- 著者
-
山口 沙絵子
- 出版者
- 美学会
- 雑誌
- 美学 (ISSN:05200962)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.69, no.1, pp.25, 2018 (Released:2019-06-01)
Paradox is one of the central concepts in the early philosophy of Friedrich Schlegel
(1772-1829) and underlies his unique theoretical endeavors. This study examines its
meaning, function and significance, which have, despite its apparent importance,
rarely been independently discussed. While paradox has often been identified with
logical self-contradiction, a historical contextualization shows that in Schlegel’s
time, it was primarily understood in its most etymologically fundamental meaning,
namely as “contrary to expectation”. When Schlegel encouraged the quality of being
paradoxical as desirable in philosophy, he was aiming for a confrontation with the
reader’s preconceived assumptions (be it socially shared or more personal). It is, as
Kant argued, often a hazardous enterprise to entertain a paradoxical opinion. However,
according to Jacobi’s interpretation of Lessing’s paradoxes, the contradiction itself
can operate educationally; it prompts readers to re-examine their own beliefs and the
interrelations between them. Following Jacobi in this respect, Schlegel recognizes the
importance of paradoxes in their capacity to stimulate the ability of people to think
for themselves. Self-contradictions, which arise only when the act of contradiction is
applied self-reflexively, form the basis of Schlegel’s dialectic philosophy.