著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

東京大学出版会

雑誌

UP (ISSN:09133291)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.48, no.9, pp.7-11, 2019-09

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

ゆまに書房

雑誌

東アジア近代史

巻号頁・発行日

no.24, pp.52-71, 2020-06

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2018, no.193, pp.193_76-193_91, 2018-09-10 (Released:2018-12-19)

参考文献数

64

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This article addresses debates about “Reform” of the League of Nations from the viewpoint of Britain and China. “Reform” of the League was one of the contentious issues among the statesman, diplomats and intellectuals in the 1930s. They focused on the pros and cons of collective security and Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations because the “failure” of the League to stop Japanese invasion of Manchuria and Italian invasion of Abyssinia threatened the collapse of the League. There were two major opinions in the debate, “the Coercive League” and “the Consultative League”. “The Coercive League” was the course to reinforce collective security to prevent further aggression. Conversely, “the Consultative League” argument was to weaken collective security and induce Germany, Italy, and Japan to cooperate with the League. Deliberations took place in both the Council, which was led by Great Powers, and the Assembly, in which Small Powers could have greater influence. Therefore, this article deals with Britain as an example of a Great Power and China as one of a Small power.The League was centered on the rapprochement rather than the enforcement in the late 1920s. Article 11 of the Covenant was more important than Article 16 in mediating disputes and reconciling belligerents. Britain administered the League Council through “the Concert of Europe,” which consisted of British, French and German Foreign Minister. The League Council was where the Powers consulted with each other. In contrast, China discovered the value of the Assembly as an arena of world opinion.Japanese invasion of Manchuria from 1931 to 1933 destroyed the credibility of collective security and cooperation between the Powers. Furthermore, the Small Powers were irritated by the indecisiveness of Great Powers, especially Britain. Some officials of British Foreign Office began to consider “reform” of the League for the purpose of weakening collective security and reestablishing the superiority of Great Powers over Small Powers after the Manchurian Incident.The Abyssinian Crisis from 1935 to 1936 accelerated this trend. The League of Nations voted for economic sanctions against Italy, but members including Britain didn’t carry out them fully. However, some Latin American members protested against the sanctions because they disrupted trade with Italy. The League Assembly set up a committee to study “the Application of the principle of the covenant of the League of Nations.” Even though Britain was pro-Consultative, she hesitated to revise the covenant. China was pro-Coercive and concerned about regionalizing collective security. The clash between two opinions left “reform” of the League deadlocked in the end.

著者

帶谷 俊輔

出版者

一般財団法人 日本国際政治学会

雑誌

国際政治 (ISSN:04542215)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.2015, no.180, pp.180_68-180_82, 2015

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This article examines how Japan, Britain and China considered the intervention of the League of Nations into disputes between the Powers and China from 1920 to 1931, focusing on the problem of Chinese governmental representation in the League.In 1920, in order to avoid becoming involved in a boycott against Japan, Britain decided to deal with the Shantung Question in the League if this was submitted by China. Britain also considered the intervention of the League as an option after the Washington Conference, because it did not expected much from cooperation with the other Powers.Japan initially left room for dealing with the China Question, excluding the Shantung Question, in the League if the Powers agreed. However, after the Corfu Incident in 1923, in which Japan had been involved as the president of the Council, Japan came to fear being criticized by small Powers in the Assembly of the League in case of a dispute with China. On the other hand, China came to recognize the importance of the Assembly in appealing to world opinion.Thus, there were major differences in the position of these three states. However, the political situation in China altered British attitudes toward this problem. In 1926, the Kuomintang government started the Northern Expedition to overthrow the Beiyang government, the internationally recognized central government of China at that time. While the Kuomintang government expanded its territories and clashed with the Powers, the Beiyang government represented China in the League until its collapse in 1928. Because of this, the League was temporarily paralyzed in dealing with the China Question. Britain, therefore, regarded appeals to the League as useless, so it bypassed the League in sending troops to Shanghai in 1927. When the Kuomintang government submitted the Jinan Incident to the League in 1928, Japan tried to reject the case for the same reasons as those raised by Britain. Japan, securing consent from Britain and the Secretary-General of the League, succeeded in preventing the League from intervening in the dispute.After overthrowing the Beiyang government, the Kuomintang government assumed the right to represent China in the League. Therefore, Britain returned to its former attitude of accepting the discussion of the China Question in the League. In 1931, Japan tried to prevent the League from intervening in the Manchurian Incident. However, the Council accepted the case of China and decided to discuss the matter. This is mainly because the problem of Chinese representation, which had until then blocked the intervention of the League in China, had already been dissolved.