著者

木下 頌子

出版者

日本科学哲学会

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019

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<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the "qua problem," which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.</p>

著者

木下 頌子

出版者

The Philosophy of Science Society, Japan

雑誌

科学哲学 (ISSN:02893428)

巻号頁・発行日

vol.52, no.1, pp.127-141, 2019-12-30 (Released:2020-06-20)

参考文献数

24

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In series of her works, Amie Thomasson has claimed that the revisionary ontology about works of arts is methodologically untenable. Interestingly, her conclusion is drawn from the reflection on the theory of reference of art kind terms. She argues that the “qua problem,” which is known as a problem for the causal theory of reference, undermine the possibility of revisionary ontology. The aim of this paper is to critically examine her argument. I argue that even if Thomassonʼs view about the reference of our art kind terms is correct, revisionary metaphysics is still possible.