文献一覧: 早瀬篤 (著者)

The main purpose of this article is to show that, in rejecting Theaetetus' first answer to the question 'What is knowledge ?'(Tht. 146c-147c), Socrates is appealing to what I call the principle of the priority of the definition of the whole over the definitions of parts, namely: (PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know the definition of any part (or any kind) of F, rather than, as many scholars have supposed, to the principle (PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any x, that x is an F (where 'x' stands for anything that may possibly turn out to be F). Some scholars have noticed that (PDWP) is at issue in the relevant context in the Theaetetus, but they regard (PDWP) as an equivalent or a version of (PD), to which they think Socrates is committed. By contrast, I argue that these two principles are independent of each other, and that (PD) is not relevant here (in fact, I have argued elsewhere that Socrates is not committed to (PD) at all, as it stands). A significant difference between the two principles is that (PD) prevents us, but (PDWP) does not prevent us, from using examples of F as reliable data for the definition of F. Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 is the source of the problem. Many scholars have supposed that Socrates employs (PD) as a basis for rejecting the examples of knowledge enumerated by Theaetetus as reliable data for the definition of knowledge. I argue, however, that on closer examination the text shows Socrates actually encouraging Theaetetus to make use of the examples before proposing the definition (cf. Tht. 147d-148d), which is a clear sign that he was not appealing to (PD). I then propose an interpretation of Socrates' argument at 147a7-c2 along different lines. I suggest that the cases Socrates is talking about there are not cases in which one enumerates many examples, but cases in which one gives a single example. The point of his argument is, then, that giving a single example of F is useless for understanding F as a whole. I suggest that Socrates argues this because of his commitment to (PDWP). I finally and briefly discuss another context in which Socrates mentions (PDWP), i. e. Meno 79c-79e. On the basis of the passages discussed in the article as a whole, I suggest that Socrates treats (PDWP) as one of his key methodological principles.

2020-09-29 18:43:17
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