3 0 0 0 OA クールノーゲームの均衡とシュタッケルベルグゲームの均衡における生産規模について
- 著者
- 村田 省三
- 出版者
- 長崎大学
- 雑誌
- 經營と經濟 : 長崎工業經營専門學校大東亞經濟研究所年報 (ISSN:02869101)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.85, no.1, pp.115-133, 2005-09-26
In this paper we consider the relation between total output level in the Nash equilibrium of the quantity setting Cournot duopoly game and it of Stackelberg game with liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions especially under conditions of negative marginal costs. In ordinal case, positive marginal costs are assumed, and the total output level of Cournot equilibia does not exceed it of Stackelberg equilibria because the best reply curve or line of the first player is rapidly declining compared to it of the second player, thus first mover has advantage to second mover. In the case of negative marginal costs, total output level in the equilibrium of Cournot game will be able to overtake the ones of Stackelberg game because of the slowly declining best reply curve of first mover compared to second mover. Hamilton=Slutsky(1990) classified some downward sloping bestreply lines with convex isoprofit curves, but they treated this is not the case, and the numerical consideration of this case was left unconsidered.
1 0 0 0 OA クールノーゲームの均衡とシュタッケルベルグゲームの均衡における生産量比率
- 著者
- 村田 省三
- 出版者
- 長崎大学
- 雑誌
- 經營と經濟 : 長崎工業經營専門學校大東亞經濟研究所年報 (ISSN:02869101)
- 巻号頁・発行日
- vol.84, no.3, pp.75-97, 2004-12-27
In this paper we consider the conditions under which the quantity level produced by the second player exceed to the level produced by the first player in Stackelberg quantity setting duopoly game in the case that both firms have liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions. If the both coefficients in the cost functions are sufficiently small and grater than-1, there is a second mover advantage in terms profit having concave isoprofit curve and the downward sloping best reply functions. In the case that the duopoly games considered here have sufficiently decreasing marginal returns that means there is a scale economy, negative marginal cost happens to be true, and these conditions carrying out the second mover firms to be advantagous in terms of profit level and the level of output. The same result is obtained in the Cournot quantity setting game in which both firms have liner demand functions and quadratic cost functions.