiscussed.Such movement grew into the denial of “ROK lead by conservatives,” taking place with the eradication of the deeply-rooted evils. It was not necessarily targeted at Japan but inevitably involved the issues of comfort women and forced labor as diplomatic problems, which was crucial for Moon Jae-in administration because it stands on the denial of Park Geun-hye. For Moon Jae-in, Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965 lacked both “justification” and “orthodoxy/legitimacy,” which was nothing but the deeply-rooted evil.If the eradication of pro-Japanese conservatives is expanded to the denial of ROK by conservatives, and furthermore, if Japan-ROK normalization of diplomatic relations is treated as deeply-rooted evils, it could lead to a political situation that will deny the Japan-ROK relations over the past half century and will call for a drastic reconstruction of the relations from the very beginning.

著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

国際安全保障学会

雑誌

国際安全保障 (ISSN:13467573)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.33, no.3, pp.41-65, 2005-12-31 (Released:2022-04-24)

著者

奥薗 秀樹

出版者

JAPAN ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2001, no.126, pp.65-80,L11, 2001-02-23 (Released:2010-09-01)

参考文献数

58

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Since the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korean government had heavily depended on the U. S. government for their military and economic security as a frontline state during the Cold War. Park Chung Hee and his Revolutionary Government, which emerged as a bearer of Korean nationalism through the 1961 military coup d'état, faced a difficult question: how to strike a balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and excessive dependence on the U. S. government as a junior partner within the Cold War regime. The purpose of this paper is to examine how Park and his government struggled for Korean self-reliance while avoiding total dependence on the U. S.. To this end this paper focuses on the following three points.First, this paper examines Korean nationalism as a causal element of the 1961 Coup and an ideological basis of the Revolutionary Government there-after. Analysis of remarks which Park and the graduates of the Korean Military Academy, the main actors of the Revolutionary Government, made before and immediately after the coup, shows that their independence-orientedness and distrust of the big powers became the keynote when they formulated its foreign policy, at least for some time.Second, this paper examines how the Park Administration's perception of the U. S. at the beginning and how the perception transformed as time went on. The Revolutionary Government, in spite of their distrust of the U. S. government, came to conclude that the presence of the U. S. Forces in Korea and their economic assistance were important for preserving Korean independence amid the Cold War conflict. Because of the dilemma they faced, Park and his government had to re-define the balance between its self-reliance as an independent nation and dependence on the U. S. in terms of the reality surrounded them.Finally, this paper examines actual policy steps which the Park Administration took as attempts to achieve Korean self-reliance. Among them, the Revolutionary Government regarded, as the most important steps, its developments in social-economic dimension and improvements of people's everyday life in addition to the build-up of its military power and completing of anti-communism. However, Park's attempts to achieve these things by itself reached a dead end after a while and they realized there was no way other than “temporary dependence” on the U. S. to preserve Korean independence.In the end, Park's struggle for self-reliance resulted in “temporary dependence” on the U. S. However, we have to notice that Park's quest for self-reliance did not end in spite of the acceptance of “temporary dependence.” His endeavour at acquiring Korean self-reliance carried on at all occasions and with his full energy. In this sense, the “temporary dependence” was literally temporal and did not mean “overall dependence” or “subordination” to the U. S. government.